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THE POLITICIZATION OF ETHNICITY AS A PRELUDE
TO ETHNOPOLITICAL CONFLICT: CROATIA
AND SERBIA IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Agneza Bozic-Roberson, Ph.D.
W estern Michigan University, 2001
This interdisciplinary research develops a framework o r a model for the study
o f the politicization o f ethnicity, a process that transforms peaceful ethnic conflict
into violent inter-ethnic conflict. The hypothesis investigated in this study is that the
ethnopolitical conflict that led to the break up o f former Yugoslavia was the result o f
deliberate politicization o f ethnicity. The model consists o f three variables— ethnic
entrepreneurs as actors, and mass media and political rhetoric as their tools for
politicization o f ethnicity. Ethnic entrepreneurs, with a conscious interest in
mobilizing ethnicity, are given this opportunity in transitional societies in which
politicized ethnicity has become the crucial principle o f political legitimation.
Specifically, this study seeks to explain how political leaders may turn into ethnic
entrepreneurs and then draw upon existing non-violent ethnic tensions and conflict
(a phenomenon existing in every multiethnic society) to generate ethnopolitical
conflict. The propositions o f the model will be tested through a case study o f
Yugoslavia, specifically, a comparative study of the Yugoslav subunits Croatia and
Serbia.
This research argues that it is necessary to conduct independent analyses o f
ethnic and political aspects o f violent inter-ethnic conflicts. Only in recognizing the
contexts in which ethnicity can be politicized and the mechanisms by which ethnicity
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is politicized, can we recognize the true nature o f the violent inter-ethnic conflict and
then develop strategies for the prevention o f such conflicts.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
“Why did multi-national Yugoslavia1 fall apart in such violence and
bloodshed?” is the question that will guide this dissertation research. While the focus
of this study is on a specific conflict situation, it forms a part o f a much broader
inquiry: Why is it that some multiethnic and multinational states stay in one piece or
divorce peacefully and others fall apart violently? The question o f political stability
has been on the agenda o f political science since Aristotle’s time. However, the social
and political changes since the end of the Cold War, and the demise o f communism,
have focused the quest for stability in multiethnic societies, since they have suffered
the most from these changes.
With the recognition that nationalist conflicts are often particularly violent
and can become very dangerous for international security, there has also been a
proliferation o f literature dealing with new ways to resolve these conflicts through the

This study is concerned with former Yugoslavia which existed from
1918-1991. It bears no reference to the rump Yugoslavia which, after Yugoslavia’s
disintegrations, consists o f Servia and Montenegro.
Gurr and others would argue that ethnopolitical conflict has been prominent
throughout second part of the twentieth century. However, Gurr’s definition of
“ethnopolitical conflict” does not allow us to see how politicization o f ethnic or
communal groups occur. To him groups are politicized if they are “politically
salient,” i.e., if they experience economic and political discrimination, and/or they
have taken political action in support o f collective interests. See Ted Robert Gurr,
M inorities at Risk: A G lobal View o f Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1993).
1
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developments o f new theories o f conflict resolution. Yet, existing analyses o f violent
ethnic conflict, by giving excessive attention to the ethnic at the expense o f the
political dimension o f such conflicts, do not contribute to the effective resolution o f
the Yugoslav, or other contemporary conflicts. Moving beyond the borders o f the
former Yugoslavia to the former Soviet Union, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, India, and
Northern Ireland, to name just a few contemporary examples of such conflicts, one
often is led to believe that in all these “ethnic” conflicts, there is an aspect o f
inevitability, because ethnicity is presented as sufficient and necessary as the cause o f
war and unimaginable atrocities. Ethnicity is promoted as the main malefactor of
conflicts: as the source o f irrationality, deep divisions and violence that lead to
forcible transfers o f people and, in general, to chronic instability within multi-ethnic
societies.
This research argues that some politicians use ethnicity as a calculated,
maximizing strategy if ethnic mobilization o f their supporters offers a political
opportunity or access to power. Specifically, this study seeks to explain how political
leaders and entrepreneurs draw upon existing non-violent ethnic tensions and
conflicts (a phenomenon existing in every multiethnic society) to generate
ethnopolitical conflict. The mechanics o f politicization and institutionalization o f
ethnicity may involve use o f different kinds of tools available to political
entrepreneurs. This study will explore to what extent the use of political rhetoric and
manipulation o f mass media may contribute to transformation o f peaceful ethnic
conflict into violent inter-ethnic conflict.
While a number o f studies have contributed to our better understanding o f
many of the inter-ethnic conflicts, they often confused causality with inevitability and
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thus leave us with inadequate tools to prevent, manage and resolve these conflicts. In
the case o f Yugoslavia, given the advantage o f hindsight, many analysts were
tempted to cast Yugoslav history in terms o f an inevitable disastrous outcome.3 Such
interpretations treated the issue o f violent ethnic nationalism as something that
gradually and even naturally developed, a phenomenon o f substance rather than a
practical and institutional category that is produced by political events and actions.4
Yugoslavia, once celebrated as an example o f a viable multiethnic state,
became the subject o f a growing body o f literature dealing with the dangers of ethnic
and nationalist conflict for international security in the midst o f the demise of
communism.5 The challenge still remains to determine how non-violent ethnic
conflict became transformed into violent ethnopolitical conflict. This study is intended
to contribute significantly to our understanding of how ethnic tensions are converted
into much more structured forms o f ethnopolitical conflict. I f we better understand
the elements and dynamics o f such social change, we will be in a better position to try
to develop measures to reduce or counteract such manipulative efforts in the future.

A good example o f this type o f work is Robert Kaplan, Balkan Ghost: A
Journey Through H istory. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), which reportedly
formed a major source o f information for President Clinton during the early 1990s.
4The argument about conceptual misuse of nationalism is best elaborated in
Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Refram ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996).
5See e.g., Ted Robert Gurr, M inorities; Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in
Conflict (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1985); Donald Horowitz,
“Democracy in Divided Societies,” Journal o f Democracy, 4, 4 (1983): 18-38;
Donald Horowitz, “Ethnic and Nationalist Conflict,” in World Security, 2d ed., eds.
Michael Klare and Daniel Thomas (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994); Rita Jalali
and Seymour Lipset, “Racial and Ethnic Conflicts: A Global Perspective,” Political
Science Quarterly, 107, 4 (1992): 585-606.
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The result of excessive attention to ethnicity as the major source o f conflict is
illustrated in the fact that the term ethnic has become the popular descriptive term for
both violent and peaceful conflicts among ethnic groups residing within multiethnic
states. Labeling violent inter-ethnic conflicts as ethnic is narrowly uni-dimensional
and neglects not only the positive aspects o f ethnicity, but also the inherent latency of
its political nature. It is the contention o f this research that labeling such conflicts as
ethnic is misleading and inadequate to describe the true nature o f conflicts which are
frequently set in action by what Rothschild would term the “politicization o f
ethnicity.”6 This study proposes that ethnicity becomes imbued with violent force
through a process of deliberate politicization. In multiethnic societies burdened with
economic and political problems, ethnicity provides a convenient instrument that is
easily manipulated.
This study proposes the term ethnopolitical as a more appropriate term for a
description o f violent conflicts among ethnic groups since these conflicts involve a
politics deliberately using ethnicity in the struggle for power and control over the
territory or resources o f certain states. This research thus utilizes ethnopolitical as a
descriptive term for violent inter-ethnic conflicts because it implies interaction
between the ethnic and the political aspects o f inter-ethnic conflicts. Since
ethnopolitical conflict is seen as the result o f politicization o f ethnicity, only through
independent analyses o f political and ethnic aspects of the conflicts is it possible to
determine in what circumstances and how ethnic identity becomes politicized. Once
ethnic identity and politicization are separately analyzed, they can be brought

6Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1981).
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together to determine the precise nature o f a developing ethnopolitical conflict. Only
by acquisition o f this understanding can conflict management and prevention stand
any chance o f success.
At a time when numerous inter-ethnic conflicts are taking place, and new
ones are threatening to emerge, there is a deficiency o f theories that deal with
prevention o f ethnopolitical conflicts. The same excessive attention to ethnicity as the
sole cause o f ethnic conflict only adds to the perception o f the ethnic phenomenon as
non-rational and thus not conducive either to conflict management or to prevention
o f ethnopolitical violence. This study intends to fill the gap in the literature on the
Yugoslav case and, on violent conflict in general, by providing insight into the
mechanics o f politicization o f ethnicity—precisely, in what circumstances will
political entrepreneurs use the tools o f mass media and political rhetoric to achieve
their political objectives. Once the conditions and mechanics o f politicization o f
ethnicity are known, w e should be able to develop strategies toward prevention o f the
occurrence o f ethnopolitical conflicts.
Conflict prevention strategies should emerge from the focus on the two major
goals of this research. The first is to develop an analytical framework for the study of
ethnopolitical conflict. In this framework ethnopolitical conflict is seen as a result o f
politicians who deliberately use ethnicity in the struggle for power and resources o f a
state. We describe these politicians as ethnic entrepreneurs, since they use ethnicity to
pursue and implement a political agenda structured around ethnicity. This framework
identifies the factors that lead to politicization o f ethnicity and singles out three
elements—ethnic entrepreneurs as actors who use the tools of mass media and
political rhetoric to capitalize on the changing socio-political environment and on the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

6

vulnerabilities o f ethnic identities. The second goal is to assess the relationship
between and the relative influence o f these three factors in the violent breakup o f
Yugoslavia.
Organization o f the Dissertation
Yin proposes that the case study consists o f two parts: a theoretical
framework and its application on the specific case. Thus, this dissertation is
organized into two major parts. The first, the theoretical part, consists of Chapter I as
an introduction which explains the purpose and organization o f this research. Chapter
II elaborates on the design and method of this research, while Chapter fll lays out the
model for the study o f politicization of ethnicity. In this chapter, I reflect on the
literature on ethnic and political conflict and international security and assess their
usefulness and limitations in the analysis and prevention o f the Yugoslav and other
ethnopolitical conflicts. In Chapter HI, I offer a definition o f terms through the
discussion o f the principal issues in literature on ethnicity, nationalism, ethnic
entrepreneurship, mass media and political rhetoric. The literature on ethnicity and
nation is intended as a section on conceptual clarification—to provide understanding
o f these two phenomena, often mistakenly identified with each other. In that section I
also explain why ethnic identity is so salient in the contemporary inter-ethnic conflict.
In this research ethnic identity is considered a contextual variable. The section on
nationalism looks at existing theories and offers a new view o f the phenomenon— that
which involves politicization o f ethnicity.

7Robert Yin, Case Study Research: Design a n d M ethods, 2d ed. (Thousand
Oaks, Cal.: Sage, 1994).
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The literature from the field o f political communication, especially mass media
and political rhetoric, is intended to help us understand how communication, i.e., the
use o f political language through mass media and rhetoric, can be used strategically
to influence public knowledge, beliefs and action on political matters. We are
interested in finding the meaning o f political messages and how this meaning leads to
political consequences, in this case, violent inter-ethnic conflict. In its political
dimension, communication can have serious consequences: it can be used both to
induce conflict and cooperation, and it can cause both empowerment and
marginalization. 8 To what end communication tools, rhetoric and mass media, would
be used is largely a function o f ethnic entrepreneurs.
In order to fully understand the nature o f ethnopolitics, one needs to examine
the structure of power and political motivations of political actors. In this framework
the type of political actors that I analyze are termed ethnic entrepreneurs. Ethnic
entrepreneurs are defined as those individuals and leaders who in the times of change
recognize the window o f opportunity for their own self-promotion. We are interested
in exploring who were the individuals inside the political structures and those outside
o f those structures who grabbed the opportunity to impose their “solution” to
problems o f ethnic conflict.
The second, empirical, part o f this research is further divided into two
sections. The first section, Chapters IV and V, provides the context for the
emergence o f ethnic entrepreneurs. Chapter IV looks at development o f Croatian and

^ a n Nimmo, and David Swanson, “The Field o f Political Communication:
Beyond the Voter Persuasion Paradigm,” in New Directions in P olitical
Communication, eds. Dan Nimmo and David Swanson (Newbury Park, Cal.: Sage,
1990), pp. 7-50.
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Serbian ethnic identity. Chapter V describes the development o f Serbs and Croats as
constituent peoples o f the Yugoslav state. This ethnic and institutional history o f two
ethnic groups should offer a reference point for understanding o f the political
language used by entrepreneurs, in the media and in the rhetoric o f the period under
investigation. The second section o f the empirical research, Chapters VI and VH,
uses the model o f politicization o f ethnicity to analyze politicization o f ethnicity in
Serbia and Croatia respectfully. Chapter VI focuses on the role o f Slobodan
Milosevic and how he used mass media and rhetoric as his tools to politicize the
Serbs. Chapter VII focuses on Franjo Tudjman, as an ethnic entrepreneur who
politicized the Croats, and his uses o f rhetoric and mass media. Each o f these
chapters begins with an immediate context in order to uncover the major issues o f
ethnic identity, as well as social, economic and political circumstances that might
have provided a window o f opportunity for the emergence o f ethnic entrepreneurs.
Chapter VHI summarizes the findings and makes an appeal for more scholarly
attention to the issue o f politicized ethnicity. I suggest that only in recognizing the
contexts in which ethnicity can be politicized and mechanisms which politicize
ethnicity, can we recognize the true nature of the violent inter-ethnic conflict and
develop strategies for the prevention o f such conflicts.
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CHAPTER n
THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Method and Design
The hypothesis to be investigated in this study is: The conflict that led to the
breakup o f the former Yugoslavia is the result o f a deliberate politicization o f
ethnicity, thus, the concept of ethnopolitical conflict. In many ways this research
remains faithful to Rothschild’s views on ethnopolitics: ethnic assertiveness and
violence are not the result o f some primordial aspect o f ethnicity, but rather is the
product o f ethnic entrepreneurship. These ethnic entrepreneurs, with a conscious
interest in mobilizing ethnicity, are given this opportunity in transitional societies in
which politicized ethnicity has become the crucial principle o f political legitimation
and delegitimation o f systems, states and regimes. Ethnic entrepreneurs may choose
which ethnic markers to sacralize and politicize and thus mobilize an ethnic group
either to high militancy against others or to lead it to peaceful coexistence within a
multiethnic society. In order to assess how the energies o f ethnicity can produce
devastating violence, this research develops a model o f ethnopolitical conflict.
This model consists of three variables— political entrepreneurs as actors, and
mass media and rhetoric as their tools o f politicization o f ethnicity. Ethnic
entrepreneurs have a wide variety o f tools and mechanisms at their disposal by which

9Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1981), p. 99.
9
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they can accomplish the task o f politicization o f ethnicity. In this research I focus on
communication, specifically, mass media and political rhetoric. The assumption
behind this choice is that communication is central to politics. Strategic uses o f
communication to influence public knowledge, beliefs and actions, represent an
essential part o f politics. Mass communication is o f interest in this study because of
the role it played in the course o f political transition from Communism. O ’Neil claims
that institutions such as mass media can shape the process o f political change and the
prospects for democratization.10 However, there are cases in transitional systems,
largely unexplored, where mass media did not necessarily lead to the collapse of
authoritarianism. Although not directly, this work hopes to shed some light on that
subject as well. Through the above variables I investigate how and what
entrepreneurs communicate to their public, and with what effect.
The goal o f this research is to offer a framework for analysis which helps
account for the Yugoslav conflict but which also helps us understand other
contemporary violent inter-ethnic conflicts. The intention o f this research is to
develop an analytical model attractive to future scholars to evaluate its applicability
to other violent inter-ethnic conflicts.
Lijphart and many other critics of the case study method claim that case
studies can make little contribution to theory building and comparative politics
generally because of the “small-n, many variables,” over-determined outcomes,

10Patrick O’Neil, ed., Communicating Democracy: The M edia a n d P olitical
Transitions (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
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inability to eliminate alternative explanations, etc.11 In order to avoid the traps o f
old-fashioned case studies and to create a model that will be useful for future
scholars, this analytical model focuses only on three variables. This research strives to
contribute to theory-building by identifying particular factors which can be applied to
other cases. Here I accept Eckstein’s claim that case studies are most valuable at that
stage of theory building at which theories are tested. 12 Analyzing Yugoslavia with all
o f its structural and ethnic complexities offers a very useful methodological exercise.
The overall research design o f this interdisciplinary work is that of a case
study as developed in Yin and his notion of an embedded research design of a case
study.

An embedded research design, as designed by Yin, allows for the

comparison between subunits within a case, which offers an opportunity to use the
comparative method. Such a design is well suited to the Yugoslav case since it allows
the author to use several approaches in order to enhance the study’s theoretical and
empirical significance. This study unites the advantages o f an in-depth country study
with the benefits o f a comparative approach facilitated by the embedded research
design which allows for intra-country and across-variable comparison. .

Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,”
American P olitical Science Review 65 (September 1971): 682-693. See also Michael
D. Kennedy, Professionals, Power, and Solidarity in Poland: A Critical Sociology o f
Soviet-type Society (New York: Cambridge University Press).
12

Hary Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Handbook
o f Political Science, eds. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, Pa.: AddisonWesley, 1975), p. 80.
13Yin, Case Stucfy, pp. 42—44.
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The case study as a research strategy appears to be most appropriate for an
inquiry which seeks to explain complex causal links in major historical events, since a
deep understanding o f contextual conditions is critical for such explanation. The
underlying philosophy that guides this research is that only in the search for the
causes of conflict, can we begin to develop strategies to prevent its occurrence. This
is in line with Eckstein’s argument that objectives o f a case study are actions that
strive to correct a certain condition.14 However, recognizing the theoretical
limitations o f the case study, usually criticized for thick description and too many
variables whose relative importance cannot be evaluated, this research chooses to
look at three variables in hope that they will be regarded as questions to be
considered in other analyses of violent inter-ethnic conflict. Such use o f these
variables may help in future theory building.15
To describe how and why violent inter-ethnic conflict occurred in the former
Yugoslavia, this case study uses an embedded research design which consists o f a
unit and its subunits. The inclusion o f subunits is necessary due to the federal
structure of former Yugoslavia. The unit o f analysis is a country, Yugoslavia, with
two subunits, two out o f the six former republics. Croatia and Serbia appear to be
most relevant for this study, allowing for the most meaningful comparative analysis.
These two subunits are selected, first, because o f their historical role. Croatia and
Serbia and the relationship between Serbs and Croats played a critical role in the

14Eckstein, “Case Study,” pp. 92-93.
15Ibid.
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Yugoslav national question.16 Second, these two federal units played a primary role
in the contemporary political developments in the crucial period between 1986 and
1991.
The research will focus on the period between 1986 and 1991. In 1986, two
developments o f a contrary nature occurred: the first bold strides toward civil society
appeared in Slovenia, which affected, with some delay, the Croatian Communist party
leadership. At the same time the Memorandum o f Serbian Academy of Sciences and
Arts (SANU) began wide circulation. In 1991, the Yugoslav National Army (JNA)
attacked Slovenia following Croatia’s and Slovenia’s declarations o f independence.
The explanation o f the relationship among the three proposed variables in the two
subunits should assist in explaining how politicization o f ethnicity occurred and in
turn later affected the violent inter-ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia.
The questions below will lead this research. Answers to these questions will
allow examination o f the hypothesis mentioned above.
1.

How did Socialist Federal Republic Yugoslavia attempt to solve its

question o f ethnic diversity?

TJanac defines the national question as a phenomenon o f inadequate
conditions for the free and independent development o f nations and national
communities. National question describes inharmonious relations among various
nationalities, characterized by the supremacy o f one group (or coalition o f groups)
and the resistance (violent or passive) of the others. Ivo Banac, The National
Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1988), p. 12; Also illuminating are the following works: Dusan Bilandzic,
Historija SF R J [History o f SFRY] (Zagreb: Skolska knjiga, 1985); Dennison
Rusinow, “Nationalities Policy and the ‘National Question,”’ in Yugoslavia in the
1980s, ed. Pedro Ramet (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985); Aleksa Djilas, The
Contested Country (London: Harvard University Press, 1991).
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2. What were some o f the major economic and political factors influencing
the crisis o f the late 1980s?
3. How did the institutions o f the federal government react to the crisis?
4. How did different republics and their leaderships react to the crisis?
5. How did they communicate with the people in the process o f solving the
crisis?
6. How did ethnic entrepreneurs become important leaders with high popular
legitimacy?
This study relies mainly on printed sources published in the United States,
Great Britain, Yugoslavia and later, Croatia and Serbia. These printed sources were
supplemented by interviews. Interviews with intellectuals, journalists and politicians
whose work and ideas played an important part in the process o f change that
enveloped former Yugoslavia will constitute an important part o f the data for this
research. Some o f the intellectuals contributed to the decreased importance of the
communist ideology, and the creation of a new system, some worked for adaptation
o f an existing system to a more democratic system. Some o f them resisted the
politicization o f ethnicity, some capitalized on it. Aware that some o f interviewees
were more interested in their own self-promotion, I used those interviews as data, but
presented them as individual opinion. In each step o f the analysis, when able, I
verified “facts” through the process o f triangulation.
The research has been done in the United States, Croatia and Slovenia. Since
I was a student at Zagreb University in the period 1986-1990,1 used my notes and
reflections regarding the individuals and processes under examination. I was not able
to go to Serbia, as the Serbian Embassy refused to give me an entry visa in the fall of
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1997. However, I interviewed several individuals from Serbia during their visits to
the United States and through email.
Material collected through analysis o f Croatian and Serbian presses is also
essential for this study, not only because o f the treatment o f mass media as a variable,
but also as one o f the sources o f data for the research. Journals and newspapers are
listed in the bibliography.
There are several methodological problems with this approach. When I was
conducting field work in Croatia, a few of my interviewees noted that they disagreed
with the title o f my dissertation, especially the “ethnopolitical” part o f it. They
suggested that nationalist would be better, because, the whole conflict was about a
nation struggling to achieve its state.

17

In their opinion ethnicity was not at the same

level o f importance as “nation.”
To those and others who may arrive at similar conclusions about this work, I
offer the following explanation. While I am aware that Croatians, Serbs and other
titular nations o f the six former republics considered themselves nations, and ethnic
minorities as nationalities, as in the Yugoslav constitution, I base my use of
ethnopolitics on the following.
First, Yugoslav scholars themselves use the term ethnic to denote the nature
o f relationships among different nations and nationalities within Yugoslavia without

Particularly sensitive to ethnopolitical in the title was Ante Beljo, one o f the
members of the Norval group, a Canadian emigre group who assisted Franjo
Tudjman in coming to power. During the Tudjman regime, Mr. Beljo was the
director of the Croatian Information Center. Personal interview, Zagreb, October 29,
1997. Dobroslav Paraga, the leader of a right wing Croatian Party o f Right, had a
similar comment. Personal interview, Zagreb, October 17, 1997.
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ever questioning their political autonomy.

18

Second, these groups strived to establish

their own sovereign states, therefore prior to the formation o f those units, their sense
o f nationhood seemed incomplete (even though they had their political and territorial
unit, albeit within an existing state). Hence, for the sake of conceptual clarity, there is
a notable difference between these “nations” as nations and as “ethnic groups.” Third,
this study supports Smith’s argument that every nation has ethnic features.

19

Ethnic

entrepreneurs found that the use of ethnic or primordial elements strengthened
emotional identification with the “national.” Thus they offered to their “nations” their
notions of sovereignty as possible only on a “us” versus “them” type o f exclusion,
where “we” is defined as an ethnie, a common culture and history that can only be
acquired through birth.
Fourth, some leaders would present economic, social and political problems
by ethnic criteria, rather than giving a specific problem’s explanations rooted in its
specific field. When the civic transactions, the rules and regulations that govern the
relationship between the rulers and the ruled and the institutions through which these

18

The following studies are just an example o f some of the studies published
in Yugoslavia: D. Pantic, E tnicka Distanca n SF R J [Ethnic Distance in SFRYJ.
(Beograd: Institut Drustvenih Nauka, 1961); Djordje Djuric, “Ispitivanje Etnicke
Distance kod Dece [Research on Ethnic Distance with Children],” Z b o m ikza
Drustvene N aukeM atice Srpske (1971): 126-132. Rudi Rizman, “Radikalizacija
Problema Etnicko-Nacionalno i Modemost [Modernity and Radicalization o f the
Problem of Ethnic-Nationa/,” Pogledi 18 (April/Junel988): 533-542.
19

See e.g., Anthony Smith, The E thnic R evival (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981); Anthony Smith, The E thnic Origins o f N ations (New York:
Blackwell, 1988); Anthony Smith, National Identity (Reno: University o f Nevada
Press, 1991).
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transaction are performed, are illicitly transferred to the realm o f ethnicity, the
emotionality o f ethnicity affects the decision making in a negative way.

20

For these reasons, this study sees this particular type o f nationalism

21

as a

process o f politicization of ethnicity. Some Yugoslav analysts referred to those
tendencies as a formation o f a nation-state based on an ethnic principle, which meant
that nationalists strived to establish a political system based on an ethnic or cultural
identity, and not on the principle o f citizenship which French and American
Revolutions inaugurated.

22

Those nations were defined as the body o f citizens whose

collective sovereignty constituted them a state as the result o f their political
expression. Even though the nation as such defined involved citizenship and mass
participation within democracy, it said very little about what exactly the sovereign
people were. Definitions o f nations from nineteenth century identified citizens with
the territorial state, but had very little to say about national identification with

20

A good case differentiating between an ethnic and a civil realm is developed
in George Schopflin, "Nationalism and Ethnic Minorities in Post-Communist
Europe,” in Europe's New Nationalism, eds. Richard Caplan and Jon Fefifer (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
21

The notion of “new nationalism” is introduced in a volume Europe’s New
Nationalism, edited by Richard Caplan and Jon Feflfer. Each contributor offers a
different view on why contemporary nationalism in East Europe is different compared
to earlier types o f nationalism. See e.g., Louis Vos, “Nationalism, Democracy, and
the Belgian State,” in E urope’s New Nationalism, eds. Richard Caplan and Jon Fefifer
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
22

See Mojmir Krizan,”Civilno Drustvo i Modemizacija Jugoslovenskog
Drustveno-Politickog Poretka [Civil Society and the Modernization o f Yugoslav
Socio-Political Regime]” in Gradjansko Drustvo i Drzava [C ivil Society and the
State], ed. Zoran Pokrovac (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1991) p. 370.
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characteristics, such as language, ethnicity, history, which would allow collective
identification with a group.

23

In the next chapter, theories pertinent to analysis o f violent-ethnic conflict are
analyzed, with emphasis on their relevance to the study o f politicization o f ethnicity.
An integral part o f Chapter HI is the elaboration o f the model for the study of
politicization o f ethnicity.

23

Eric Hobsbawm, N ations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth,
Reality, 2d ed., rev. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
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CHAPTER m
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Ethnopolitical Conflict
Ethnicity provides nationalist and non-nationalist elites alike, and thenindividual leaders, with a foundation that can be utilized and manipulated for any
number o f ends. The political utilization o f ethnicity, like conflict itself, may be both
positive and negative, i.e., destructive. Positive uses o f ethnicity in the political arena
would include the assertion o f ethnicity for a more equal distribution o f resources or
for improving the position o f disadvantaged groups through various forms o f cultural
and political autonomy. The negative uses o f ethnicity emphasize intolerance and
exclusion among groups and result in destructive politics. Such negative utilization of
ethnicity is evidenced in mass violence aimed at the members o f other ethnic groups,
in the forced expulsion of innocent people, and in the destruction o f other groups’
cultural and religious sources o f identity.
The goals, and mechanisms for the achievement of these ends, may range
from peaceful coexistence and tolerance within one territorial unit to radicalism,
exclusion, and violence in a struggle for the resources of either another group or of
the state. The concern o f this research is with the destructive side o f ethnic
politicization, thus the term ethnopolitical conflict in this work implies that violent
inter-ethnic conflicts usually occur as the result o f the deliberate use o f ethnicity in
the struggle for power and control over the territory or resources o f a certain state.
19
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The analysis in the following sections will focus on existing explanations o f so
called ethnic conflicts, the essence o f ethnicity and ethnic identity and those elements
o f politicization which utilize the most vulnerable aspects o f ethnicity in pursuit o f
radicalism and open conflict with the members o f other ethnic group. Each o f the
elements that are seen as central to the politicization o f ethnicity—political
entrepreneurs, the mass media, and political rhetoric—represents an essential part of
this analytical framework for the study o f ethnopolitical conflict. Consequently, the
review o f literature, by discussing central issues in the literature on ethnicity and
nationalism, and by defining central concepts, will lay out a framework for the study
o f ethnopolitical conflict.
Ethnopolitical Versus Ethnic and Political Conflict
Most contemporary scholars o f inter-ethnic conflicts agree that violent inter
ethnic conflicts, as a result o f pervasive force o f ethnicity, are widespread phenomena
and that they present both domestic and international actors with unprecedented
challenges in the issues of world security.

24

Gurr’s “global view o f ethnopolitical

conflicts” supports such a conviction by providing empirical evidence about

Exam ples include Rita Jalali and Seymour Martin Lipset, “Racial and Ethnic
Conflicts: A Global Perspective,” Political Science Quarterly, 4 (1992-93):
585-606; Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Pandaemonium: E thnicity in International
P olitics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) and Raimo Vayrynen, “Towards
Theory o f Ethnic Conflicts and Their Resolution,” The Joan B. Kroc Institute fo r
International Peace Studies (South Bend, Ind.: University o f Notre Dame, 1994).
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pervasiveness o f ethnically based conflicts in the contemporary world.

25

Gurr’s study

deserves attention not only because it identifies various expressions o f ethnic conflict
throughout the world, but also because, unlike Vayrynen and Horowitz, he claims
that few o f these conflicts are intractable.

26

Such attitude is in agreement with this

study, which is ultimately concerned with prevention of violent inter-ethnic conflict.
While this research argues that referring to contemporary violent inter-ethnic
conflicts as ethnic is inadequate and misleading, the concept ethnic conflict has
become the popular descriptive term for conflicts among ethnic groups who reside in
multiethnic nation-states. This needs to be addressed. These theories try to transcend
the traditional theories o f political conflict, but in the process, ignore important
political aspects. A brief introduction o f these theories is appropriate before we
concentrate on the contemporary theories of inter-ethnic conflict. Traditional theories
o f political conflict, as represented by Davies and Gurr, advance a psychological
explanation for political violence. 27 They advance the idea of discontent and
grievances as the main sources o f aggressive behavior directed toward institutions o f
state. As a result o f a sense o f relative expectations or deprivation, these grievances

25

Ted Robert Gurr. M inorities a t Risk: A Global View o f E thnopolitical
Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Pease Press, 1993).
26Donald L. Horowitz, “Democracy in Divided Societies,” Journal o f
Democracy, 4 (October 1993): 18—38; Vayrynen, “Towards Theory.”
27

James C. Davies, “The J-Curve o f Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a
Cause o f Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion,” in Violence in
America: H istorical and Comparative Perspectives, eds. Hugh Davis Graham and
Ted Robert Gurr (Washington, D.C.: National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention o f Violence, 1969). Ted Robert Gurr, Why M en Rebel (Princeton: New
Jersey, 1970).
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can be politicized by adding political motives to their demands. While this model has
limited power for the explanation o f ethnopolitical conflict—because it cannot
address the problems that arise from the problems o f identity—it does have certain
strengths.
Davies, for instance, explains the importance o f the political context, i.e., the
nature o f government: weak government will be replaced by the rebellious group,
while strong government will force the frustrated group to live with its frustration in
“quiet rebellion.” Davies’ “hatred of oppression [that] lingers and deepens . . . in the
minds o f momentarily silenced rebels”28 illustrates how the historical experience o f a
group may influence their perception of a group associated with the government.
This type o f perception, as part o f the identity o f a group, may provide a notable
source o f power for those looking for an opportunity to mobilize an ethnic group
toward a certain goal.
Gurr’s theory o f relative deprivation provides an important element to the
analysis—that o f expectation, namely, what individuals perceive as rightfully owed to
them.

29

This perception o f justice, o f what is rightfully owed to individuals, may

result from tradition and present social position— what their ancestors have enjoyed,
what they had in the past or what they believe they had in the past, and what their
position is in relation to others in society. This perception too, if used to mobilize an
ethnic group against “others,” can provide the potential for destructive politicization
of ethnicity and justification for political violence.

28Davies, “The J-Curve,” p. 637.
29Gurr, Why M en Rebel.
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While Tilly’s model o f mobilization is known mainly for its focus on
organization and resources needed by groups in pursuit o f political power, this
analysis finds Tilly’s discussion o f a revolutionary situation and the revolutionary
outcome o f particular utility in accounting for violent ethnopolitical conflict.30 A
revolutionary situation or multiple sovereignty is the result o f a long-run chain o f
events. This situation may result in a revolutionary outcome—the displacement of
one set o f members o f a polity by another set.

31

The critical sign o f a revolutionary'

situation is the emergence o f an alternative polity. This description could well be
applied to the cases o f groups who perceive secession as the only way to preserve
their independent status. On the other hand, an alternative polity can be established
by the members o f a dominant group as well; their dissatisfaction with the
government may originate from government’s perceived tolerance o f “secessionist”
claims.
It seems that these major representative theory o f political conflict and
violence have several things in common: popular dissatisfaction over many issues
usually predates violent acts o f rebellion. However, in agreement with Chalmer
Johnson’s view o f revolution—these acts “never occur as a result o f forces beyond
human control,” but are testimony that “creative political action” was not recognized

30

Charles Tilly, From M obilization to Revolution (Reading: Addison-Wesley,

1978).
31Ibid., p. 193.
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or used.

32

What are the forces that propel violent ethnic conflict? And what kind o f

“creative political action” is necessary to control them?
The “ethnic conflicts” literature in this field is reflective of the fact that there
is not yet an established conceptual framework for analysis o f inter-ethnic conflicts.
Frequently ethnic and nationalist, peaceful and violent conflicts are identified by being
labeled as “ethnic” conflict. The major reason for the inadequacy o f the term ethnic
conflict is that it does not differentiate between violent and non-violent inter-ethnic
conflict. Most often, ethnic conflict is used as an umbrella term for identification o f
various manifestations, forms and expressions o f different types o f inter-ethnic
interactions. Thus, a whole range o f phenomena, from economic and cultural issues
to violent conflicts arising between different ethnic groups, are termed ethnic
conflict: from the largely peaceful “ethnic conflict” in Belgium between Walloons and
Flemings and the issue of Quebec in Canada, economic complaints o f the Welsh and
Scots in Great Britain, cultural demands o f Basques in Spain to the tribal conflicts in
Nigeria and other African countries, wars o f secession such as that in the former
Yugoslavia, and religious “warfare” in Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland.

33

This research argues that referring to the contemporary violent inter-ethnic
conflicts as “ethnic,” contorts the conflicts into phenomena that are not conducive to
effective conflict management. The works cited below help to illustrate both to which
extent the concept of ethnicity is “stretched” as Sartori would say, and how present

32

Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1966), p. 166.
33

This is particularly obvious in an article authored by Lipset and Jalali,
“Racial and Ethnic Conflicts.”
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authorities in the studies o f inter-ethnic conflict distort the notion ethnicity to the
extent that it does not allow for effective conflict management.34
Klare and Thomas, for instance, introduce Horowitz’s article by referring to
ethnic conflict as “one o f the most widespread, and often intractable sources o f
political disintegration and violence in the contemporary world.’05 Horowitz
discusses both peaceful and violent manifestations o f ethnic conflict, and presents
them both as equally formidable in public life.

36

In his analysis it appears that any

group that has a political goal will bring about conflict with neighboring ethnic
groups. Jalali and Lipset lead us to believe that multiethnic polities are circumscribed
by conflict since, they assert, interactions among diverse ethnic groups are often
accompanied by intolerance.

37

These authors, like Horowitz, subscribe to the belief

that both nonviolent and violent inter-ethnic conflicts are equally dangerous. The
above authors agree that conflicts among different groups are the result o f groups’
advancement o f political goals, and in different ways, recognize variations in the ways
inter-ethnic conflicts manifest themselves. Nevertheless, faced with the ubiquitous,
fluid and dynamic qualities o f ethnicity, their analyses remain more o f a lamentation

34Giovanni Sartori, “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,”
American Political Science Review 64, 4 (1970): 1033-53; Giovanni Sartori,
“Compare Why and How: Comparing, Miscomparing and the Comparative Method,”
in Comparing Nations: Concepts, Strategies, Substance, eds. Mattei Dogan and Ali
Kazancigl (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994).
35Michael Klare and Daniel Thomas, eds., World Security, 2d ed. (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), p. 6.
36Donald Horowitz, “Ethnic and Nationalist Conflict,” in W orld Security, 2d
ed., eds. Michael Klare and Daniel Thomas (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994).
37Jalali and Lipset, “Racial and Ethnic Conflicts.”
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about the contemporary state o f affairs in the world than an attempt to look at ways
in which these conflicts might have been foreseen and/or prevented.
It seems that the majority o f the literature in the field emphasizes the ethnic
dimension, however defined, at the expense o f political aspects o f inter-ethnic
conflicts. This indiscriminate use o f the concept of ethnicity reveals that the stretched
concept of ethnicity is acquiring a pejorative meaning. Moving beyond borders o f the
former Yugoslavia to the Soviet Union, Rwanda, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and
Northern Ireland, to name just a few contemporary examples of, one is often led to
believe that in all these “ethnic” conflicts, ethnicity is to blame as the cause o f war
and unimaginable atrocities. Ethnicity is promoted as the main reason for the conflict:
as the source of irrationality and deep divisions that lead to horrible bloodshed,
genocide, forcible transfer o f people, and in general to chronic instability within
multi-ethnic societies. This view is narrowly uni-dimensional and neglects not only
the positive aspects of ethnicity, but also the inherent latency o f its political nature.
Even Rothschild reinforces the myth of ethnicity by saying that ethnicity is an entity
that “may choose to be political,” rather than treating ethnicity as a primarily social
and universal attribute.

38

Politically, ethnicity is amorphous; the political form and

shape that it may take is contingent on the variables dealt with later in this analysis.
Only when we “demythologize” the concept o f ethnicity, when we determine in
which circumstances and by which mechanisms ethnicity is manipulated or
transformed into political force, will we be able to deal effectively with the
phenomenon so inadequately termed ethnic conflict.

38

Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1981).
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Efforts to differentiate between socio/psychological and political attributes of
conflicts are visible in Gurr’s and Vayrynen’s analyses o f inter-ethnic conflict. Gurr’s
original concern with politicized communal groups or minorities attempts to
overcome the conceptual predicament by differentiating between ethnonationalists
*3 0

and ethnoclasses from the rest o f the national and minority peoples.

His analysis o f

the mobilization o f the groups adds politicization as an important addition to the
analysis and resolution o f inter-ethnic conflicts. Vayrynen maintains that any
understanding o f ethnic conflict has to consider the process and level o f ethnic
crystallization, that is “the consolidation o f ethnic categories into communities.”40 He
argues that due to the complicated process o f crystallization “[e]thnic conflicts are
often intractable and, at any rate, difficult to solve.”41 The only solution to the
intricacy o f ethnic conflicts, Vayrynen claims, is to change the focus from state-based
or state-centric solutions to psychological and communal remedies which would
“deconstruct” crystallized ethnicities into more flexible and variable intra- and
intercommunal relations.42
Gurr’s optimistic conclusion about the settlement o f communal conflicts is
oriented toward state policies. H e argues that there are two keys to the constructive
management o f ethnopolitical conflict: one is to reconcile the interests o f minorities
and states, another is for the states and their leaders to begin the process o f conflict

39

Gurr, M inorities.

40Vayrynen, “Towards Theory,” p. 7.
41Ibid., p. 19.
42Ibid., p. 20.
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management in the early stages o f open conflict, that is before the groups “cross the
threshold o f sustained violence.”

Surprisingly, Gurr argues that states and political

leaders “rarely have the foresight and political will to preempt ethnic conflict before it
emerges, but they should be able to respond creatively to political mobilization and
protest by communal groups.”44
This study, on the other hand, maintains that prevention o f the violent inter
ethnic conflict is possible if both the ethnic and political dimensions o f the conflicts
are fully understood early on. This research argues that it is necessary to
demythologize the burdened concept o f ethnicity. In order to distinguish between the
ethnic and the political aspects o f inter-ethnic conflict, this study proposes to analyze
in detail several variables which, based on the case o f former Yugoslavia, appear to
be most instrumental in politicization o f ethnicity. Such analysis should assist us in
determination o f when and how ethnic identity becomes politicized. The nature of
ethnic identity in the present time provides fertile ground for radicalization, but it is
only through the factors o f ethnic politicization that these identities become
radicalized and confrontational. Once identity and politicization are independently
analyzed, they can be brought together to determine the specific nature o f developing
ethnopolitical conflict. Only by such means can conflict management and prevention
stand any chance o f success. An elaboration o f ethnicity and its politicization are
contained in the sections below.

43Gurr, M inorities, pp. 312-13.
44Ibid., p. 313.
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What is Ethnicity?
Ethnicity can be seen as the oldest human community.45 Ethnicity, in the
sense used in modem social science, is a term which surfaced in the 1950s. Its origin
dates back to Classical Greek ethnos which described large, undifferentiated groups
o f people or animals. The modem meaning o f ethnicity denotes “familiar groups of
people sharing a culture, an origin, or a language.”46 Ever since earliest civilizations,
the meaning o f ethnos implied a lack of individuation, the lack o f internal
differentiation within a group developed in response to the perception o f “other.”
This meaning and function o f ethnicity as a tool for classification of people into “us”
and “them” has remained to this day. Ethnicity is seen as an entity whose major
function is to stress and reproduce basic social similarities and differences among
groups of people.47
Equally powerful, and perhaps a part o f the “differentiation,” is ethnicity’s
unique function as a provider o f self-identity and a sense o f belonging. In that sense,
some describe ethnicity as primordial or primitive. While there is a debate as to the
meaning o f primordialism, this paper subscribes to Rothschild’s treatment of

Josip Zupanov, “Etnicnost i Kultura: Politicka Mobilizacija i Opstanak
[Ethnicity and Culture: Political Mobilization and Survival],” in Kultura, Etnicnost,
Identitet [Culture, Ethnicity, Identity], ed. Jadranka Cacic-Kumpes (Zagreb: Institut
za Migracije i Narodnost, 1999), p. 173.
46Malcolm Chapman, ed., Social and Biological Aspects o f Ethnicity (New
York: Oxford University Press), p. 15.
A "1

Thomas Hylland Eriksen, “Ethnicity Versus Nationalism,” Journal o f Peace
Research 28 (1991): 263-78. This matter is elaborated in more detail in Eriksen,
Ethnicity and Nationalism (Boulder: Pluto Press, 1993).
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primordial feelings as those that denote identification with cultural symbols (religion,
language), with symbolically significant physical attributes (as, pigmentation) and
*Q

with communal or tribal membership.

These are identities or self-perceptions

people obtain before they acquire explicit political and economic identities and
loyalties. Hobsbawm describes ethnicity as a form o f social organization whose
crucial foundation is cultural. In his words it is “something” that binds together, that
provides bonds and a sense of collective belonging to people who may or may not
live in the same territories and who may lack a common polity.49 Eriksen claims that
ethnicity is an ideology which stresses the cultural similarity o f its self-declared
members and provides individuals with an expression of their basic cultural identity
and most o f their social status.50
Smith offers the most systematic definition o f ethnicity for the purpose o f this
research: while placing a similar emphasis on ethnicity as the communal identity o f
people who share common history, social customs and physical attributes, he also
advances a set o f the fundamental criteria o f ethnicity: a name, a myth o f common
ancestry, shared historical memories, a common culture and economy, link with
historic territory and a measure of internal solidarity.51 Some o f these criteria will be
very helpful in understanding how ethnicity becomes politicized. In learning about

48Rothschild, Ethnopolitics, pp. 25-27.
49

Eric Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, 2d rev. ed.
(Cambridge: University Press, 1992), pp. 63-65.
50Eriksen, “Ethnicity,” p. 264.
51Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, chap. 2 (New York:
Blackwell, 1986).
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ethnicity, it is easier to understand the modem importance o f cultural/ethnic identity
and why it is such an important part o f reality. The appeal o f ethnic identity is
inherent in the conditions o f modem life. It is a response to the immense changes
occurring in the world, an attempt to maintain emotional gratification and support
from membership in a special community o f shared values and customs in an age o f a
mass society, industrial universalism, transient relationships and alienation.

52

As it

becomes increasingly difficult for individuals to find “satisfactory selfhood” in large
entities, they become alienated from the larger whole, and begin to search for identity
in smaller units.53 It is important to note that ethnicity is only one source of identity.
As Hobsbawm argues, “people cannot choose collective identification as they chose
shoes, knowing that one could put on [only] one pair at the time.” People have
several loyalties, several sources o f identity, simultaneously: the family, class,
religion, professional and political organizations and associations, related to various
aspects and problems o f life. Eriksen refers to this phenomena as “segmentary
identities.” Which one of those loyalties is going to be most prominent is largely
dictated by the social context in which an individual happens to be part of.54
In an attempt to determine what seems to be the mysterious character of
ethnicity that produces emotionally grounded and politically significant solidarity
(why do people identify and mobilize along ethnic rather than class, ideological or
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Ernest Gellner, Encounters With Nationalism (Cambridge: Blackwell,
1994). See also Rothschild, Ethnopolitics, and Hobsbawm, N ations and Nationalism.
53Patrick Glynn, “The Age o f Balkanization,” Commentary (July 1993).
54Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, p. 123; Eriksen, “Ethnicity,” p. 268.
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residential lines in such a great variety of societies), ethnicity as an “identity provider”
appears to be an answer. According to Smith, ethnicity can shape individual identity
and self-respect because o f the “myth-symbol” complex which endows ethnicity with
special qualities and durability.55 Myths and symbols are the historical memories and
central values o f ethnic groups which are transmitted to future generations. Equally
important is ethnicity’s simultaneous existence with other aspects o f everyday life and
sources o f identity. This makes ethnicity particularly vulnerable to mass appeal by
those who decide to present economic, political and social issues as a threat to their
ethnic group. The next section on politicization o f ethnicity will elaborate on that
issue.
Politicization o f Ethnicity
The preceding analysis helps us understand what ethnicity is. Armed with that
and in order to complete the task of conceptual clarification, we need to stress that
ethnicity is not nationalism, a conflation often appearing in journalistic jargon and in
scholarly works dealing with “ethnic conflict.”56 These authors operate within a
conceptual predicament which endows ethnicity with a political power and

55Smith, E thnic Origins, p. 15.
56Examples would include a volume edited by Joseph Montville, C onflict and
Peacemaking in M ultiethnic Societies (New York: Lexington Books, 1989); John
Coakley, “The Resolution o f Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Typology, International
Political Science Review, 13 (1992): 343-58. Other works have been mentioned
earlier in the text—Please see footnotes 24, 26, and 36.
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destructiveness that ethnicity alone simply does not have.

57

Furthermore, conflating

ethnicity with nationalism risks confusion with the modem political organization, the
nation-state.
Ethnicity, however, is not impotent or passive. On the contrary, the psychocultural appeal with which ethnicity often successfully competes for loyalty among
other sources o f identity testifies to its immense potential power. But the power o f
ethnicity is latent and thus not inherently destructive. The relationship between
ethnicity and nationalism is an interesting one. Throughout history nationalists used
ethnic history in the creation o f nations. In this sense revived ethnicity serves as a
bond between the forces o f progress and an ethnic folk, and it provides a powerful
tool against assimilation. However, such positive view as promoted by Hutchinson
warrants a counterpoint regarding the relationship o f ethnicity to nationalism. 58
Through the process o f politicization the power o f ethnicity can be turned
into a source o f hatred, o f stereotyping and ultimately can be mobilized into
particularly confrontational nationalism. Brubaker claims that nationalism is not
engendered by nations, or collectivities, but that it is produced by “political fields.”
His claim is acceptable in the sense that he treats ethnic nationality as a social

57

In order to handle the confusion with concepts o f ethnicity, nation and
nationalism, some analysts, Walker Connor in particular, o f inter-ethnic conflict
decide to label it “ethnonational” or ethnic nationalism. I f nationalism is using
ethnicity as a justification for establishment o f a state, this concept may represent a
productive compromise, especially since contemporary nationalism differs from, what
Miroslav Hroch terms, classic nationalism o f the beginning o f the century. Both
works are cited in the Bibliography.
58

John Hutchinson, The Dynamics o f Cultural Nationalism (London: Allen
and Unwin, 1987).
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category that can be institutionalized by regime’s policies.

59

The following is an

attempt to describe how nationalism can exploit ethnicity and transform its power
into a destructive force.
Nationalism
The way in which we have usually heard about ethnicity over the last few
decades, most frequently in the context o f an ethnopolitical conflict, is in the relation
to the state or to the part(s) o f which certain ethnic groups claim to be rightfully
entitled to control. In light o f the fact that the modem bureaucratic state represents
the most powerful actor in the domestic and international arena, this is not
surprising.60 This paper is concerned with the “domestic” aspect o f the salience o f
the state, that is, its capacity to enforce its rule on all the different groups under its
territorial jurisdiction.
In the most general sense nationalism could be described as an ideology which
“builds on the idea o f the nation and makes it the basis for action.”61 Nationalism in
politics would be supporting a nationalist party, demanding home rule or national
independence. Nationalism can also be non-political, such as cultural nationalism or
nationalism in sport. However, even the latter can become political if they produce
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Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), pp. 16-17.
60Alexander Motyl, “The Modernity of Nationalism: Nations, States, and
Nation-States in the Contemporary World. Journal o f International A ffairs, 45, 2,
(1992): 307-23.
61James Kellas, The P olitics o f Nationalism and Ethnicity (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1991), p. 21.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

35
apparent political effects. Cultural nationalism is important for it supports and
heightens national consciousness, without which political nationalism would not
succeed.62
The modem state is seen as an entity which controls the scarce resources and
values for which members o f society have to compete.

63

The resources that the

modem state controls and distributes, such as participation in politics and access to
the offices, and its role as the ultimate guarantor o f cultural status and economic
opportunity make it understandable why any group would want to have the resources
o f the state at its own disposal64 Preoccupation with the state, however, does not
bear a natural and immediate connection with ethnicity.
Ethnicity, as described above, has no direct historical relationship to the
formation of a nation-state, but can be used for that purpose. Hobsbawm is quick to
deny ethnicity any role in the formation o f nation states. According to Hobsbawm,
until recently very few modem national movements were actually based on a strong
ethnic consciousness. Most of the successor states created after World W ar I,
supposedly through application o f W oodrow Wilson’s criteria o f self-determination,
were not the product o f the primordial aspirations o f the people who had been under

62Ibid.
Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back in: Strategies o f Analysis in
Current Research,” in Bringing the State B ack In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich
Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985),
pp. 17-20.
64Motyl, “Modernity of Nationalism,” p. 313.
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the foreign rule, but were usually constructs o f intellectuals who studied abroad.65
However, one has to keep in mind that these intellectuals used ideas o f cultural
nationalists. In agreement with Kohn and Gellner, Hutchinson claims that the role o f
cultural nationalists is valuable for their educational function in a society provides a
basis for later political nationalist movement.66 Cultural nationalists promote visions
of their nations’ development as progressive, independent communities. They build
their visions on ethnic historical memories and distinctive cultural attributes. In order
to accomplish these visions, they often revive ethnic remains from the folk, since
these communities represent repositories o f national tradition. 67
Indeed, “nation-states” are often in fact not nation-states, that is, the
geographic boundaries o f the ethnic group that supposedly created the state
(Staatvolk), and the territorial borders o f the state rarely coincide. Ra’anan cites
Iceland, Norway and Portugal as the rare exceptions of the congruence between the
boundaries o f the ethnic group and the state (although he does not provide criteria
for why that is the case).68 The state is usually either larger or much smaller than the
area inhabited by its Staatvolk, or its corresponding nation. This simply means that

65Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism , pp. 64-65.
66John Hutchinson, “Cultural Nationalism and Moral Regeneration,” in
Nationalism, eds. John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1994), pp. 127—28; Hans Kohn, The Idea o f Nationalism. (New York:
Macmillan, 1945); Em est Gellner, N ations and Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1983).
67Zupanov, “Etnicnost i Kultura,” p. 176.
68Uri Ra’anan, “The Nation-State Fallacy,” in Conflict and Peacemaking in
M ultiethnic Societies, ed. Joseph Montville (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989), pp.
5-20.
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the modem world is dominated by the multi-ethnic states. Misconceptions about the
concept o f “nation” and its frequent use in place o f “ethnicity” require closer
examination o f the concept.
Hobsbawm argues that imprecise use o f the word “nation” has made the task
o f finding a consistent definition o f a nation, a difficult, almost impossible task.69 For
the sake o f some conceptual clarity, this paper will use a political definition of a
nation as suggested by Gellner, Anderson, Hobsbawm and Kohn, which treats the
nation as a recent invention, an artifact or “imagined community” resulting from the
modernization o f society, but having roots in the distant past. 70 In this view, a nation
is a recent historical phenomenon fostered by the technological and economic
developments o f modernization such as printing, mass literacy, modernization,
capitalism and education. The nation is a product o f nationalism. “It is a social entity
only insofar as it relates to a certain kind o f modem territorial state, the nation
state.”71 This means that both “nation” and “nationalism” have meaning only in
relation to the nation-state.
Gellner’s definition of nationalism as “a principle which holds that the political
and national unit should be congruent” appears to be one o f the most accepted
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Hobsbawn, Nations cmdNationalism, p. 5.
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Gellner, N ations and Nationalism; Benedict Anderson, Im agined
Communities (London: Verso, 1991); Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism ; Kohn,
The Idea o f Nationalism, pp. 18—20, 329—31.
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Hobsbawn, N ations and Nationalism, pp. 9-10.
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definitions o f the phenomenon.

72

However, Gellner’s definition o f nationalism leaves

one with uncertainty as to the role o f ethnicity in the formation o f the “national unit.”
Because of his ambiguity about the role o f ethnicity in the formation o f a nation-state,
the role which is often expressed as a cause o f contemporary conflict, this paper will
accept as stipulative definitions o f nationalism those offered by Eriksen and BenIsrael. 73 According to these two authors, nationalism is an ideology that is adopted
to justify the notion that cultural and ethnic groups implicitly hold political rights that
should be actualized in a state. In this sense we can stipulate that the nation is an
artificial creation that draws on ethnicity politicized to the extent that it presumes the
right to the territorial state, that is, it has political goals.
The ideology o f nationalism can be described as a union o f the idea of popular
sovereignty and ethnic solidarity. This set o f beliefs, rooted in the Enlightenment
principle of the sovereignty of people, extended the democratic right o f selfdetermination to a national grouping created to justify the right to a state. But
nationalism does not necessarily seek to express this principle through democratic
means. In order to achieve the proclaimed goals o f a nation, some nationalist leaders
do not hesitate to use violence even when the majority of the people oppose such. As
to the source o f the rights o f a nation, the argument of nationalists is tautological.
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Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 1.
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Eriksen, “Ethnicity,” p. 265; Hedva Ben-Israel, “Nationalism in Historical
Perspective,” Journal o f International A ffairs, 45, 2 (1992): 388.
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The rights o f an entity, that is, a nation, do not stem from the collective will o f its
adherents, but from its very existence as a nation; they are presented as inherent.74
Ben-Israel claims that there is a striking correlation between the extent to
which ethnicity is stressed and the propensity for making war because o f the unifying
force o f ethnicity.

75

This particular type o f nationalism, by treating nation as the

supreme object o f devotion, can justify the w orst crimes and atrocities in the eyes o f
nationalists as long as they serve the supposed national ends.

76

When this type of

nationalism exerts resource claims on another group, it becomes confrontational and
as such it provokes ethnopolitical conflict. The former Yugoslavia is such an
example. However, this kind of nationalism does not represent a permanent feature o f
a nation.
Ben-Israel claims that it may be just a stage in the life o f a nation when
nationalism produces a struggle for political power and often a reliance on war and
violence either as a strategy or as an unintended consequence.

77

Sometimes, as the

consequence o f this conflict, violence becomes a permanent feature o f the conflict
between ethnic groups. To prevent conflict from reaching that stage, it is necessary to
deal with the mechanisms which confrontational nationalists use to politicize ethnic
groups toward destructive ends. It is necessary to point out that while nationalism is

74Ben-Israel, “Nationalism,” pp. 372—74.
75Ibid., pp. 395-97.
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Julius Braunthal, The Paradox o f Nationalism: A n Epilogue to the
Nurenberg Trials (London: St. Botolph Publishing Co., 1946).
77Ben-Israel, “Nationalism,” p. 369.
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competitive by nature, it does not always involve reliance on violence and the
negative use o f ethnicity. Some nationalist movements do not even claim the right to
the independent statehood. While there are very few modem cases o f nationalism
which do not politicize ethnicity toward destructive ends, it is necessary to recognize
their existence. For the sake o f clarity, we refer to the type of nationalism that does
not exert resource claims on another group as benevolent or benign. Historically, this
was the case with Slovenia and Croatia when they decided to join the Kingdom o f
Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia in 1918. Eriksen illustrates that type o f modem
nationalism with the example o f Mauritius. A multi-ethnic state, Mauritius bases its
integrational nationalism on inter-ethnic compromise. It consciously promotes
national symbols that emphasize Mauritian nationalism based on cultural uniformity
and keeps ethnic identities outside of the educational, political and economic
systems.

78

Many scholars emphasize the dual nature o f nationalism. Geopolitically,
nationalism is an ambiguous ideology. It can be aggressive and expansionist both
within and outside state boundaries. At the same time it can serve as a truly peace
keeping and culturally integrating force in a nation-state or a region. This latter
universalist nationalism, in line with the principles o f the Enlightenment, emphasizes
equality and individual human rights. Particularist nationalism, on the other hand,
denies non-citizens or supposedly culturally different citizens full human rights and, in
extreme cases denies them membership in the community o f people. Thus, depending

78Eriksen, “Ethnicity,” p. 270.
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on the social context nationalism may have socio-cultural integrating as well as
disintegrating effects. 79
This discussion of nationalism suggests two important points regarding the
relationship between ethnicity and nationalism. First, the ideology o f nationalism is
different from ethnicity, which is more precisely described as a subjective feeling of
belonging to a specific group. The second point responds to the argument advanced
by Eriksen who claims that the difference between nationalism and ethnicity is one
only o f a degree, because they both appear as “ideologies which stress the cultural
similarities o f their adherents.”

80

His justification o f a difference—that many political

movements are both ethnic and nationalist in character—does not recognize the fact
that ethnicity is often used as an instrument for nationalist aspiration: setting up the
state based on a specific culture.
The case o f former Yugoslavia poses an inevitable question: why is it that the
Communist attempt to provide identity with the proletariat or working class lost to
the identity with a nation. Dunja Melcic insists that one explanation could be that the
nation is a genuine space of communication and self-interpretation. It is an
interpretation o f collective identity that links present, past and future. The working
class, on the contrary, is not a communicative category; its language is derived and
therefore it is in service of communist ideology. This communicative national project
can be successful only if it respects communication with other members of the
community about most pertinent political decisions and institutional arrangements.
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Eriksen, Hobsbawm, and Ben-Israel are in agreement on this point.

80Eriksen, “Ethnicity,” p. 264.
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The communicative national project fails if one group concentrates all the powers in
their hands and promotes their interpretation o f national interest as the only one.
When the communicative national project fails then it is perverted into aggressive,
racist and expansionist nationalism.

81

Melcic’s theory is important because it

implicitly intertwines the role o f ethnicity, and o f communication. With this lead in,
we move on to the next section to examine how communication variables, namely,
mass media and rhetoric, can be used in politicization o f ethnicity.
Elements o f Politicization
The elements that appear to be particularly salient in the analysis o f modem
ethnopolitical conflict are ethnic entrepreneurs as actors and initiators o f
politicization o f ethnicity. Ethnic entrepreneurs use mass media, and political rhetoric
as tools by which they achieve their goals. The entrepreneurs typically capitalize on
the difficult socio-political environment and vulnerabilities o f ethnic identity. These
elements represent important factors whose visibility allows for early diagnosis and
advanced prevention o f ethnopolitical conflict. That is, their appearance might
contribute to an early warning system and allow for preventive actions.
Ethnic Identity
An understanding o f inter-ethnic conflict within multi-ethnic states and, in the
context o f the pervading violence and ultimate demise o f multi-ethnic states, is
incomplete without consideration of the character o f ethnic or national identities (for
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Dunja Melcic, “Communication and National Identity: Croatian and Serbian
Patterns,” Praxis International, 13, 4 (1994): 354-372.
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those nations that did have their autonomy and political units in some form o f
political unit). The notion o f ethnic identity as elaborated in the earlier sections
incorporates culture, religion, any state traditions and various historical events that
are reflected in the popular values and political myths and symbols, often represented
in national heroes or epic events and/or literature. They shape the character and
aspirations o f the ethnic group and inevitably influence how these are going to be
politicized. No less important is the fact that they also shape and color the
perceptions o f their neighboring groups which they can se e as either contenders for
power or as legitimate sharers o f that power.
The psychological nature o f ethnic identity of some ethnic groups, its
emotionally grounded solidarity, its capacity to arouse and engage the most intense
and private emotional sentiments, may lend itself to politicization or radicalization. In
the cases o f radical nationalism, politicization directs an ethnic group to build
boundaries between itself and other groups.

82

In those instances, the differentiating

role o f ethnicity is imbued with intolerance and exclusionary relations to other
groups. Those are the cases when segmentary identities, people’s loyalty to several
communities simultaneously, which in normal times facilitate peaceful coexistence o f
different groups within polity, turn into binary identities with clear boundaries
between “us” and “them” and may ultimately come into conflict with one another.
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Whether the ethnic groups will resort to conflict depends largely on the historical and
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Milton Esman, “Political and Psychological Factors in Ethnic Conflict,” in
Conflict and Peacemaking in M ultiethnic Societies, ed. Joseph Montville (Lexington:
Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 53-64. Also see Rothschild, Ethnopolitics, p. 13.
83Eriksen, “Ethnicity,” pp. 268-69.
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present political environment and whether such context offers an opportunity for
emergence o f ethnic entrepreneurs and the way these entrepreneurs utilize rhetoric
and mass media. Thus, ethnic identity with its primordial characteristics and potential
for differentiation between “us” and “them” is a necessary but insufficient cause for
the mobilization o f ethnic groups into militant political actors. Both ethnic identity
and certain historical events that mark the development o f ethnic groups and
relationship between ethnic groups are considered an important context which might
provide an opportunity for emerging ethnic entrepreneurs.
Historical and Political Context
The political, social and economic context, as noted by the analysts o f
nationalism and political and ethnic conflict, is important to the extent that it
describes the characteristics o f the regime within which ethnic groups reside. It is
accepted by theorists o f nationalism that times o f social strain and instability lend
themselves to the ideologization of ethnicity, which turns primordial or cultural
markers o f an ethnic group into an intense differentiating value. A chapter on history
will deal in more detail with major social, economic and political processes in
Yugoslavia. In this section I will briefly comment on one important issue in Yugoslav
historiography.
The role o f history in the violent breakup o f multi-ethnic Yugoslavia is a very
complicated one, made even more complex by those who use false historical
arguments to claim that ancient ethnic hatreds lay behind the destruction o f
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Yugoslavia.84 Such mono-causal claims made it difficult to understand the actual
interests involved in the conflict that developed into the bloodiest war in post-World
war II Europe. There is another problem with historical analysis, and this one
originates from the advantage o f hindsight. This problem contributes to the method
ological dilemma that Jill Irvine refers to as “the temptation to recast the whole
period in terms o f its outcome.” 85 Thus, many analyses of Yugoslav catastrophe
focus only on those elements that contributed to the demise o f the state.
The purpose of Chapters IV and V is to look at the development o f ethnic
groups and at history of the former Yugoslavia in a more productive way that allows
us to gain better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses o f the multi-ethnic
state, and with it, the reasons that might have contributed to violent inter-ethnic
conflict, or provided good instruments or motifs to be used by political entrepreneurs.
Very often these entrepreneurs used myths and symbols of ethnic groups as the
essence o f their appeal and saw historical events and circumstances as an opportunity
to impose themselves as their true leaders. Since the history o f different ethnic groups
was frequently evoked in order to justify poor political choices and atrocities

Such arguments are particularly difficult to accept since commonly
acclaimed historians of Yugoslavia such as Ivo Lederer, Ivan Banac and Gale Stokes,
claim that ethnic groups which comprised first Yugoslavia o f 1918: Serbs, Croats,
Bosnians, Montenegrins and Slovenes developed independently o f each other and
with minimal contacts. See, Ivo J. Lederer, “Nationalism and die Yugoslavs,” in
Nationalism in Eastern Europe, ed. Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (Seattle:
University o f Washington Press, 1969), pp. 396-438; Ivan Banac, The N ational
Question in Yugoslavia (London: Cornell University Press, 1984), and Gale Stokes,
Three Eras o f P olitical Change in Eastern Europe (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1997).
85

Jill A. Irvine, “State-Society Relations,” in State-Society Relations in
Yugoslavia, 1945—1992, eds. Melissa K. Bokovoy, Jill A. Irvine, and Carol S. Lilly
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 2.
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committed in the name o f history, the section on ethnogenesis o f the Serbs and
o/r

Croats

is meant to demystify the role of history and to aid in understanding o f the

origins o f the diversity o f population that characterized Yugoslavia.
Determining whether or not Yugoslavia was to stay as one state is not the
purose of this analysis. This research is more concerned with a manner in which the
disintegration o f the state occurred. It is led by the hypothesis that Yugoslavia’s
disintegration in such a brutal manner was not inevitable. The premise here is that in
order to understand the crisis that brought a violent inter-ethnic conflict, it is neces
sary to examine crucial political and social events and institutions that preceded the
crisis. In this respect, this chapter should provide a frame o f reference for the analysis
o f Yugoslav ethnopolitical conflict. In order to avoid the risk of mistaking causality
with inevitability, the challenge here is to bear in mind Irvine’s counsel because closer
examinations o f Yugoslav history, especially in the period after World W ar n,
suggest that those elements that contributed to cohesion and stability to the multi
ethnic state in its earlier period might function later as sources o f its violent
breakup.87

86
The role o f other ethnic groups or “nations” (Slovenes, Macedonians,
Montenegrins, Bosniaks,) and “nationalities” (mainly Albanians and Hungarians) as
Yugoslav official language referred to these groups, will be dealt with as they relate
to the developments o f the groups under investigation in this work.
87

This argument is well illustrated in the contributions to the volume by
Melissa K. Bokovoy, Jill A. Irvine, and Carol S. Lilly, eds. State-Society R elations in
Yugoslavia, 1945—1992 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997). The detailed analysis
o f the main political trends and processes by Bilandzic contributes to this argument as
well. See Dusan Bilandzic, H istorija Socijalisticke Federativne Republike
Yugoslavije, [History o f SFR Yugoslavia], (Zagreb: Skolska knjiga, 1985).
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The complicated task o f presenting Yugoslav history becomes even more
difficult today, because lately so many participants in that history demand that a
“new” history be written. The Communist regime that ruled Yugoslavia from 1945 to
1990, as with its monarchical predecessor, insisted intensely on the heroic
presentation o f historical events. In postwar Yugoslavia, the history o f the interwar
Communist movement, the Second World War, and the civil war which occurred
during the World W ar n, was written under the supervision o f the Yugoslav
Communist Party. Aleksa Djilas states that in spite o f the party’s “historiographic
orthodoxy,” many Yugoslav historians have not been ready to misrepresent historical
events. 88 They, however, kept quiet about events that were, from the party’s point o f
view, particularly “ sensitive,” that is, events that called attention to the problems o f
nationalism. This troubled relationship between the Communist Party and history
resulted in a large amount of “dissident literature” published abroad that dealt mainly
with the issues about which Yugoslavs had to remain silent. For example, Ivan
Supek’s book K runski Svjedok Protiv H ebranga 89 was literally smuggled across the
Yugoslav-Italian border, and much o f Milovan Djilas’s later work was only published
abroad. Tudjman’s career as a historian was devoted to proving the historical errors
o f the Communist leadership.
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Aleksa Djilas, The Contested Country (London: Harvard University Press,
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Ivan Supek, Krunski Svjedok P rotiv Hebranga (Chicago: Markanton Press,

1991).

1983).
90Franjo Tudjman, Bespuca Povijesne Zbiljnosti: Rasprava o Povijesti I
Filozofiji Zlosilja [W ilderness o f H istorical Reality : A n Essay on H istory and
(continued...)
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Since the death o f President Tito in May 1980, the consequent liberalization
o f intellectual life has brought many serious challenges to the official “Titoist”
interpretation o f modem Yugoslav history. However, it seems that rewriting o f
history in different republics encouraged intolerance and forces o f destruction, just
like former dissidents who assumed positions o f responsibility in the new regimes
practiced the same type o f political control and prejudice they endured from their
Communist persecutors.
Due to the fact that Yugoslavia was a country with a complex ethnic and
national make-up and intricate history, to present an objective and complete history
o f Yugoslavia is a challenge indeed. Sensitive to this issue, and aware that this
analysis, due to the research subject, will inevitably be incomplete, all the author can
do is to take into account different views on most problematic political issues and
events in describing Yugoslavia’s past.
Ethnic Entrepreneurs
Identity and behaviour are partly genetic, but they are also shaped by context
and choice. In politics they are resources waiting to be used by politicians and
their supporters for their own advantage. Human nature provides the
“necessary” condition for ethnocentric behaviour, but politics converts this
into the “sufficient condition for nationalism as we understand it today.”91
The potential for conflict between ethnic groups gives rise to leaders (either in
pursuit o f their own opportunistic goals or because they truly believe in the cause o f

(...continued)
Philosophy o f Violence]. (Zagreb: Nakladni Zavod Matice Hrvatske, 1990).
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James Kellas, The Politics o f Nationalism a n d Ethnicity. (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1991), p. 19.
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the “nation”) who recognize the circumstances in which the potential psychological
intensity o f ethnic identities, anxieties and aspirations can be made pertinent and a
source o f political legitimacy, and thus, power.
Politicians who operate in the context o f ethnic cleavage can use those
cleavages as a calculated, maximizing strategy either to stay in power, or to persuade
their ethnic constituency about the need to elect this particular politician to represent
them. This most often happens, when these politicians argue about inadequacy o f
existing institutions. Such deliberate calculations about representation o f an ethnic
group can lead to fundamental disagreements about institutions. This type o f an
entrepreneur will mobilize voters to perceive opportunities and constraints in
different institutions and, thus, put forward those institutional preferences that
advantage his or her access to power.

92

The instrumental manipulation o f ethnic allegiances by politicians for
individual goals, has been noted by African scholars. Mboya argued that “some
leaders have revived these old hostilities for their own personal reasons. When a
leader feels himself weak on the national platform, he begins to calculate that the only
support he may have will come from his own tribe; so he starts to create an
antagonism o f this sort, to entrench himself as at least a leader o f his tribe.”
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The role o f ethnic entrepreneurs and their desire to maintain themselves in
power is especially dangerous if in their rhetoric they choose to instigate fear of
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others. I f we recall Gurr’s hypothesis that “the greater the frustration, the greater the
quantity o f aggression against the source o f frustration,”

94

fear as a stronger

emotion, can induce radicalization and militant mobilization against the threat. This is
especially the case with ethnic groups whose major myth is the myth o f chosen
people, or “ethnic election,” chosen to live and fulfill its destiny.

95

When there is a

danger that such myth may be jeopardized, there is justification for the people to
defend themselves. Since ethnic problems usually exist in the context o f economic
and political crisis, the leader has a choice whether to deal with the problems or to
create fear and hate and direct major frustrations o f his people against specific
groups.

96

While, Kingdon does not specifically touch on ethnic policies, his theory of
entrepreneurs is applicable in a complex context of ethnic cleavages. An ethnic
entrepreneur, much like business or policy entrepreneur, rather than bargain for
common solution in a difficult situation, will present a problem in such way, so that
his proposal appears as the acceptable one. Entrepreneurs offer their solutions in the
hope o f future return, one o f which can be personal aggrandizement.

97

Ethnic

communities are particularly vulnerable to these types o f individuals since they often

94Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p. 9.
95

Zupanov, “Etnicnost i Kultura,” p. 176; Smith, N ational Identity, pp.

36-37.
96Ivan Siber, “Psychological Approaches to Ethnic Conflict,” in Ethnic
Conflict M anagement: The Case o f Yugoslavia, ed. Dusan Janjic (Ravenna: Longo
Editore, 1997), p. 125.
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John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2d ed. (New
York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995).
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present their policies as motivated by the advancement, o f their own identity group,
to as Smith puts it, enable them to take “their place in a world o f nations.”

98

In multiethnic societies, the leaders can choose whether to talk their ethnic
group into embracing the larger, i.e., federal state, or to reject such association.
Depending on their own rational calculations about access to power, they propagate
acceptance or instigate rejection o f the larger community. Ndegwa has noted that
opportunist politicians can draw their legitimacy from an ethnic group if they are
perceived as fulfilling particular material and nonmaterial needs o f members in that
group. 99 Particularly interesting is the fact that ethnic or other identity groups offer
authority to those leaders who can offer the group a supposedly absolute memory by
which they can appear as “one o f the group.” Success o f those kinds of leaders,
regardless o f their activities, is seen as an enrichment o f their own community.
Gurr and Davies point to the importance o f a regime’s ability to
proportionately allocate its resources to alleviate the relative deprivation o f different
groups and its legitimacy, i.e., the feeling o f different groups that their needs are met.
If demands articulated through conventional channels o f communication lead to
responses that the discontented find inadequate, they are increasingly likely to use
ioo
demonstrative, sometimes violent actions.
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Snath, N ational Identity, pp. 19-20.

Ndegwa, “Citizenship and Ethnicity,” p. 601.

100

Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, e d s ., Violence in America:
H istorical and Comparative Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: National Commission
on the Causes and Prevention o f Violence, 1969); Davies’ article “J curve” is one o f
the contributions to the volume.
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The leadership o f the state has a powerful role in organizing its economy. In
multi-ethnic states the underlying dynamics o f inter-ethnic relations is a constant
resource competition. Whether the resource competition will result in pluralism,
cooperation, or conflict is largely determined by the political influence o f leaders.
Frequently, various ethnic boundaries are associated with “economic production
niches.” 101 In some cases, the leaders deliberately use economic differences as
delineated by ethnic boundaries to perpetuate exploitation and exclusion of
subordinate ethnic groups.
The economic dimensions o f inter-ethnic relations provides leaders with a
mechanism to distribute resources either on the basis o f ethnic segregation or on a
more equal basis. In cases o f the former, the power of resource allocation allows the
leadership o f the state to perpetuate inter-ethnic hostility. Ethnic groups who suffer
discrimination, or perceive themselves as being discriminated, can use their position
to strengthen their solidarity and eventually rise in violent opposition against the
status quo.
Rothschild points to the leaders as the most important actor in deciding
whether the politicization o f ethnicity is going to take militant or peaceful ways
toward the achievement o f the goal. In that regard, leaders do not hesitate to
transform powerful myths and symbols into sorts of experience that can be utilized
for political purposes. Reference to historical events and victories, even defeats that
need to be corrected, usually lead to a win-Iose situation and the view that the

10‘Joane Nagel, “The Ethnic Revolution: The Emergence o f Ethnic
Nationalism in Modem States,” Sociology and Social Research, 64, 4 (July 1984) :
417-34.
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solution to the “problem” can be achieved only through force and deception.

102

The

reason for choosing the term political entrepreneurs rather than ethnic or political
leaders is due to the conclusion of the researcher that individuals formerly not
actively involved in leadership positions, emerged at the critical point and asserted
their nationalistic appeal. Their leadership serves opportunistic and self-promoting
purposes at the expense o f emotionally vulnerable populations.
Mass Media
Most people learn about politics through mass media, especially television.
Sometimes, it is their only source. In that sense, mass media serve the role o f a
mediator between politics and the people.

103

The mass media are thus the most direct

link that most people have to politics.104 In the process, however, great amounts o f
political phenomena must be summarized, condensed, and simplified— leaving only
vague outlines and symbolic representations o f complex political events. The power
o f the media is not only in their role to survey the events o f the day and make them
focus of public and private attention. They also interpret the meaning o f the events,
put them in the context, and speculate about their consequences.105 Since people are

102RothschiId, Ethnopolitics, pp. 137-71.
103

James Strousse, The Mass Media, P ublic Opinion, and Public Policy
Analysis (Columbus: Merrill, 1975).
104Katz, Elihu, and Lazarsfeld, Paul, P ersonal Influence (Glencoe: Free
Press, 1955).
105Doris Graber, M ass M edia and Am erican P olitics (Washington:
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1980).
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selective not only to the type o f things they pay attention to but also to the sources
upon which they rely, they most often choose the ones that offer views most
agreeable to their own. Because o f various factors, many people have ready access to
only one daily newspaper and thus much of what they know and understand about
contemporary politics often depends upon what and how that paper chooses to
report.106 Recently, television news has been a major source o f political information,
but those who spend a lot o f time watching television, tend to be poorly informed. 107
The power o f media, therefore, lies in their role as the mass communicator of
news and ideas, and in their ability to penetrate large numbers o f people and influence
their belief systems. Modem societies have created and used mass media for
dissemination o f political information rapidly to a large number o f people. Many
governments either own or control the mass media because they firmly believe that
their ability to govern is closely related to the nature, quality and quantity o f
information disseminated to the public.

108

When it comes to the relationship between media and government, there are
two models o f media power. Marxist materialist and critical theory endorses the
dominance model, while the pluralist model is upheld by schools o f individual and
structural functionalism. In the dominance model, mass media are considered by the

106Philip Tichenor, George Donohoe, and Clarice Olien, Community Conflict
and the Press (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage, 1980).
107

Steven Chaffee and Stacey Frank Kanihan, “Learning About Politics From
the Mass Media,” Political Communication, 14 (1997): 421—30.
108Doris Graber, “News and Democracy: Are Their Paths Diverging?” Roy
W. Howard Public Lecture in Journalism and M ass Communication Research, 3
(April 1992).
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ruling class or the dominant elite to be means serving the institutions o f the ruling
class. The pluralist model, with its diversity and predictability, however, is impossible
in a society dominated by a unified elite and can only be introduced into a society
which is open to changes and democratic control, in which competing political, social
and cultural interests and groups exist.109 Yugoslavia, like all other Communist
regimes subscribed to the dominance model. One Yugoslav author argued that
“public diffusion o f information belongs to the realm o f social labor which is
increasingly described . . . [as] ‘the consciousness industry.”’110
The role of media in multi-ethnic societies is o f particular importance.
Hobsbawm argues that the mass media is one o f the most significant characteristics
o f modem nationalism. The mass media became the means by which popular
ideologies not only became standardized and easily transmitted, but also exploited for
the purposes o f deliberate political propaganda— deliberate use o f the mass media to
create malevolent impression o f “other.” Moreover, the mass media has become an
instrument which transmits national symbols as part o f the everyday life o f individuals
and has thus reinforced ethnic identification.111 In contemporary multi-ethnic
societies media can serve as an instrument in reinforcing stereotypes, “hostile

109

France Vreg, “Dilemmas of Communication Pluralism in Social Systems,”
in Democratization a nd the M edia: An East West Dialogue, eds. Slavko Splichal,
John Hochheimer and Karol Jakubowitz (Ljubljana: Communication and Culture
Coloquia, 1990).
110Miroljub Radojkovic, “The Economic Position o f Mass Communications
Institutions in Yugoslavia,” in Towards Democratic Communication: M ass
Communication Research in Yugoslavia (Ljubljana: Edvard Kardelj), p. 121.
11hobsbaw n, Nations and Nationalism, pp. 141-42.
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attitudes and over-sensitivity to differences [which] lead to distorted views that may
intensify and perpetuate conflict.”

112

Political Rhetoric
Rhetoric, as Hegel puts it, “addresses o f peoples to peoples, or orations
directed to nations or princes,” is an integrant constituent in history. 113 Rhetoric,
therefore, is a force in history, and just like other forces in history—economic, social,
political, or psychological— can provide significant insights about certain historical
phenomena. According to McGee, all o f history happens within a “rhetorical matrix.”
With acceptable arguments great masses o f people can be convinced to accept
changes o f all kinds, social, political, and technological. Throughout history,
important issues have been and are argued publicly.

114

Rhetoric is the art o f using language as a symbolic means so as to persuade or
influence humans who by nature respond to symbols.115 Through rhetoric, speakers

112
Morton Deutsch, “Subjective Features o f Conflict Resolution:
Psychological, Social and Cultural Influences,” in New Directions in Conflict Theory,
ed. Raimo Vayrynen (London: Sage, 1991), pp. 26-56.
113

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Lectures on the Philosophy o f H istory,
trans. J. Sibbree, GBWW, XLVI, 154.
114Michael McGee, “The Fall o f Wellington: A Case Study of the
Relationship Between Theory, Practice and Rhetoric in History,” Quarterly Journal
o f Speech, 63 (1977): 28^*2.
115Bitzer, Lloyd, “Political Rhetoric,” in H andbook o f Political
Communication, eds. Dan Nimmo and Keith Sanders (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage
Publications, 1981), pp. 225-48.
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voice feelings o f those they address.116 This striving for social control is vividly ex
pressed in political discourse. It is this which makes politics and political rhetoric a
serious matter o f interest.
Political rhetoric serves the art o f politics at every turn, both as a mode o f
thought and as an instrument of expression and action.

117

All o f its functions rhetoric

performs through the use o f language. The basic function o f political language is to
convey a message. Political language articulates all the things we think o f as political.
In its political dimension, language is used to influence public knowledge, beliefs, and
action on political matters. Accordingly, language can be used to produce both
conflict and consensus; it can cause both empowerment and marginalization,
“language reproduces and reinforces exploitation, inequality and other traditions of
power.”

118

Ultimately, the power o f the public person lies precisely in deciding what

purpose to use rhetoric for.
The Nazi interest in rhetoric was solely political. According to Hitler, rhetoric
was an instrument; the best channel to win the broad base o f mass support was public
speaking. Part o f his conviction was that no man could be a true leader o f his people
if he did not have genuine ability to move them by his words. Hitler’s theory o f
rhetoric is well elaborated in M ein K a m p f:

116Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric o f M otives (New York: Prentice Hall, 1950);
Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses o f P olitics (Urbana: University o f Illinois Press,
1964).
117

Bitzer, P olitical Rhetoric, p. 225.

118Paul Corcoran, “Language and Politics,” in New D irections in P olitical
Communication, ed. Dan Nimmo and David Swanson (Newbury Park, Cal.: Sage,
1990), pp. 51-85.
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I know that one is able to win people far more by spoken than by the written
word, and that every great movement on this globe owes its rise to the great
speakers and not to the great writers.. . . All great movements o f the people
are volcanic eruptions o f human passions and spiritual sensations, stirred
either by the cruel Goddess o f Misery or by the torch o f the word thrown into
the masses.119
Each political message has a meaning which leads to political consequences.
These consequences may be as large as the preservation o f the state and the well
being o f each and every citizen, or as small as a single individual’s wealth. Symbols
are the most important aspect o f the political communication process. They represent
the focal objects o f political opinions and attitudes and are used to define the
procedural and substantive affairs o f government. Symbols are important part o f the
political heritage and traditions that define the political culture o f a community. To
understand what a speaker communicates to his audience, it is necessary to take into
consideration the symbols that characterize their political culture, the way they are
used and how people relate to them.

120

Because words have power to influence people’s thinking and behavior,
political rhetoric should ideally follow Aristotelian prescription for public speaking.
He argued that rhetoric is about persuasion through logical reasoning— in
influencing citizens the speaker should not use disreputable tactics and appeals which

119

Houston Peterson, A Treasury o f the W orld's Great Speeches, rev. ed.
(New York: Grolier Inc., 1965), p. 757.
120Edelman, Symbolic Uses', Charles Elder and Roger Cobb, The P olitical
Uses o f Symbols (New York: Longman, 1983).
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play on irrelevant emotions in the hearers.

121

Unfortunately, in contemporary

political discourse, the Aristotelian ideal type represents only one possible way o f
communicating, and is rare. Graber refers to it as “statesman’s oratory.” Depending
on the appeals political speakers use to convey their messages Graber classifies
rhetorical styles as statesman’s, charismatic, and demagogic.
The essence o f “statesman’s oratory” is to appeal to reasoned argument and
intellectual explanation o f the issues at hand. The salient issues are presented clearly
and in moderate language without emotionally charged distractions. Speakers who
use this type o f speaking avoid appeals to emotions, simplistic explanations and
slogans.

This rhetoric is the most ethical since it strives to provide truthful and

relevant information that makes rational, significant choice possible.

123

“Charismatic oratory,” by contrast, appeals to deeply held emotions and ideas
shared by large numbers o f people. Charismatic leaders and speakers derive their
legitimacy from the fact that the public perceives them as people endowed with
supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.124
They are skillful in using the historical situation to create a value order that is
121

Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. W. Rhys Roberts (New York: Modem Library,
1954), 1355b26; 1355blO; Gaver, Eugene, A ristotle’s Rhetoric: A n A rt o f Character
(Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1994).
122Doris Graber, “Political Language,” in Handbook o f Political
Communication, ed. Dan Nimmo and Keith Sanders (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage,
1981), p. 211.
1 O'X

James Jaksa and Michael Pritchard, Communication Ethics: M ethods o f
Analysis (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Publishing, 1994).
124Max Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building, ed. S. N. Eisendstadt
(Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1968).
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expected for the time. The charismatic speaker seizes upon diffuse, and intense, but
unarticulated sentiments and articulate ideas and emotions in ways that make their
audience feel they have a spokesperson. The audience identifies with such speakers
and has faith in whatever they plead for. In turn, the charismatic speaker becomes a
symbol of public values.

125

“Demagogic” rhetoric also appeals to emotions, but on a baser level, with
clear intent to stir prejudice, hatred, and bigotry. The appeals used by demagogues
are opportunistic; their main goal is to make people believe what they want them to
believe, thus leaving little room for truth and fairness. Johannesen describes a dema
gogue as an unethical communicator who enjoys popular support, and who exerts his
influence primarily through the medium of spoken word. A demagogue relies heavily
on propaganda, i.e., “intentional use of suggestion, irrelevant emotional appeals, and
pseudoproof to circumvent human rational decision-making processes.” A
demagogue is the speaker who uses available social problems to advance his or her
own personal position or goals.

126

In modem times traditional statesmen’s oratory has become rare.

127

Its place

is now taken by a mixture o f charismatic and demagogoc rhetoric. Many
contemporary politicians use rhetoric to manipulate people’s beliefs for their own

IOC

Graber, “Political Language,” p. 211; Martin Spenser, “What Is
Charisma?” British Journal o f Sociology 24 (1973): 347—48; McGee, “The Fall o f
Wellington,” pp. 32-33.
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Graber, “Political Language,” p. 212; Richard Johannesen, E thics in
Human Communication, 2d ed. (Prospect Heights: Waveland Press, 1983).
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ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967).
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political ends. This is especially true for individuals who speak out in a time o f crisis.
These rhetors seize the circumstances in which they and their fellows struggle and
interpret and express them in such a way as to demonstrate leadership. In situations
in which speakers want to guide their audience to action, they take advantage o f
myths and other symbols whose pow er in creating and reinforcing social identity and
sense o f belonging cannot be stressed enough. Myths can serve as preparation for
political action by unifying individuals into collectivities which share perceptions o f a
common heritage and common destiny.
While any rhetorical act is a complex, interrelated whole, four parts can be
separated as analytically distinct: context and audience, speaker, message/speech, and
consequences.

128

The context o f the speech is contained in historical, political, social

and cultural factors or events that made it possible/necessary for a speaker to address
an audience. Social and cultural values pertain to a speaking situation. People speak
in order to solve problems, or to compel action because there is something going on
in the world around them that is in need o f modification or is threatened and must be
defended. The potential for conflict between ethnic groups gives rise to leaders
(either in pursuit o f their own opportunistic goals or because they truly believe in the
cause o f the “nation”) who recognize the circumstances in which the potential

128

In my analysis I use the following approaches to rhetorical criticism: James
Andrews, The Practice o f R hetorical Criticism, 2d ed. (White Plains, N.Y.:
Longman, 1990); Bernard Brock, “Rhetorical Criticism: A Burkean Approach,” in
M ethods o f R hetorical Criticism: A Twentiety-Century Perspective, eds. Robert
Scott and Bernard Brock (Detroit: Wayne State University, 1980); Kenneth Burke,
A Rhetoric o f M otives (New York: Prentice Hall, 1950); Lester Thonssen, Craig
Baird and Waldo Braden, Speech Criticism, 2d ed. (New York: Ronald Press
Company, 1970).
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psychological intensity o f ethnic identities, anxieties and aspirations can be made
pertinent and a source o f political legitimacy, and thus, power.
Context also involves the audience o f the rhetorical discourse. This audience
is both immediate—those who actually witness the speech, and potential—those who
may hear or read the speech. Speeches are by nature audience centered.
Understanding the nature o f audience helps the speaker in development o f his
purpose—what can and cannot be reasonably accomplished. Speakers tailor their
messages to fit audience needs and perspectives. According to Hitler, the role o f the
audience was instrumental, its support was needed in order to achieve power. “Only
one who knows the suffering and struggles of the people will know how to coin
expressions that are right for the people.”

129

The speaker (or rhetor, or orator) is the authority who delivers the speech,
hoping to accomplish a specific goal. In analyzing the speaker we ask if the rhetor is
someone interested in resolving the problem or an individual who sizes up the
circumstances in which he and his fellows struggle and interprets and expresses them
in such a way as to demonstrate leadership? The effective speaker is one who is able
to accomplish his or her rhetorical purposes. The speaker strategically selects verbal
symbols that represent his attitudes and which he feels will be effective in inducing
“identification” with his audience.
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The third element o f a rhetorical act is the speech itself—the collection of and
connection between words. The rhetorical message is always purposive; its aim is to
get a response from an audience. What arguments and language do speakers use that
best fit their purposes and audiences expectations? The language o f the message will
reveal the rhetorical motives o f the speaker. Unlike any other language, basic
function o f which is to convey the message, language used by politicians, becomes
political language. Graber describes political language as a separate entity, a language
that that possesses special potency. That potency comes from the context in which
the information is disseminated and the function the political language performs. One
o f the functions o f political language is to interpret the scene in the process o f calling
attention to situations, people, and events. This function o f political language enables
political elites to create reality through linking their own actions to acceptable
motives, goals and developments.

131

The final element of a rhetorical act is its consequences or effects. This
element is best expressed in the question: “What potential did the message have to
influence what audience in what ways?” The major concern o f this study is the effects
o f Tujman’s and Milosevic’s political rhetoric on politicization o f ethnicity.
In times o f a perceived threat to the ethnic group, the power o f rhetoric based
on ethnic appeal is immense. Not only do such leaders manage to persuade their
ethnic kinsmen to perceive their destiny in ethnic rather than in individual or class
terms but their power o f mobilization is particularly important. It is at such moment
that peoples’ identity may shift from a “segmentary” status (multiple sources of

131Graber, “Political Language,” p. 203.
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identity) into a “binary” status (ethnicity as the predominant source o f identity).

132

This power o f a rhetor steins from his knowledge o f what his followers perceive as
the most serious threat to their security, self-esteem and physical well-being.

133

Demagogues with rhetorical skills can persuade people to organize themselves into
communities with a strong sense of solidarity, perceived as the only way to preserve
their values, customs, uniqueness and survival in the midst o f real or imagined
dangers coming from (an)other ethnic group(s). The promise to address the injustices
incites the people to follow their leader unconditionally, even to the point o f
desecrating the graves and raping women.
This model for the study o f politicization o f ethnicity will be used for the
analysis o f politicization o f ethnicity in Serbia, Chapter VI, and in Croatia, Chapter
VII. The following chapters, Chapters IV and V, are empirical analyses o f contextual
variables, ethnic identity and historical events. Chapter IV offers a description o f the
development o f Serbian and Croat national identity. Chapter V provides historical
background to the units o f analysis. Particular attention will be paid to those
historical events that were later utilized by ethnic entrepreneurs in Croatia and Serbia.
A brief methodological note is in order prior to moving to the empirical
analysis. In this research ethnic identity and historical events represent important
contextual variables, but cannot be considered as the single determinant o f the
outcome, in this case violent inter-ethnic conflict. As Isaak points out, it is seldom
possible to find one necessary and sufficient condition that leads to a certain political

1^Rothschild, Ethnopolitics; Eriksen, “Ethnicity.”
133

Deutsch, “Subjective Features.”
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outcome. More often, it is a combination o f factors that play the role o f partially
sufficient conditions.134 This is the case with this research. Contextual variables,
together with three variables o f the model for the study o f politicization o f ethnicity,
provide a combination o f partially sufficient factors that may cause violent
ethnopolitical conflict.

134

Alan Isaak, Scope an d M ethods o f Political Science, 4th ed. (Chicago:
Dorsey Press, 1985), pp. 128-29.
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CHAPTER IV
ETHNOGENESIS

Genesis and Development o f Ethnic Identity Among Croats and Serbs

135

The term South Slav or Yugoslav was first used by Bishop Josip Juraj
Strossmayer o f Croatia in the nineteenth century during the time o f national revival.
Yugoslavism then connoted the idea or rationale for the formation o f a South Slav
state based on the belief in the ethnic, linguistic and cultural unity o f the South
Slavs.

136

The ancestors of contemporary Serbs and Croats were Slav migrants who

135

The main sources used for this section are: Ivo Banac, The National
Question in Yugoslavia (London: Cornell University Press, 1984); Olivera Buric,
“The Zadruga and the Contemporary Family in Yugoslavia,” in Communal Families
in the Balkans: The Zadruga, ed. Robert F. Byrnes, (Notre Dame: University of
N otre Dame Press, 1976), pp. 117—138; Vladimir Dedijer, IvanBozic, Sima Cirkovic
and Milorad Ekmecic, History o f Yugoslavia, trans. K. Kveder (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1974); Branislav Djurdjev, Bogo Grafenauer and Joijo
Tadic, Historija Naroda Jugoslavije [H istory o f the Peoples o f Yugoslavia], vol. I,
(Zagreb: Skolska Knjiga, 1958); Pavel M. Dolukhanov, The E arly Slavs: Eastern
Europe from the Initial Settlement to the Kievan Rus (New York: Longman, 1996);
Z. Kostelski, The Yugoslavs (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952); John Lampe,
Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a Country (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996); Ferdinand Schevill, A History o f the Balkans, (New York:
Dorset Press, 1991; originally published in 1922 by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich);
Fred Singleton, A Short History o f Yugoslav Peoples (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1985); Leslie Tihany, A History o f M iddle Europe (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1976).
136While the term South Slav refers to all the South Slav peoples of the
former Yugoslavia (Croats, Macedonians, Serbs, Montenegrins, Bosnian Muslims,
(continued...)
66
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in the period between sixth and seventh century raided and then colonized
southeastern Europe. The lands the Slavs first entered bore material remnants o f
Roman civilization, and were populated by the early inhabitants o f the former Roman
provinces and o f the Byzantine Empire, the successor of the eastern half o f the
Roman Empire. The Slavs migrated from their homeland in the Ukraine southward to
the Carpathians in scores o f disassociated tribes, but powerful enough to cover the
entire Balkan peninsula.

137

Because they were scattered about in many small

communities, they were not strong enough to retain the expanse o f territory they had
settled by the end o f the seventh century. By the end of the eighth century most o f
the area o f the former Yugoslavia had been colonized by separate and independent
Slavic tribes, to the extent that Byzantine writers referred to this territory as
Sclavinias, best translated as “the lands o f the Slavs.” Due to the Slav invasion, the
indigenous inhabitants o f the Balkans, the Illyrians (whose present day descendants
are the Albanians), Latinized provincials (later to be known as Vlachs and
Rumanians), and Greeks were pushed into the mountain regions in the w est and to
the coast in the south o f the Balkan peninsula.
Thus, although the Slavs established themselves as the dominant ethnic group,
ethnic minorities continued to live in the region and their influence was most
noticeable in the border and mountain areas. Since the Slavs were mainly rural

(...continued)
Slovenes, and Yugoslavs), this study will focus only on the development o f Serbs and
Croats, and will deal with others only as they concern the development o f the two
nations under investigation.
137

While the designation Balkan has been a matter o f controversy, in this
work it is seen as a geographic and territorial category, divided not only by natural
characteristics, but also among several states.
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people, the towns came to be inhabited largely by Germans in the continental area
and Venetians on the coast. An essential part o f the Balkan history has been the
continuous movement o f populations which continued throughout the centuries of
Ottoman domination. Consequently, the ethnic structure of the former Yugoslavia is
a complicated one— different peoples settled and mixed with each other and were
always open to external influences, adding to that complexity in economic, political,
social and religious spheres o f life. The m ost salient example o f the complexity o f the
South Slav history is the fact that the dividing line which separated the Western
Roman Empire and the Eastern Empire, later Byzantium, run through their lands.
The South Slavs share the Balkan region with the Magyars, Bulgars and
Greeks, whose cultural influences are still felt, but the influences o f German, Italian
and Turkish cultures also penetrated through centuries of occupation. Borders among
different peoples, however, were not fixed, reflecting the expansionist moves of
different groups and kingdoms as well as the continuing migrations of peoples. In the
eight and ninth century the non-Slavs, the Magyars o f Hungary, the Germans of
Austria, the Romanians o f Wallachia separated the South Slavs in the Balkans from
their kin, the West Slavs (Czechs, Slovaks and Poles) and the Eastern Slavs
(Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians). Even though the Slavs were one o f a score
o f peoples (such as the Goths, the Avars, the Lombards, the Huns, the Franks) who
raided the Roman world, they were among the few who were transformed from
“marauders to settlers” and thus preserved their identity, but, mostly in the Balkan
peninsula. The Slavs were not assimilated because they retained their tribal rural
institutions, centered around division o f labor in the extended family or zadruga. The
settlement o f the Slavs in the Balkans and their resistance to assimilation was possibly
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due to their sedentary nature. Their economy was based on agriculture and stockrearing—which allowed for the preservation o f early institutions, but which made
them less o f a threat to the Byzantine rulers.
Because o f their geographic position and diverse ethnic structure, the South
Slav lands played an important part in the historical development o f their neighbors.
The South Slav people have been drawn into and affected by the game o f power
politics played by the great powers. The territorial expansion o f the powerful
European countries infringed upon the independence o f the South Slavs and
subjected them to long periods under foreign regimes. It is believed that the division
among the Christian states facilitated the Ottoman conquest o f the south-east Europe.
The conflict among the European powers and their fears of the Russian expansion,
allowed for the prolonged rule o f the Ottomans. Some argue that the new state o f
Yugoslavia created after World War I was the creation of big powers. While the role
o f external and international actors was important throughout history o f the Croats,
Slovenes and Serbs, this study will focus only on those international events which
contribute to an understanding of more contemporary events.
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Religious Diversity

138

Two centuries before the definitive rift between Rome and Byzantium in
1054, two Christian confessions, the Eastern church based in Byzantium and the
Western church based in Rome, began to battle for control o f the Slavs. This conflict
initiated a division by ecclesiastical jurisdiction which to this date runs through the
land o f South Slavs, and is commonly referred to as the “dividing line between East
and West.” The Croats o f Dalmatia were converted by missionaries from Rome
during the early seventh century, but in the eight century the Byzantine emperor
challenged Frankish expansionism and with it papal primacy in the Balkans and
Adriatic littoral. The result o f this was that Dalmatia was relegated to Byzantium.
The Slovenes and some Croats had been converted during the time o f Charlemagne,
the great king of the Franks who allied himself with the Pope (at the turn o f the ninth
century) and his goal to spread Christianity in the conquered areas. To the Serbs and
Macedonians, Christianity came from the east, under the influence o f the Byzantine
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emperors, who were the rulers o f the Slavs in the southern Balkans until the
formation o f the medieval South Slav states.
The leaders o f some Serbian tribes might have recognized Christianity as early
as the seventh century, but the real beginnings o f Christianity in this area date from
the last decades o f the ninth century and are associated with the “Apostles o f the
Slavs,” the brothers Constantine-Cyril and Methodius. The brothers were sent at the
request of the Byzantine emperor, who intended to restrain the influence o f the
Frankish clergy. Constantine and Methodius were to instruct the Slavs in the
Christian faith through the use of the Slavonic language. The brothers devised an
alphabet, the Glagolitic, and translated some o f the most important books for the
religious service. This language, which formed the basis o f Old Church Slavonic,
spread throughout the Balkans and into central Europe as far as southern Poland.
In Croatia, the position of Church Slavonic was relatively insecure. In the
later half of the eleventh century, the Croatian king Zvonimir recognized the supreme
authority o f the pope and in return received protection from other papal adherents
like Normans of southern Italy. Croatians thus fell under papal jurisdiction. The
papacy opposed the use o f old Slavic in the liturgy, but ran into resistance from many
local priests and Dalmatian bishops. In Croatia, the struggle against the imposition o f
liturgical Latin and for the use o f the old Slavonic liturgy long characterized the
religious and political life. In the northeastern Adriatic area both the Old Church
Slavonic language and Glagolitic script became the official mode o f communication
outside of the church and in time became enriched with the elements o f Croatian
vernacular. This practice set the ground for the growth o f a Croatian literary
language and literature in Dalmatia and Dubrovnik. For a long time, the Croats were
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culturally divided even though they belonged to the Roman Catholic tradition. In
some areas o f Croatia and Dalmatia the use o f the Glagolitic script and Church
Slavonic was encouraged by Catholic monks as a weapon against Greek Orthodox
influences and for that reason it was tolerated by the popes. In some areas, however,
the churches used the Latin liturgy and persecuted the users o f the old Slavonic
liturgy. Thus, beside the existence o f old Latin bishoprics in the Dalmatian towns,
new, purely Croatian bishoprics were formed inland at Nin, Skradin, and Knin, and
Sibenik and Biograd on the coast, and in these towns the Croatian clergy used the old
Slavonic liturgy. During the Habsburg times o f intensive magyarization and
germanization, the Croats used Latin to resist foreign influences.
In the ninth century, in its home area o f Macedonia, the Cyrillic alphabet had
replaced Glagolitic. During the next two centuries the alphabet spread throughout the
lands of the Byzantine (Eastern Rite) Church. Within the sphere o f the Orthodox
Church, adjustments were made in the Cyrillic alphabet in order to incorporate the
distinctiveness o f the different evolving Slavonic languages: Bulgarian, Serbian,
Macedonian and Russian. In the Eastern Orthodox zone the position o f Church
Slavonic was more secure. In 891, the Serbs were officially placed under the
jurisdiction o f Byzantium by the zupcm (ruling prince) o f the Serbian principality o f
Raska, today’s Kosovo. During the next three centuries, the Serbs were pawns of the
struggle between Rome and Byzantium, but the Eastern Church finally prevailed
during the reign o f the Serbian ruler Stephen Nemanja in the late twelfth century even
though Stephen’s older son was crowned the first Serbian king by the Pope in 1217.
Since the measure o f state power in Orthodox lands was at the time reflected in the
possession o f an autocephalous, separate church organization, in 1219, Stephen’s
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brother, the priest and later Orthodox Saint, Saint Sava, sought and won an imperial
decision from the Patriarch o f Byzantium to establish an autocephalous archbishopric
for the state under the Serbian king and Nemanjic dynasty. This change was fervently
but ineffectively opposed by the Macedonian archbishop o f Ohrid, who thus lost
ecclesiastical power over Raska. Saint Sava, the first Bishop o f the new
autocephalous Serbian Church, set up a number o f new bishoprics and trained a
domestic clergy and church hierarchy. The creation o f a separate church organization
was instrumental in consolidating the several parts o f the Nemanjic state and, in time,
merging them into a whole. As in other lands o f Eastern Christianity, in Serbia too
the sacred and secular coexisted, or more accurately, the state was conceived as both
a religious and a political community. In essence, the first Serbian rulers, founders o f
both an independent state and church, made political history that was closely
interwoven with church tradition. This enabled the Serbian church to carry an
important integrating function and to maintain the continuity o f historical national
consciousness, even through centuries o f Ottoman control.
During the reign o f Tsar Dusan in the fourteenth century, a Serbian
patriarchate was established at Pec, in southern Serbia. Although the patriarchate was
annulled and then restored again on several occasions during the Ottoman
occupation, it was not finally abolished until 1766. Pec, which lies in a remote comer
of southeast Yugoslavia, close to the Albanian border, in the Albanian-speaking
province o f Kosovo, is still the spiritual center o f the Serbian Orthodox Church
although the Serbian patriarchate was much later reestablished in Belgrade. The
creation o f an independent Serbian archbishopric altered the boundary between the
Eastern and Western Churches, since the expansion o f the Orthodox bishoprics in
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Dalmatia and Bosnia undermined papal jurisdiction. However, the boundaries
between Catholic and Orthodox religions did not remain permanent, changing under
the influence o f political and religious events and processes. This was especially the
case during the Ottoman occupation, when the leaders o f the Serbian Church could
take advantage o f Islam’s tolerance toward non-Muslim subjects and stay under the
Ottomans, rather than to join the all-Christian European Coalition led by the AustroGerman house o f Habsburg.
One o f the significant factors in the religious history o f the South Slavs, even
before the Turkish occupation o f the Balkans in the fourteenth century, was the
existence o f the Christian church o f Bosnia and o f the Bogumil dualist heresy which
appeared at the close o f the twelfth century. Bogomilism was a manifestation of a
neo-Manichean movement, dating back in particular to the Roman Empire, which
penetrated into southern and western Europe between the ninth and thirteenth
centuries. In South Slav territories, this movement first appeared in Macedonia
during the tenth century as a reaction by oppressed Macedonian peasants to the
imposition o f feudalism by the Bulgarian emperors. Since Bogomilism spread to
Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Dalmatia during eleventh and twelfth centuries,
and both Byzantium and Rome attempted to suppress its followers. In Bosnia and
Herzegovina their persistence alarmed the Roman Curia. In dealing with the heretics
in Bosnia the pope drew support from the Hungarian kings, for whom this meant
winning territory for themselves and souls for Rome.

139

139Singleton, Short H istory, pp. 19-20.
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When an independent Bosnian state emerged under Ban (Vice-Roy) Kulin
(1180-1204), Kulin abandoned Rome and adopted Bogomilism as a state religion.
For three centuries the Roman Curia attempted to reform the Bosnian diocese along
the model o f the Roman Church, but all that resulted were massive revolts and
several wars between the Hungarian army and domestic forces led by Bosnian Bans.
The Catholic church failed to attain its goal, the “heretics,” who saw themselves as
Christians, took control o f the old Bosnian diocese and transformed it into the
“Bosnian church.” This unique native Slav church supplemented the political
framework o f the Bosnian state and provided both political and spiritual boundaries
from other South Slavs. It also saved Bosnia from political encroachment o f both
Roman Catholic Hungary and Orthodox Serbia.140 Some maintain that the voluntary
acceptance o f Islam by the members of this church, when the Ottoman Empire
conquered Bosnia in the mid-fifteenth century meant the preservation o f the Bosnian
state under a new governor.141
In the fifteenth century when the Ottomans conquered the Bosnian state,
many Bosnians voluntarily converted to Islam, and after the Bosnian Church
disappeared, a native-born Slavic Muslim population came into existence. It was only
in Bosnia and Albania (in the seventeenth century) that Islam succeeded in extending
its spiritual influence. Islamic law did not promote the idea o f subjecting a conquered
population to its religion. In most cases mass conversions were motivated by

140Sidak, C rkva Bosanska, pp. 117-124.
141E.g., Murvar, N ation and Religion', Sidak, however, calls into question
any possibility o f mass conversion on the premise that there was not any data
available to support the claim, p. 149.
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economic rather than spiritual considerations. In other territories occupied by the
Ottomans, i.e., Serbia and Macedonia, the Muslim populations consisted o f a small
number o f Turkish immigrants; Muslim landowners and administrators ruled over the
Christian peasants.
Although there were some examples o f forcible conversion, and Christian
subjects were subjected to social and economic disabilities, the legal code o f Islam,
Shar’ia, allowed the native religious communities to administer to their populations
through the system of m illets (nations). On the other hand, because acceptance o f the
Islamic faith was directly connected with extensive rights and privileges, such as
complete exemption from taxes and the right to carry arms, there were strong
incentives for conversion.
The Ottomans were not involved in the internal affairs o f the individual
m illets. They left the religious communities under the supervision o f their respective
religious leaders, who were responsible for maintaining order, administering justice
and collecting taxes within their community and in general, most civil law, as well as
canon law. The religious communities were left alone provided that they paid their
taxes and did not cause problems. The close involvement o f religious leaders with the
civil affairs o f their followers had important consequences during the nineteenth
century, when the declining Ottoman empire faced the rising waves o f Slav
nationalism. Orthodoxy and national identity became closely intertwined, and through
this process, religious leaders became the spokesmen o f national revolts.
In time, the lines o f religious demarcation in southeastern Europe under
Turkish rule delineated the areas o f political and national self-determination. The
influence o f the Orthodox church was extended to areas o f Hungary, Croatia-
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Slavonia, and the Military Frontier between Croatia and Serbia where Serbs migrated
from Ottoman-held territories. The Orthodox communities in these areas pursued a
shadow struggle against the attempts of the Catholic Church, the Habsburg dynasty,
and the Hungarian and Croatian estates to impose Roman Catholicism on the
Orthodox population. In this struggle the Serbs found inspiration in the political and
spiritual splendor o f the cults o f Orthodox saints who extended from the royal
Nemanjici lineages and the post-Kosovo 1389 line o f Serbian despots.142 It seems
that even though Catholicism and Islam did affect national traditions in the Slovene,
Croat and Bosnian lands, the influence of these religions was not nearly as strong as
Orthodoxy was among the Serbs whose religious affiliation helped to shape their
national identity. Both Islam and Roman Catholicism and universalistic religions.
Wherever they exercised jurisdiction, Serbian church organizations promoted Serb
nationhood.
Histories o f the Serbs and Croats
In the course o f time, the groups o f undifferentiated Slavs consolidated into
distinct and recognizable groups whose names will be later reflected in the titles o f
the six constituent republics o f Yugoslavia: Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Slovenia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro.

1 ,/f O

Ivo Banac, “The Insignia o f Identity: Heraldry and the Growth o f National
Ideologies Among the South Slavs,” Ethnic Studies 10 (1993): 215—37. After the
Ottoman defeat o f the Serbian king at the Battle o f Kosovo in 1389, the Serbs lived
under a succession o f “despots” until the last remnants o f the medieval Serbian state
were finally extinguished.
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Croats143
The Croat Slavs settled the area between the Drava river, the Danube and the
Adriatic sea. During the eighth century, two main settlements developed, Pannonian
Croatia (consisting o f Croatia and Slavonia) to the north and Dalmatian Croatia,
along the Adriatic coast. Byzantine documents referred to this territory as Croatia,
but the Holy See and Venetian Republic used the name Slavonia. At the end o f the
eighth century, the northern Croats were subordinated to Frankish rulers while
Dalmatia fell to Byzantium. Frankish rulers introduced intensive conversion to
Christianity and drew the Slav tribes of Croatia and Slovenia into the sphere o f Latin
Western Christianity and culture. The Croatian territory, organized into a multitude
o f old traditional tribes, zupa, or tribal counties, remained under the rule o f the local
princes, dukes, bans (governors) and zupans (court notables). The kings, dukes
(usually the king’s brothers or sons), bans and court zupans deliberated at the Kings
Council, while the representatives of the tribes and towns met at the Sabor,
legislature. (Sabor is still used to denote the Croatian legislature). Gradually the tribal
system was penetrated by Frankish and Latin influences and developed into a feudal
system. The most influential tribal organization consisted o f twelve tribes which were

1 >4*3

The main sources used in this section are Stephen Gazi, A H istory o f
Croatia (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1993, originally published by
Philosophical Library, Inc., 1973); Vladimir Dedijer, IvanBozic, Sima Cirkovic and
Milorad Ekmecic, H istory o f Yugoslavia, trans. K. Kveder (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1974); Branislav Djurdjev, Bogo Grafenauer and Joijo Tadic,
H istorija Naroda Jugoslavije [H istory o f the P eoples o f Yugoslavia], vols. 1 and 2,
(Zagreb: Skolska Knjiga, 1958); Bogdan Krizman, “The Croatians in the Habsburg
Monarchy in the Nineteenth Century,” A ustrian H istory Yearbook, 3, part 2 (1967),
116-58; Ivo Omrcanin, D iplom atic and P o litica l H istory o f Croatia (Philadelphia:
Dorrance, 1972); Ferdo Sisic, P regledP ovijesti H rvatskog Naroda [Rewiev o f
H istory o f Croatian P eople] (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1962).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

79
the bearers o f Croatian statehood. The representatives o f these tribes ruled the
country jointly with the king.
In the tenth century, Tomislav, a zupan, united the Dalmatian and Pannonian
Croats and established a kingdom free from both Frankish and Byzantine rule. In 924
Rome sanctioned prince Tomislav’s royal title and thereby gave prestige to the newly
formed Croatian state. During the reign o f King Tomislav Croatia experienced a
period o f development and expansion which continued through the tenth and eleventh
centuries. During that time the Croatian borders expanded all the way to the Danube,
to the Hungarian border, and to the Drina valley in the south, to the border o f the
Byzantine empire, and to the Serbian principality of Raska.
The Kingdom o f Croatia came into existence in the border territory between
the Eastern Empire and the Frankish Empire which continued its efforts to conquer
Croatia. Consequently, Croatia was involved in the struggle between the eastern and
western empires, and was able to build its independence based on their weaknesses.
But the strengthening o f Venice and Hungary, presented a challenge to Croatia’s
independence, especially since internal struggles for the throne o f Croatia began at
the turn o f eleventh century. Even open declarations o f papal support could not save
the Kingdom o f Croatia and Dalmatia from the two expanding powers. Following the
internal struggle for rulership o f Croatia, in 1000, the Dalmatian cities fell to the
Venetians. After the death o f King Peter Kresimir IV (1058-1074), who regained the
extent o f Tomislav’s Croatia, his successors could not maintain the territorial stability
o f the kingdom. The most significant threat from within was the struggle that
developed between the proponents o f Latin liturgy and Old Slavonic liturgy. The
initial clerical squabble soon assumed the proportions of a political struggle between
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the supporters of the court and those who supported the popular representatives. The
King, the court and high nobility supported the Latin Synod. The small nobility and
the representatives o f the twelve tribes sided with the Croatian clergy. This struggle,
coupled with papal interference and violence o f the First Crusade, exhausted the
country and brought an end to medieval kingdom o f Croatia.
A pro-Hungarian group among the Croatian aristocracy offered the crown o f
Croatia to the king o f Hungary. In a systematic military campaign, the Hungarian
king and his successor, Koloman o f the Arpad house, conquered Croatia and broke
down local resistance to Hungarian rule. After negotiations between the Croatian
aristocracy and the representatives o f the twelve tribes, a union between the
Hungarian and Croatian kingdoms was established by the treaty in 1102. By the
resulting document, Pacta Conventa, the Croatian nobility recognized the king of
Hungary as ruler o f Croatia, who controled foreign affairs and defense. From the
Croatian point of view, however, the union was only personal and provided for
considerable autonomy; the king was represented by a viceroy, a ban, who resided in
Zagreb. The Croats retained their identity and the King accepted the existence o f the
Croatian assembly, the sabor, and its meetings in all matters concerning national
interest. The treaty also protected the privileged positions held by the hereditary
Croatian aristocracy who were declared free o f land taxation. But from then on
Croatia’s destiny was closely linked with that o f Hungary and, hence later, with that
o f the Austro-Hungarian Habsburg monarchy.
After the P acta Conventa, the three historical Croat lands of Croatia,
Dalmatia and Slavonia continued their parallel existences, but under different political
rule and cultural influences. The Hungarian influence was most evident in Slavonia,
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where the Hungarian kings exercised direct royal authority and appointed separate
Slavonian B ans. In Croatia proper, the princely dynasts were free from royal
prerogatives and continued to exist as a separate political entity, while Dalmatia was
exposed to Venetian influences through the eighteenth century.
The Ottoman expansion into Croatia in the fifteenth century combined with
internal instability split the Croatian territories into three parts, one coming under the
Venetians, another under the Ottomans, and a third was the small remnant o f Croatia
closely tied with Hungary. The sixteenth-century Ottoman conquests reduced the
territory o f unoccupied Croat lands to the extent that Croatian nobles accepted the
rule o f the Habsburgs in exchange for the defense from Ottoman invasions. In 1552,
the Habsburg dynasty established a border defense zone— the Military Frontier—to
protect the Habsburg lands against the Turks in Bosnia and Serbia. This crescentshaped zone, at its greatest extent, ran northward from the Adriatic across Croatia
and Slavonia, and then eastward through Srem and Banat to Transylvania. Initially,
this military territory Vojna K rajina, was to be protected jointly by the King’s forces
and Croatian feudal lords. Since the King did not provide financial support to the
Croatian nobility, they surrendered their feudal lands and towns on the border to the
King. In sixteenth and seventeenth century, this depopulated area was colonized by
the peoples o f the Orthodox faith from Thrace, Macedonia and southern Serbia, who
were frequently referred to as Vlachs. At the invitation of the Habsburg generals,
these groups moved across the vacated Croatian territory and settled on the frontier
facing the Ottomans. In exchange for their military services against the Ottomans, the
King granted these Vlachs special privileges such as religious freedoms and the right
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to elect their own authorities and judges. This zone came under the direct rule o f the
Habsburgs and was exempt from the authority o f the Croat Civil authorities.144
The joining o f Croatian lands to the Habsburg provinces occasioned internal
political and cultural changes. Moreover, the Protestant Reformation spread to
Croatia from neighboring Habsburg lands. By the end o f the sixteenth century many
noblemen, citizens o f several large cities, and the former Bishop o f Senj, had
accepted the new faith. Protestantism was popular because it promoted the Croatian
language, publications in Glagolitic, and permitted priests to marry. At the height of
the Reformation the first printing press was brought to Croatia. The popularity of
Protestantism alarmed the Roman clergy and nobility who directed the Sabor to enact
a law by which only Roman Catholicism was permitted in the country. With the help
o f the Jesuit order, which took over the schools, the Counter-Reformation inhibited
Protestantism in Croatia. While the Reformation was not as instrumental in forging
national unity as it was in Slovenia and elsewhere in central Europe, the literary
efforts o f its propagators stimulated the development o f literature in the vernacular
even as Roman Catholicism prevailed.
While Protestantism attracted nobility and citizenry because the movement
criticized the wealth and power of the church, it did not appeal to the peasants since
the new religion too demanded subordination to the landlords. Imposition o f heavy
dues and mistreatment o f Croatian peasants by Croat, Hungarian and Austrian feudal
lords resulted in peasant migrations to Turkish, Hungarian and Slovene areas. The

144The Military Frontier was dissolved in 1881, when the area fell under the
authority o f the Croatian Ban. However, this handover happened more than a century
after the Turkish danger passed, and caused frustration of Croats with both
Habsburgs and Serbs.
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culmination o f peasant dissatisfaction was the mass uprising in the sixteenth century,
but peasant rebellions continued throughout seventeenth and eighteenth century. In a
1754-55 rebellion, the peasants demanded to be included in the Military Frontier
since that would eliminate their liabilities (obligations to the king and local lords).
The Croatian nobility wielded similar oppressive treatment o f their peasant-serfs as
the Hungarian nobility, but in the seventeenth century, as Hungary asserted more
power in the monarchy, conflict ensued between the two groups, mainly because o f
the reduction in the autonomy o f Croatia. At the end o f the century, the post o f ban
was given to Hungarian nobles who were subservient to the Viennese court and, after
liberation from the Ottomans, promoted the Hungarian cause. Despite the successful
operations against the Turks in southern Croatia, the freed territories there were
absorbed into the Military Frontier or ceded to the Ottomans and Venetians. At the
beginning o f the eighteenth century the Hungarian Diet deprived the position o f the
Sabor was severely undermined by the Hungarian diet. In 1779, Croatia was put
under the control o f the Hungarian government. The Imperial acts o f Joseph H,
which imposed germanization and abolished all existing constitutions, brought about
a revival o f national spirit in Croatia and other non-German nations o f the empire. His
successor tried to pacify his subjects, but Hungarian nationalism won over the divided
and weak Croatian nobility. This time Croatians became subjected to magyarization.
The victorious wars o f Napoleon over Austria after the French Revolution brought
another influence to Croatia at a time when Croatian nationalism began to reemerge.
Croatian nationalism was first associated with warding off Habsburg and Hungarian
attempts to impose their language and cultural influence. A desire for selfdetermination was engendered by the creation of a short-lived state in the north
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western Balkans in the brief Napoleonic era. In 1809, Napoleon had united the
Slovene areas and parts o f Croatia and formed a political entity, the “Illyrian
provinces,” with Ljubljana as its capital. It only lasted till 1815, but it produced
significant results: the first periodical written in Croatian was published, general
education introduced, serfdom w as abolished and legal equality instituted. From this
union o f Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, however temporary it may have been, there
grew up a movement among the Croats embodying the ideals o f the French
Revolution plus the ideas o f the German romantics as represented in the ideas o f the
pan-Slavism whose aim was full political unification o f the South Slavs based on their
linguistic similarity.145
The first effective spokesman for this “Illyrian movement,” later to be called
the “south Slav movement,” was the Croatian writer Ljudevit Gaj (1809-1872). In
his Short Principles o f C roatian-Slav Orthography written in 1830 he advocated
reform o f the Croatian alphabet to bring the language into line with the Serbian
language reforms of Vuk Karadzic in order to develop a common Serbo-Croatian
literary language and establish a closer union between the two nations. In general, the
mission of the Illyrian movement was the creation o f modem Croatian ideology.146

145Hans Kohn, P an-Slavism : Its H istory and Ideology (Notre Dame, Ind.:
University o f Notre Dame Press, 1953).
146The Croatian ideal o f an “Illyrian Kingdom” was in direct opposition to the
Serbian dream o f a “Greater Serbia” (e.g., Vuk Karadzic’s writings of the time
promoted the idea of inclusion into the Serbian state o f all lands speaking the Slavic
language) and against Habsburg centralization. The Serbs were more opposed to
merging o f the various south Slav peoples than Slovenes who worked on unification
o f the Slovenes. For the Serbs, larger Illyrian or Yugoslav union meant loss o f the
Serbian name and glory they began to achieve with the successful rebellions against
(continued...)
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The bishop o f Djakovo, Josip Juraj Strossmayer, accepted the Illyrian idea, but he
used the geographical terra Yugoslav, which was derived from Vienna’s official
language by which the South Slavs, Croats, Slovene and Serbs, were differentiated
from the Northern Slavs within the empire. By founding the “Yugoslav Academy” at
Zagreb in 1867, he showed that he favored the campaign for the unification o f the
southern Slavs. However, his initial hopes for transformation o f the Habsburg empire
into a federal union and granting concessions to all nationalities were to become more
and more unrealistic. Harsh experience throughout the nineteenth century taught the
Croats that such concessions could never be obtained without first reaching a
settlement with the Hungarians. In 1868, in the document called N agodba or
Compromise, the Hungarians recognized Croatia as a political nation consisting o f its
three historical lands and sanctioned the country as the Kingdom o f Dalmatia, Croatia
and Slavonia. This triune kingdom was to have independence in internal
administration, education and religion, and its official language was to be Croatian. In
spite o f the agreement, Dalmatia and the Military Frontier were left out o f the
Croatia’s jurisdiction, and Hungarian government still decided on all important state
questions related to Croatia’s development. The Hungarians recommended to the
King who was to fill the office o f B an, the head o f Croatia’s government.
Consequently, the Ban was seen as a representative of the Hungarian power.
In the context of these developments Croatian nationalism o f nineteenth
century was represented by two opposing ideologies. An exclusivist ideology that
argued for an independent state based on traditions of the medieval Croatian state

(...continued)
the Ottomans in 1804—1830.
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was represented by Ante Starcevic and his H rvatska Stranka Prava, the Croatian
Party o f Rights. Starcevic advocated a Greater Croatian state, independent o f Vienna
and Budapest, which would extend to cover Serbian lands. At the same time Croatia
was home o f the pan-Slavic idea o f Yugoslavism which attracted large number o f
followers. The advocates o f Yugoslavism held that cultural integration o f the South
Slavs would bring about the integration o f the Croat lands and, in time, political
sovereignty and progress to Croats and each separate nation in a federal political unit
based on equality. Their insistence on culture was a reflection o f fear that political
appeal would not bring Serbs and Croats together because o f their different state
traditions. At that time, the state was not seen as the basic prerequisite for the
preservation and development of the Croatian nation. The idea of Croatian selfabnegation for the sake o f the South Slav union was the continuation o f Gaj’s Illyrian
idea which led to the decision to accept the stokavian dialect as the literary language
o f Croatia because the majority of the South Slavs and the Serbs in Habsburg empire
spoke stokavian.
The rigorous twenty-year rule o f Count Khuen-Hedervary (1883-1903),
appointed by Budapest as Ban in order to “pacify” and wherever possible magyarize
Croatia, did not cause the proponents o f these two Croatian national movements to
rally together. Further damaging was the Hungarian policy of playing Croats and
Serbs o f the Monarchy off against each other in order to advance Hungarian control.
This policy, capitalizing on the Croatian Party o f Rights’ hostile attitude toward
Serbs, did much to provoke mutual distrust between the majority Croats and minority
Serbs. By the end o f the nineteenth century the Croats showed both admiration and
resentment for Serbia (independent since 1830) which, despite numerous changes in
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foreign policy, had made impressive gains and was becoming the political center o f
the south Slav world. The Serbs living in Croatia and other Austro-Hungarian lands
began to look to Serbia as the new center for realization o f Yugoslav idea.
At the turn o f the twentieth century a new generation o f Croats came to play
a significant role in bringing about a reconciliation between the Croats and the Serbs.
The attempts at rapprochement, however, were discouraged by B an KhuenHedervary whose actions still inflamed Serb-Croat relations. After his resignation in
1903, a window o f opportunity opened and new efforts led to a Serbo-Croat
rapproachment. In 1905 the Croat and Serb leaders unified in opposition to
Hungarian rule and negotiated a program for political cooperation which resulted in
the formation of the H rvalsko-Srpska K oalicija, Croatian-Serbian Coalition. The
Coalition remained the leading political force in Croatia until 1918, despite numerous
efforts by Vienna to discredit it. The Coalition’s program advocated unification o f the
South Slavs and was sympathetic to Serbia and Montenegro, and attracted both
Serbian and Croatian parties.
The issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, became the controversial
issue in Serbo-Croatian affairs. The territory o f Bosnia and Herzegovina was at
different times conquered by both Croatian and Serbian rulers in the time o f their
medieval empires. The region was inhabited by both Serbs and Croats, and was a
source o f ethnic and confessional conflicts between the Croats and the Serbs. Both
Austria and Hungary exploited the differences between the Croatian and Serbian
nationalism and capitalized on their conflict. Bosnia and Herzegovina was one o f the
cards they used to foster disunity o f the South Slavs. When Austro-Hungary
occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878, and annexed it in 1908, most Croats
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welcomed the occupation on the basis o f the “Croatian historical right,” and in hopes
that it would lead to an eventual union with Croatia. The Serbs, however, objected to
the occupation and annexation because they wanted the territory incorporated within
Serbia.
The political opinion in Croatia was divided until the formation o f the
Yugoslav state. Those Croats who sought closer cooperation with Belgrade
supported Serbo-Croat Coalition. They were opposed by those in the Party o f Rights
and in Stjepan Radic’s Croatian Peasant Party who feared Serbian expansionist
policies as advocated by Hija Garasanin and Nikola Stojanovic. The Serbo-Croat
Coalition continued its legal activities within the monarchy and it supported the
Yugoslav Committee, an organization which was set up in exile by Croatian
politicians such as Frano Supilo, Ante Trumbic, and Ivan Mestrovic. The Committee
advocated the destruction o f the monarchy and formation o f a South Slav state on
federal lines. To that end, one o f the goals o f the Yugoslav Committee was to force
the Serbian leadership to reject the idea o f a Greater Serbia. The formation o f the
Kingdom o f the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 marked the victory o f
Yugoslavism in Croatian political life. Other movements, whether traditional
nationalism o f the Party o f Rights or Austro Slavism o f the Peasant Party, lacked the
diplomatic force to achieve their goal o f independent Croatia.
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Serbs147
The Serbs had settled the area east and southeast o f the Croats. During the
centuries o f the great migrations they became scattered over a wide area between the
Danube and the Adriatic. The Serbs occupied the heart o f the Balkan peninsula,
where they encountered a Byzantine civilization and culture. Along the Adriatic coast
they found elements o f Roman tradition. During much o f the eighth to the eleventh
centuries, the Serbs were subordinated to Bulgar and Byzantine rulers. By the ninth
century the Serbs had converted to Christianity. The original territory settled by the
Serbian tribes was Raska, the territory centered in southern Serbia.
During the period o f Byzantine decline, strong tribal leaders formed the Serbs
into two independent states, Zeta (roughly, contemporary Montenegro) and Raska
(contemporary Kosovo). In the late twelfth century Stefan Nemanja, at the time a
great zupan o f Raska, united Zeta and Raska into a Serbian Kingdom. Together with
Stefan Prvovjencani, his son and the “first crowned” king o f Serbia, Stefan Nemanja
conquered the lands to the east o f Raska as far as the Morava valley, as well as the
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littoral from the Cetina to the mouth o f the Drin river (modem Montenegro). Stefan
Prvovjencani obtained his royal crown from the pope, but his brother Rastko, later to
become the Orthodox Saint Sava, promoted an independent Serbian church in order
to unite the disagreeing tribes. Rastko established an independent Serbian Orthodox
church in 1219, and as the first Serbian archbishop, he bequeathed to Serbia a lasting
Orthodox orientation based on the Byzantine principle that church and state should
work together to shape public policy.
Under the succeeding Nemanjic rulers in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries Serbia expanded farther to the east and stretched from Macedonia, in the
south, to the Danube in the north, but at this time Serbia lost Hum (contemporary
Herzegovina) to the expanding Bosnian state. At the time Byzantine empire was in
decline because o f the Turkish invasion. While the Serbian emperors advanced into
former Byzantine territory, the tribal leaders who had become feudal lords retained so
much authority that they were able to deny the rulers their support.
The greatest Serbian ruler, Stefan Dusan (1331—1355), brought the medieval
Serbian state to the height of its power. He controlled a vast empire that included all
o f modem Albania, Macedonia, Epirus and Thessaly. In 1346 he was crowned the
Emperor o f the Serbs and Greeks with the capital in Skopje (modem Macedonia).
Serbia thus became the strongest state in the Balkans, a position it held for the next
200 years. This period o f Serbia’s greatness is manifested in the legacy o f a
sophisticated legal and political system and the proliferation o f Serbian Orthodox
churches. Nevertheless, there were no central institutions capable o f suppressing local
rebels. After Dusan’s death, rebellious nobles brought an end to the empire and
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Serbia broke up into many dynastic principalities, and as a consequence it made itself
vulnerable to the Ottomans.
In the middle o f the fourteenth century the Ottomans advanced against the
Serbs. On June 28, 1389, the famous St. Vitus day, Vidovdan, Serbian princes
together with their Bosnian, Albanian, and Bulgarian allies, confronted the Turkish
forces in southern Serbia. In spite o f their severe losses, the Turks won. This event,
the Battle o f Kosovo Polje, retained special significance in Serbian oral epics as a
defeat to be vindicated some day. The Ottoman conquest o f Serbia was completed in
1459. Most o f the Serbian lands came under Turkish rule which lasted for more than
450 years, and most Serbs refer to that period as their “dark age.” The Ottomans
liquidated the old Serbian ruling class, and the Serbs assumed the role of a peasant
people; cut off from the outside world.148
In spite o f Serbia’s subjugation, Ottoman administration was not as
oppressive as in other lands under their control. Like other subjects o f the Ottoman
Sultan, the Serbs were ruled by cavalry officers or spahis who were granted land and
the peasants to till it in return for military service. The Ottoman m illet system divided
the empire’s subjects according to religious affiliation, and gave authority in civil
government and law to religious leaders. Certain communities, because of
livelihoods, locations, military service or other reasons, retained more autonomy than

148This is in direct contrast to the Croats, and to a lesser degree Slovenes,
who with a seafaring tradition and access to the Dalmatian coast looked outward.
The differences are reflected in migration patterns, the Croats and Slovenes
immigrated to the New World during the era o f migrations, while the Serbs remained
landlocked, and when migrating spread northward or East, with the exception o f the
Serbs o f Croatia and o f Herzegovina, who joined into the migrations to the Western
Hemisphere.
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others. Border communities which provided soldiers for the Ottoman army had a
greater degree o f self-rule than the peasant population in the villages whose leaders,
knezovi, were not allowed to bear arms. Generally, the Serbs were prized as soldiers
and were employed both by the Ottomans and by the Habsburgs on the Military
Frontier.
The new Ottoman rulers also allowed the reconstruction o f the Patriarchate in
Pec in 1557. As part o f their overall policy toward the conquered Christian peoples,
the Ottomans shifted almost all civil authority o f the former Serbian state to the
patriarch in Pec. As the representatives o f the Serbs, the patriarchs o f Pec thus were
not only given all the prerogatives of the spiritual station, but also much o f the
authority that had been wielded by the medieval Serb kings. Ottoman rule only
became oppressive when its central authority began to break down and by the late
sixteenth century, the subject populations suffered under brutal landowners,
freebooting soldiers and corrupt tax collectors.
The patriarchate expanded its jurisdiction over Serbia, Montenegro, and all
Serb settlements in Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia and Hungary. Another
Serbian population came under Habsburg rule as a result o f migration, impressed
military service or Habsburg expansion. To some extent the Serbs were granted
privileges from Vienna, which were not given to the local nobility. But in spite o f the
inclusivity of the Habsburg doctrine, the Serbian church served as a gathering place
for the people, and it sustained the idea o f Serbian identity and unity. The church
elevated the consciousness o f the Serbian nation and national traditions not only
survived but were extended to communities where they had never before existed.
When the Turks abolished the Patriarchate in Pec in 1766 (after the Serbian clergy
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supported Austria against the Ottomans), the center o f Serbian spiritual life shifted to
the Serbian communities within the Habsburg empire. Thus, the first centers of the
Serbian national movement developen in Novi Sad (Vojvodina) and Karlowitz (the
Croatian Military Froniter) under Habsburg rule.
In the fourteenth century, Turkish occupation caused great migrations of
Serbs north and west. This flight accelerated during the sixteenth and the beginning
of seventeenth centuries when Ottoman rule became more abusive. The greatest
Serbian concentrations developed in southern Hungary and in the Military Frontier,
both parts of the Habsburg empire. While the Serbs never united into a territorial
union inside the empire, they nevertheless, were united through their church
organization, a bastion o f Serb culture and expression. Moreover, the chief cultural
element which, much like the church, connected the Serbian past to subsequent
generations was Serbian oral epic poetry. The epic poems kept alive the greatness o f
medieval Serbia and the spirit o f resistance following the defeat at Kosovo. The most
famous cycle o f this poetry is the Kosovo cycle, which recounts the monumental
battle and calls for struggle and sustained sacrifice. Some analysts compare this cycle
and its role to the collective remembrance of the Serbian past to Homeric epic
poems.

149

Vojvodina emerged as the center o f Serbian religious and educational life, as
well as the most economically and socially developed Serbian community, and during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it became the principal location o f the Serb
national awakening. It was from this environment that Serbia’s poets, the leaders o f
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the Serbian literary revival, notably Vuk Karadzic and Dositej Obradovic, emerged.
Karadzic’s orthographic work laid the foundation for modem Serb literature and
national language. In compiling a Serbian grammar and dictionary, Karadzic chose
the Herzegovinian, i.e., sto dialect, as the purest and therefore the best. The sto
dialect subsequently developed into the standard Serbo-Croatian language. Through
the language reforms that he promoted and those that Gaj advanced in Croatia, the
Serbs and Croats began to develop a common literary language and some Yugoslav
enthusiasts hoped that this would lead to the formation o f one nation. Karadzic’s
ideal, based on the teaching o f the German romanticists, envisioned a Serbian land
wherever the sto dialect was spoken, regardless o f the religious or ethnic
identification of the people. In this respect, Croats saw Karadzic as a champion o f
Serbian nationalism rather than a proponent o f broader Illyrian and later Yugoslav
union.
The first significant challenge to Ottoman rule in Serbia came in 1804, when
Karadjordje, a Serbian peasant, staged a revolt against the maladministration and
oppressive rule o f the local Turkish officials. A second revolt led by Milos Obrenovic
in 1817, gained Serbs a considerable amount o f autonomy, but it also marked the
beginning o f the struggle between Karadjordjevic and Obrenovic families which long
influenced the nature o f Serbian politics. In 1830, with the pressure from Russia, the
Ottomans established Serbia as an independent principality. In 1878, through the
Treaty o f Berlin, Serbia achieved complete freedom from Turkish domination and
became an independent kingdom in 1882. While in Croatia where nationalist ideas
were promoted by an intellectual minority, Serbian independence was created by
peasant masses, the class that was denied any educational benefits. When the Serbs
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established their government in 1817, much o f the leadership was provided by
educated emigre Serbs from Vojvodina. The Serbian leadership was burdened with
internal conflicts provoked by dynastic plots, which were frequently exacerbated by
Russian and Austrian influences in order to keep Serbia’s position weak. From 1815
to 1903, there were eight changes o f rulers in Serbia between Obrenovics and
Karadjordjevics.
At the time when the Yugoslav movement was gaining ground in Croatia, the
Serbs made plans for the creation o f an independent state. In 1847, the minister o f
internal affairs o f Serbia, Dija Garasanin, publicized the N acertanje. This program
called for a large Serbian state that included Bosnia, Herzegovina and northern
Albania. Following the publication o f N acertanje, young political activists from
Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Serbia, were consumed by the idea o f creating a
common language and new Yugoslav nation. In the Kingdom o f Serbia, however, the
Yugoslav idea did not have a strong appeal. Prominent Serbian politicians o f the
time, such as Nikola Pasic and Ljubomir Stojanovic, saw the Yugoslav idea only as a
cultural phenomenon, and less significant than the liberation o f the Serbs from
Ottoman and Habsburg rule. Serbian goals and activities, therefore, brought it into
direct conflict with these empires, especially with Austro-Hungaiy.
As a result o f Balkan wars in 1912 and 1913 against Turkey and Bulgaria,
respectedly, Serbia occupied the territories inhabited by the Albanians and
Macedonians, and suddenly Serbia was perceived as the center o f the South Slav
world. The territory of Serbia doubled between 1817 and 1905. The official policy
for Yugoslavia reflected the awareness that such policy would demand the breakup o f
the Habsburg Empire, a decision which the other great powers w ere willing to accept
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and support. The change o f the attitude toward Yugoslavia was reflected in Serbian
nationalism—Yugoslavia became one particular aspect of Serbia’s destiny, and the
liberation of the Habsburg South Slavs, both Serbs and non-Serbs, a national
responsibility. But to Croat and Slovene nationalists, Serbian interest in Yugoslavism
seemed a cloak for territorial expansion.
Pro-Yugoslav Croats and Slovenes began to share sympathies for Serbia
largely due to the anti-Habsburg feelings o f Serbs in Serbia and a hope that a strong
Serbian state could liberate them from foreign rulers. A thirty-year chain o f
discouraging developments, including annexation o f Bosnia and Herzegovina by
Austro-Hungary, reinforced Serbian nationalist determinations to make o f Serbia the
“Piedmont” o f the South Slavs. Serbia became the center of various societies,
revolutionary and ultranationalist, some open, some secret and paramilitary. They all
shared one thing in common: hatred for Austro-Hungary and the vision o f an
eventually united Yugoslav state. For significant groups of the youth, the Serbian
officer corps and numerous intellectuals and politicians on both sides o f the
Habsburg-Serbian frontier, Yugoslavism became a revolutionary conviction. The
momentum o f nationalist violence grew, especially in Bosnia where martial rule and
economic exploitation by Vienna aggravated the South Slav groups.
In early 1914, the followers of a revolutionary organization, M lada Bosna,
Young Bosnia, plotted the assassination o f Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and carried
it out on June 28, 1914. This caused Austria-Hungary to declare war on Serbia.
During the war many Serbs in Austria-Hungary helped Serbia by engaging in
subversive activities and joining its army. The assassination in Sarajevo set loose the
larger European tensions and, through the conflict that ensued, made possible the
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formation o f an independent and unified Yugoslav state. Yugoslavia was created after
negotiations between the Yugoslav Committee, which represented the Croats,
Slovenes and Serbs from Austria-Hungary, and Serbian delegation, led by Nikola
Pasic. Pasic was known as a great Serbian patriot whose Great Serbian conception o f
Yugoslavia did not allow for a federative agreement envisaged by the Yugoslav
Committee. Under the pressure o f the Serbs who supported Yugoslavia, the collapse
of Russia, and pressure from the Allies, Pasic decided to accept the Yugoslav
formula. At the end of World W ar I, the Yugoslav Committee was transformed into
National Council o f Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, rushed to accept a joint state with
Serbia because o f the threat o f the Italian occupation. Serbia accepted the
representatives o f the National Council and the Kingdom o f the Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes was proclaimed on December 1, 1918. For the Serbs, this union meant a
great sacrifice; renunciation of Serbian national sovereignty and independence, since
the Kingdom o f Serbia disappeared from the map.
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CHAPTER V
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
From Yugoslavism to the Yugoslav State
On December 1, 1918, the Unified Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes was proclaimed in Beograd, the capital o f Serbia. Even then, this first
common South Slavic State, was unofficially referred to as Yugoslavia, land o f South
Slavs, the name it officially assumed in 1929. The idea o f South Slavic integration,
Yugoslavenstvo, had evolved in the 1860s under the leadership o f the liberal Bishop
o f Zagreb, Josip Juraj Strossmayer. The proponents of Yugoslavism, mainly of
Croatian nationality, recognized Serb and Slovene nationhood.
Until united into the state Kingdom as the result o f the post-World W ar I
Versailles treaties, the South Slavs had never lived together in one state. They had
started learning about each other only in the late eighteenth century. Until then thensocial structures, economic developments, and political and cultural activities were
shaped and governed by the imperial interests o f the Habsburg and Ottoman
empires.150 Over the course of the eighteenth century, largely due to the changes in

150Ivo Lederer, “Nationalism and the Yugoslavs,” in N ationalism in Eastern
Europe, eds. Peter Sugar and Ivo Lederer (Seattle: University o f Washington Press,
1969), pp. 396-438.
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the international environment and especially within both empires, the South Slavs had
begun to develop their independent national awareness.
Tendencies toward sovereignty existed among Croats and Serbs prior to the
formation o f the Kingdom. The desire for sovereignty among Croats arose chiefly in
response to the external dangers o f Habsburgs, while the Serbs wanted to free
themselves from the long occupation by the Ottomans. The emergence o f the modem
Serbian state is associated with agrarian and social revolts o f 1804-1830 which
forced the Ottoman landowners out of Serbia. Both Lederer and Stokes agree that
the development o f a strongly centralized Serbian state led to the formation o f
Serbian nationalism.151 Serbian nationalism, closely tied to the Serb Orthodox
Church, included the mission to incorporate all Serbs, but since a large number o f
Serbs lived outside o f the newly Serbian liberated state, elements of Serbian national
ideology came to include irredentism aimed at liberating the rest of their kin. At the
end of the nineteenth and beginning o f the twentieth century, Serbia was the first
independent South Slav state and thus was seen as the center o f the South Slav
world. Sympathies for Serbia among Croats and Slovenes were due, in large part, to
the anti-Habsburg feeling o f Serbs in Serbia.
While Serbs, encouraged by their military victories, held an expansionist
vision o f their future state, the Croats and Slovenes, subdued in the AustroHungarian lands and threatened by assimilation from Magyars and Austrians, focused
more on how to achieve some degree of political autonomy or sovereignty that
would protect their national culture. Just as with Serbian, Croatian nationalism too

151Ibid., pp. 403-07.
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developed in response to external forces and pressures. Croatian nationalism o f the
nineteenth century was represented by two contrasting ideologies. One, exclusivist
ideology, that argued for an independent state based on traditions o f the mediaeval
Croatian state, was propagated by Ante Starcevic and his Croatian Party o f Rights,
Hrvatska Strarika Prava. At the same time, Croatia was home to the pan-Slavic
Yugoslav movement which remained the prevalent nationalist ideology in Croatia.
Even though it was idealistic in its nature, the Yugoslav movement established a
foundation for the formation o f the first Yugoslavia. The proponents o f Yugoslavism
held that the cultural integration o f the South Slavs would bring political sovereignty
and progress to Croats and to each individual nation in a federal political unit based
on equality. Their insistence on culture was a reflection o f the fear that political
appeals would not bring Serbs and Croats together because o f their different state
traditions.152
Stokes argues that early instances o f Serbo-Croat 1860s cooperation did not
indicate a joint Serbo-Croat ambition to form a Yugoslav state but that such
dialogues were built on Serbian Realpolitik and Croatian weakness, not primarily
Yugoslav sentiments. Michael Obrenovic, Serbian prince and leader in 1860s,
jettisoned his Croatian partner, Bishop Strossmayer, as soon as he sensed that
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cooperation with Hungary might achieve his aims, the creation o f a larger Serbian
state which would encompass Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro.

153

The Slovenes, like the Croats, had a strong sense o f Slavic reciprocity, but no
state history, except for a brief period in eighth century. The strongest factor
supporting national integration throughout their history was their separate linguistic
tradition.154 Because o f their lack o f state tradition and because the Slovenes lived
divided among four different provinces o f the Habsburg Empire, in the beginnings o f
the national awakening o f the nineteenth century Slovene leadership focused on two
goals, first, to preserve their language through control o f their schools and second,
the unification o f their people into one administrative unit, preferably within Austro
Hungary.155 Since their national awakening, the Slovenes were politically divided
over how to counter Italian irredentist designs and Austrian cultural repression. In the
1870s, Slovene Yugoslavism begin to develop, calling for joint political-cultural
action of South Slavs within the Habsburg empire. Only after the attempt to form a
common political unit within Austro-Hungary failed, did the Slovene intellectuals
become interested in association with Serbia and the ideas of Pan-Slavism.156
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It may be hypothesized that national ideologies formed in response to the
external threat provided the foundation for an oppositional, xenophobic orientation
toward any perceived, potential hegemonic threat. This hypothesis requires some
variation in the case o f the Serbs, since they were the first o f the South Slav nations
to attain independence and thus had an opportunity to include their neighbors into
their national ideology. And, both the Serb and the Croat populations were
geographically dispersed throughout the area rather than being concentrated as were
the Slovenes.
Yugoslavia emerged as the result o f the changing international situation o f the
early twentieth century, which was used by a relatively limited number of Croat, Serb
and Slovene intellectuals and leaders who were pro-Yugoslav. Because of the foreign
threats, both Croatia and Slovenia perceived that their sovereignty could be achieved
only in some kind o f South Slav union; in achieving that they relied heavily on Serbia
as a key actor due to its independence and its position in the Balkans. The Croats,
suffering from a lack of unity in their national programs, “did not persuade the Serbs
to embrace the idea o f South Slav state in the spirit o f Yugoslavism.”

157

The Serbian

government ofN ikola Pasic also promoted the cause o f Yugoslav unification, even
though its position was less clear and enthusiastic.
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However, the belief that

Yugoslavism meant respect for the nationhood and independence o f each South Slav
nation was not as universally accepted among the Serbs as among the Croats. Banac
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explains that it could not have been otherwise because the national ideologies were
extremely different. The Serbs had an independent national state with a history of
expansion and assimilation, while the Croats and Slovenes had few modem state
traditions.159
The official Serbian version o f a South Slavic state, as advocated by the
Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pasic at the time o f World War I, was bound up with
visions o f Serbian expansionism. The first South Slav state was proclaimed in 1918,
amid tensions and a fundamental mutual misunderstanding between the Serbian
representatives and the Yugoslav Committee (Jugoslavenski odbor) which repre
sented the Croats, Slovenes and Serbs who had been the citizens o f the AustroHungarian Monarchy. Even though the Yugoslav Committee won public support of
Entente leaders for the creation o f a South Slav federal state, in the rush o f events
committee members could not prevent the creation o f Yugoslavia that was dominated
by the Serbs. Even though the Serb nationalists in power at the base faithful to the
ideal o f expansionism, the changing fortunes o f World War I, which came to include
the dissolution of the old empires, and the increasing number o f diplomats who
supported a unified Yugoslavia convinced the Serbian political representatives to
promise that they would help free their fellow Slavs.
The unification engineered under the aegis o f the Versailles agreements, did
not establish any guarantees against the dominance o f the Serbian monarchy, whose
troops were already occupying former Habsburg South Slavic possessions and
Montenegro. Thus the new state realized the age-old dream o f Serb unification.
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Given the role o f the Serbian state in the construction of Yugoslavia and the actual if
not formal continuation of Serbian state institutions after the unification, the Serbs
could adjust to the new circumstances without a feeling of loss, without feeling
deprived o f their sense o f national individuality.160
For Croats and Slovenes, however, unification was not so simple. Barely a
month after the end o f their long subordination to the Habsburg Monarchy, they were
now bound into a unitary state, a constitutional monarchy under the Serbian royal
house, with Serbia and Montenegro. Moreover, the decision to unite with Serbia was
made for them in such circumstances by a group o f men who, according to Banac,
did not know how to establish and use political power.161
The sense o f Yugoslav unity may have had some meaning to bourgeois,
professional politicians, lawyers, and intellectuals who promoted the idea o f a South
Slav state, but it had not penetrated deeply into the consciousness o f the mass o f the
peasantry who constituted more than 80 percent o f the population.

162

None o f the

South Slavic nationalities, including the Serbs, had an opportunity to express their
preferences by means of popular referenda, or plebiscite, as were carried out in other
parts of central Europe as part o f the peace process.
Once the monocratic characteristics o f the new state were firmly established,
various forms o f domestic opposition arose in all non-Serbian areas, even among the

160Ibid., p. 138.
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educated and wealthy classes which were considered strongly unitarist in 1918. The
leaders o f the Kingdom o f the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs attempted to impose from
above, on a heterogeneous mixture o f different social, ethnic and cultural groups, a
common set o f rules and a common political and economic order, all under Serbian
dominance. The “founding fathers” o f Yugoslavia pretended that a Yugoslav nation
already existed. They ignored the existence of Slovene as a language separate from
Serb and Croatian. They disregarded the differences in world views which had
evolved during centuries o f life under different regimes. No consideration was given
to the great numbers o f the non-Slavic population (17 percent o f the total) who did
1
not have any reason to identify themselves with the Kingdom.
In 1918 in Yugoslavia there were two governments (Montenegro and Serbia),
six custom areas, five currencies, four railway networks using three different gauges,
three banking systems, and the remnants of four legal systems which had to be assim
ilated into a common code o f law. The first general elections for the Constituent
assembly (U stavotvom u Skupstinu) were held on the whole territory o f the new state
in 1919. They resulted in the following: Radicals, 27 percent; Democrats, 17 percent
(both Serbian parties); Croatian Peasant Party, 14 percent; and Communists 12
percent. A Serbian Radical-Democrat coalition decided that the constitutional
document would be passed by a simple majority, which meant that the input o f the
Croatian Peasant Party would be obviated from the beginning. This led to a Croatian
Peasant Party boycott on the grounds that the electoral arrangements were rigged to
favor the Serbs and to eliminate any notion of federalism. Thus, since the inception o f

l63Ibid.
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Yugoslavia, the Croatian cause was severely crippled. Pavlowitch describes the
Constitution o f 28 June 1921 as, in effect, the Serbian constitution simply adapted to
the needs o f a greatly expanded Yugoslav unit. It merely updated the old Serbian
structure o f a parliamentary government under the Serbian monarchy, keeping the
triple name o f the state as a concession to non-Serbian feelings.164
The fact that the constitution was declared on June 28 served as another
reminder that The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was in reality Greater
Serbia. That day is Serbia’s national day, Vidovdan (St. Vitus day in the Serbian
Orthodox Church Calendar), the day on which the fate of medieval Kingdom of
Serbia had been decided at Kosovo Polje in 1389 and on which in 1914 in Sarajevo
the Habsburg Archduke Ferdinand was assassinated, marking the beginning o f World
War I. This imposition o f a slightly modified Serbian constitution only aggravated the
tensions between the Serbs and their Slavic cousins in Croatia and Slovenia. To them,
the Vidovdan constitution “marked the conquest o f the centralist Serbian experience
over the Austro-Hungarian tradition o f constitutional complexity.” 165
During the first decade of the life o f the Kingdom an attempt was made to
operate a parliamentary democracy based on the model which had evolved in
Western Europe during the nineteenth century. The experiment in parliamentary
democracy failed because the dominant political culture did not support it and

1^S tephen Pavlowitz, The Im probable Survivor: Yugoslavia and Its
Problem s 1918—1988 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press), pp. 2—3.
165Ibid., p. 3.
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because the social conditions for its survival did not exist.166 The Serbs’ centralist
conception o f the state and their numerical domination as the plurality population
caused a radical increase in Croatian nationalism. Between the two world wars, the
Serbian political, bureaucratic, and military elites, together with the Serbian
monarchy, dominated Yugoslav political life. 167 The majority o f Croatian political
parties charged that Yugoslavia was under “Serbian hegemony,” demeaning of
Croatian national identity. The support for a united South Slav state which had been
considerable among Croatian politicians since the beginning o f the twentieth century,
and which had become prevalent among young and educated strata o f Croats at the
end o f World War I, almost completely disappeared. Consequently, during the
interwar period, many Croats called for independence o f some kind, ranging from
1
limited autonomy to complete separation.
King Alexander’s Declaration and Death
The first confused decade o f Yugoslav history culminated in King Alexander
Karadjordjevic’s autocratic proclamation o f January 6, 1929, which dissolved the
Parliament, Skupstina, suspended the Vidovdan constitution, appointed a new
government which relied heavily on the Serb dominated army, and renamed the
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Kingdom o f Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as the Kingdom o f Yugoslavia. Behind this
act was the intent o f the regime to integrate the Serbian, Slovenian, and Croatian
separate identities into one state-based patriotic identity for Yugoslavia, which
already existed with the Serbs. This effort would result in failure. The pragmatic
notion o f Yugoslavism was confronted with several primordial169 forms o f identity
that had developed before Yugoslavia was conceived and were only strengthened
through tensions after its formation.
While most Serbian politicians were willing to accept, at least temporarily, the
establishment o f King Alexander’s dictatorship because it preserved the unity of
Yugoslavia in time o f growing economic and political crisis, to the Croats it appeared
as a way o f getting them to accept Serbian-style centralism. The dictatorship
increased the Croatian emotional separation from the government in Belgrade. This
was spurred by the assassination of Stjepan Radic. Radic, the leader o f the Croatian
Peasant Party (H rvatska seljacka stranka-H SS) enjoyed the wide support o f the
Croatian population. Radic had fought in parliament for a federalist constitution,
seeing this as the best way to ensure the autonomy and protection o f the national
entities. His murder on the floor of the Parliament in 1928, by a member o f an
extreme Serbian organization, generated disquiet among Croats and was an
immediate cause for the institution of royal dictatorship in which the normal interplay
o f party politics was suspended.
Thus, the national problem remained constitutional, but turned tragic because
dictatorship prevented any further debate between different conceptions o f the state

169Primordial identities are those where loyalties are based on traditional
connections to kinship and ethnicity, e.g., religion, culture, language.
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advanced by political parties and ethnic groups. At this time o f what was perceived
among non-Serbian groups in the Kingdom as a progressive “Serbianization,” militant
and secessionist movements grew strong, especially in Croatia and Macedonia, whose
terrorist branches, Croatian Ustasha and IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary
Organization), organized and with the help o f European (Italian) Fascists executed
the assassination o f King Alexander on a state visit to France in October o f 1934.
The King hoped to get the support o f the French in Yugoslavia’s resistance to the
mounting threats from Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria. There was genuine grief in
Yugoslavia when the news o f the King’s death was received. Although many o f his
opponents detested his methods, they all feared that his removal might cause an
uncontrolled disintegration o f the state, which could only be to the advantage o f
Yugoslavia’s enemies.
The Regency
After the King’s murder his cousin, Prince Paul Karadjordjevic, took his place
as Regent until Alexander’s son would come o f age in September 1941. Prince Paul
worked on two main objectives: defending Yugoslavia’s independence against
pressures from Italy, Germany, Bulgaria, and Hungary and liberalizing the regime to
bring about a reconciliation between Serbs and Croats in order to prevent the
dissolution o f Yugoslavia from inside. 170 The prince regent was careful to choose
cabinets that would comply with his goals. After two changes in the government, in
June 1935 Milan Stojadinovic became Premier. He convinced the prince regent that

170Bilandzic, H istorija, pp. 9—11.
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he genuinely believed in a parliamentary system on Western lines and that he could
effect a reconciliation with the Croats. In that direction he signed a Concordat with
the Vatican. Although Stojadinovic signed the Concordat on the behalf o f the
Yugoslav government and although the Concordat was based on the one which
existed between the prewar Serbian Kingdom and the Vatican, its ratification was
refused in 1937 by the Parliament after the Serbian Orthodox Church threatened to
excommunicate any Serb who voted for it. The plan did not succeed, but the fact that
Stojadinovic made it was seen by Croats as a conciliatory move. An equally
encouraging sign was the amnesty that was granted to the thousands o f political
prisoners, many o f them Croats.

171

The opposition, led by Vlatko Macek, Radic’s successor as the head o f the
Croatian Peasant Party, was pulling its strength together. The opposition called for a
national government to work out transitional arrangements leading to a new
constitution which would satisfy a majority o f Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Its activity
caused a wave o f enthusiasm. Pavlowitch concludes that Serbo-Croat relations at
popular levels had never been so close. In leading the opposition block, Macek had
the support o f the Serbian Agrarians, the Democrats, and the Muslims o f Bosnia, in
addition to his Croat Peasants. The opposition coalition made much progress in
general elections—more than 37 percent of the votes in 1935 and almost 45 percent
in 1938, in spite o f an electoral system designed to favor the government.
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In the late 1930s, both the government and the opposition agreed on the need
to solve the Croatian problem before a European crisis placed Yugoslavia in danger.
Eventually, in August of 1939, the Croat Peasant Party came to an agreement with
the regency-appointed Minister, Dragisa Cvetkovic. The Croat Peasant Party thus
broke its alliance with the Serbian opposition parties. While the Premier,
Stojadinovic, who had employed some o f the mass “street politics” o f fascism, was
enjoying the hospitality o f Hitler and Mussolini and assuring them o f his devotion to
fascism, his regent, Macek, and Cvetkovic were working hard to create the
conditions necessary for national unity.

173

They feared that the country would fall

apart under the growing pressure o f the Axis unless the Serbs and Croats found a
basis for living and working together.
The legislature was dissolved August 20, 1939. Stojadinovic was removed,
and a new government was formed under Cvetkovic. Prince Paul chose him because
he felt that Cvetkovic was the person most likely to win the confidence o f the Croats
and to bring the negotiations with Macek to a successful conclusion. Macek became
vice premier in the new government, popularly known as the Cvetkovic-Macek
government. As a result o f the Cvetkovic-Macek talks, a self-governing and
expanded province of Croatia, B anovina H rvatska was established on the basis o f the
Crown’s emergency powers. B anovina H rvatska was the only autonomous political
territorial unit in the Kingdom. Thus, this was not a true federalism. Macek’s close
ally, Ivan Subasic, became governor, Ban, o f the Province which covered most o f the
historic units o f Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia, plus some o f the Croatian-speaking
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areas o f the Vojvodina, Srem, and Bosnia. The Banovina enjoyed autonomous
control over its internal affairs. Croatian extremists criticized this concession as only
a half measure, far short from the independence they demanded. The establishment o f
Banovina led to dissatisfaction among Serbs both in Serbia and Croatia. Serbs from
Serbia perceived the compromise as a grant o f privileged status to the Croatians and
responded with their own Greater Serbian plans for the formation o f “Serbian lands”
that would involve Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vojvodina and Montenegro. Serbs in
Croatia saw themselves cut off from Serbia and subjected to the Croatian rule.
Neither Croats nor Serbs were concerned with the interests o f other national groups
or with Yugoslavia.

174

World W arH
In 1936, the regency government decided on a policy o f neutrality in
international affairs. Such a decision was the result o f a feeling that regional alliances
could not protect Yugoslavia against the Axis powers without adequate support from
Britain and France, whose attitude toward Yugoslavia was at best ambivalent.
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But

the situation in which Yugoslavia found itself at that time was not favorable to Paul’s
plans, which were ultimately based on a Western orientation.
The Yugoslav economy was heavily dependent on Germany; during the 1930s
Germany had become the predominant trading partner. The growing strength of
Germany and Italy, added to the benefits o f the German economic connection, made
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real neutrality almost impossible. The beginning o f World W ar n increased
Yugoslavia’s dependence on the Reich. It made it plain to everyone how perilously
isolated and weak was its position. As German pressure grew, on 25 March 1941,
Yugoslavia signed the Tripartite Pact in Vienna.

1I f *

Huge protest demonstrations occurred in Belgrade and in other cities as a
response to the Pact. Although this may be seriously questioned, the Communists
later claimed responsibility for organizing the demonstrations.
Yugoslavia was attacked by the Fascists without a declaration o f war on April
6, 1941. The country was stunned, already in a state o f confusion, and was quickly
overwhelmed. By the time o f the capitulation o f its armed forces on April 18, 1941,
King Peter and his government had already gone into exile in London, leaving
Yugoslavia’s people to struggle with unsolved problems. Royal Yugoslavia ceased to
exist, although its shadow lived on in exile in London. Pavlowitz describes the end o f
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
It had taken a world w ar for it to come prematurely into the world at the end
o f 1918 and, however shaky its state o f health in the spring of 1941, it took
another world war to destroy the Kingdom o f Yugoslavia, which to all intents
and purposes came to an end between 6 and 18 April o f that year.177
Following the attack by the German Fascist military on April 6, 1941, the
country, already in a state o f confusion, was quickly put out o f action. The German
and Italian occupying forces played on existing ethnic tensions and helped the
domestic fascist forces to establish collaborationist regimes in Croatia and Serbia in
order to combat resistance. The German invasion initiated the first violent conflict
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among the nations o f Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was soon divided into a German and
Italian zone. The Croatian Ustashas had set up a nominally independent state, the
N ezavtsna D rzava H rvatska (NDH), the Independent State o f Croatia, which ended
up being under the Italian protectorate, but after the Italian collapse o f 1943 the
German control over the Independent State o f Croatia was absolute. But, the fiction
was maintained that the Independent State o f Croatia was an independent state with
its own army, police and administration. In reality it was not independent; almost half
o f its population were not Croats, and its economy was subordinated to the needs of
German war machine. 178 Its international status was not even recognized de ju re by
the Vatican, which has frequently been accused of supporting the Independent State
o f Croatia, and its government could act only with the approval o f the occupying
powers. 179 In any case, Ante Pavelic, the leader (Poglavnik) o f the Croatian state,
succeeded in dishonoring even the name o f Croatia by the appalling atrocities for
which his regime became notorious. His regime declared that one o f its chief
objectives was to “purify” Croatia o f alien elements, especially the Serbs. The number
o f Serbs who were killed during the regime is not known. Such research was not
allowed during the Communist regime; the figure of 750,000 as given by the Serbians
was accepted as official. Denitch’s research shows that the real losses for all wartime
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casualties were around one million.

180

The political rhetoric in Serbia still turns to

this powerful myth o f massive extermination o f their countrymen and today’s
Croatian government is compared to that o f W orld War n as being fascist and
genocidal.
The NDH’s savage policy toward Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies served to obscure
the contribution o f Croat Communist-led partisans in freeing the biggest chunk o f the
territory in the western part o f Yugoslavia with the wide support o f the Croatian
population, who fought for the freedom o f the country and “for a better tomorrow”
only to realize that all turned against the people.

181

These events in the history o f

Yugoslavia, which were disguised and removed from public eyes, continue to be
important today.
The Ustasha’s ferocious racism in the Independent State of Croatia
encouraged in Serbia pro-Allied enthusiasm at the time o f Hitler’s invasion o f Russia,
and resulted in rebellions against the Germans, who retaliated ruthlessly. In the
fratricidal civil war that followed the Ustasha massacres, in which Serbs killed Croats
and Moslems, and Moslems killed Serbs, Communist devotion to national equality
increasingly attracted people from the different nations o f Yugoslavia.
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There were two major “rebellious” groups that fought against the occupation.
Both o f them had far broader goals than “just defending” the country.

182

One group,

the Chetniks, a faction o f a larger Chetnik resistance movement, was under the
Serbian Colonel Draza Mihailovic. His aim was to build an underground movement
that would take power and restore the Serbian monarchy when the fortunes o f war
turned against the Axis. He was a standard-bearer for Greater Serbia and for the
House o f Karadjordjevic. H e eventually made contact with the govemment-in-exile
and in September 1941 a joint Yugoslav-British mission was sent out to talk with
him. In October, the British government, on advice from Yugoslavs in London,
decided to recognize Mihailovic as the leader o f the Yugoslav resistance movement.
His Chetniks were credited w ith many acts of sabotage which were, in fact, carried
out by Tito’s Communist-led Partisans.
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The British and the London govemment-

in exile built up Mihailovic’s reputation and underestimated the role o f the Partisans.
The Partisans were the other major insurgent group. Under the leadership o f
Josip B roz Tito and Communist party cadres, they saw the Axis destruction of
Yugoslavia as the opportunity to advance the cause o f the socialist revolution and to
establish a new Yugoslavia on the basis of national freedom and equality.
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The Yugoslav Communist Party
The Yugoslav Communist Party (CPY) was established in 1919 as a
Bolshevik party. Its communist orientation had forced it to operate illegally during
most of the interwar period, because the regime outlawed it in August 1921. At the
time of Axis occupation the CPY emerged as the only all—Yugoslav political force
which called the peoples of Yugoslavia to arms, stressing in its Proclamation o f July
4, 1941, the anti-fascist and liberating character of the fight against the enemy rather
than its former anti-imperialistic and anti-capitalist emphasis that Bolshevism
dictated. In the short period o f time from Yugoslav occupation till Germany launched
an attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the CPY prepared politically and
militarily to resist the enemy.

1QA

The name o f Josip Broz Tito is irrevocably connected with the life of CPY. In
1937 he was appointed secretary-general o f the party. During the four years that re
mained before the Axis invasion Tito built up the illegal Communist Party into a
highly effective revolutionary avant garde. Its membership increased and it included
people from all walks o f life and from all national groups within Yugoslavia. Milovan
Djilas, his former second in command, sees Tito’s personality, his drive and energy,
and his unswerving loyalty to the policies o f Comintern as those that gave a sense o f
purpose and direction to the Party which, prior to Tito’s accession to leadership, was

184Bilandzic, H istorija, pp. 139-49.
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tom by internal dissensions and factional fighting.

185

When the old regime

disintegrated under the pressure of war, under his leadership the CPY was able to rise
to the occasion and create a national movement, and in turn to weld the resistance
movement into an instrument o f social revolution.

186

As Martin observes, it is misleading to explain what happened in Yugoslavia
during World W ar II as the product o f a two-sided struggle between the Partisan
resistance movement on the one hand and the occupying powers and their
collaborators on the other hand. He sees four major conflicts taking place: first, there
was the religious-political war launched by the quisling Ante Pavelic and his so called
“Independent State o f Croatia” against the Serbian people living in its borders. As
previously explained, this conflict was marked by massacres and counter massacres.
Second, there was the conflict between the occupying powers and the two major
resistance forces—the Mihailovic movement, which was essentially nationalist and
dynastic, and the Partisan movement that was committed to a communist Yugoslavia.
Third, there was the conflict in Serbia between the forces of General Mihailovic and
the collaborationist “Chetnik” forces o f Kosta Pecanac, and intermittently, the forces
o f General Milan Ljotic, the Axis appointed governor o f occupied Serbia. Finally,
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there was the civil war that the Tito and Mihailovic forces waged against each other,
alongside o r within the framework o f the resistance movement.

187

The Allied policy toward Yugoslavia was o f great import for the future o f this
small Balkan country. During 1941 and 1942 and the first part o f 1943, the Allies
gave all-out support to General Draza Mihailovic as the only leader o f the Yugoslav
resistance. By the end o f 1943, Mihailovic was abandoned because his forces were
inactive against the enemy and he had collaborated with them. At this point Britain
and the United States, which had conceded British primacy in determining Balkan
policy, began to give their support to the Communist resistance movement. 188
At the Teheran Conference which took place between November 28 and
December 1, 1943, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin agreed to support the Partisans
as the only effective Yugoslav resistance movement. There were still formidable
obstacles for Tito’s forces to overcome, but at the beginning o f 1944 it was
becoming increasingly obvious to all concerned that Germany was losing the war and
that the future government o f Yugoslavia would be dominated by the Communists.
The official surrender of Germany (May, 1945) did not stop the killing in Yugoslavia.
Thousand o f Croats and Slovenes who were retreating with the Germans were
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rounded up by the British forces in Austria and brought back to Yugoslavia, many o f
them were subsequently murdered by victorious Partisans.

189

This part of Yugoslav history was kept in secret until the late 1980s. Then,
the stories about the Partisans’ cruelties began to get out. Among the most bitter
experiences o f that time was the exodus o f Croatian and Slovene soldiers and people.
They were driven back to Yugoslavia from Italian and Austrian camps along what is
now known as the “Bloody Path to Bleiburg.” In the town o f Bleiburg, Austria, they
were slaughtered by Partisans and buried in huge pits.

190

The Communist Rise to Power
The outcome o f the World War II led to a unified Yugoslavia, even though,
once again, there was no all-national consultation. In May 1945, the Yugoslav
Communist Party, at the head o f the victorious Partisan army, proceeded to
consolidate its power. The Partisans presented themselves as the sole unifying force
in Yugoslavia because they led simultaneous campaigns against occupiers,
collaborators, and Croatian, Serbian and other national extremists. This campaign
appealed to a large number o f non-communists, especially those who had been
radicalized by the upheavals o f the war.
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While the government in exile was con
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templating the dangers o f Communism in Yugoslavia, it was not able to fight for a
return to the status quo before the war. The old elites were eventually destroyed in
the course o f the civil war. As Axis forces withdrew, the Communists ascended to
power. The Communists seized power and never allowed free elections to challenge
their hegemony.

192

The Tito-Subasic government, which came into existence in

March, 1945, as a result o f political maneuvering among Tito, the Yugoslav
government in exile and the British government, was intended by the same subjects to
be a caretaker administration set up to govern the country during the difficult period
o f war reconstruction.
Elections to a Constituent Assembly in November 1945, were held under a
new electoral law which gave equal rights to men and women over the age o f
eighteen and to ex-Partisans under that age. The right to vote was withdrawn from
250,000 people alleged to have been collaborators. By the time o f elections, any
political party or candidate who was unwilling to run on the CPY National Front
Slate had been eliminated. Although some prewar, non-communist groups were
permitted to run on the National Front slate, there were no contested seats. Such a
discriminatory electoral law resulted in the victory of the People’s Front (a newly

(...continued)
from different ethnic groups was that the Party leadership did not attempt to
persuade Partisans that they were Yugoslav rather than Croat, Serb or Slovene. In an
atmosphere o f tolerance, each group was allowed its own national identity in order to
free itself from foreign rule. On the other hand the party leadership was clearly
thinking in Yugoslav terms. This devotion to Yugoslavism would show only when
the first conflicts between “provincial,” i.e., nationalist, and Yugoslav interest
emerged. See Paul Shoup, Communism, and Bilandzic, H istorija.
192

Sabrina Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962—1991,
2d ed. rev. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), p. 42.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

122

formed Communist organization) with 90 percent o f the votes cast. On November
29, 1945, the Constituent Assembly approved the abolition o f the monarchy and the
establishment o f the Federative People’s Republic o f Yugoslavia (Federativna
N arodna R epublika Jugoslavia—FNRJ). 193
Enthusiastic Communists, enchanted by the Marxist ideology, were proud o f
their achievements during and after the war. They never questioned that postwar
federalism and Yugoslavism would solve the national question for good, because they
believed in the strength o f national freedom and justice. That image was maintained in
post-war works o f the intellectuals. The work o f Franjo Tudjman, later President o f
Croatia between 1990-2000, may serve best to illustrate the official picture and
ideology concerning the role o f the Communists during World War H The People’s
Liberation Movement was described as the principal factor o f all developments in
Yugoslavia during the Fascist occupation o f 1941-1945, so that its growth within the
general framework of the Second World War resulted not only in the overthrow o f
the occupation system, but also in liquidation o f the bourgeois monarchy and the
establishment o f a new federated socialist commonwealth o f Yugoslav peoples.

194

The results of the first elections well illustrated that the CPY was committed
to the abolition of all other political parties. There were tw o ideological motives for
the CPY’s rejection o f political pluralism. First, Marxism regards political parties as a
part o f a “superstructure” o f the capitalist social and economic order whose purpose
is the perpetuation o f that order. In the building o f a socialist society, the CPY saw a

19^
Bilandzic, H istorija, pp. 71-80.
i ga

Tudjman, O kupacija, p. 309.
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multi-party system as unnecessary and regressive. Secondly, Leninism maintains that
a monopoly o f power by a communist party is a prerequisite for the revolutionary
transformation o f society. The CPY leadership was united in their belief in the need
for the “dictatorship o f the proletariat,” that is, their party’s monopoly o f power.

195

Since the CPY legitimacy rested on its claim to represent all the Yugoslav
peoples, federalism appeared as the logical option in order to satisfy the diverse
population and thus solve the national question. However, since the Communists
were preoccupied with consolidating power, their decisions about internal borders
and the treatment o f individual ethnic groups w ere arbitrary, without full
consideration for the potential consequences.

1 Q ft

Some o f the controversy regarding

territoriality issues and national question is illustrated by looking at the first 1946
Constitution and the subsequent three institutions o f 1953, 1963 and 1974, each o f
which established the varying federal structures.

197

The first constitution o f the post-World W ar H Yugoslavia was promulgated
on 31 January 1946. The Constitution sanctioned the country’s new structure as a
multinational federation o f eight units (six republics and two autonomous provinces)
based on both ethnic and historic criteria. The intention was to establish balance

195

Vojislav Kostunica and Kosta Cavoski, P arty Pluralism or M onism :
Social M ovem ents and the P olitical System in Yugoslavia (Boulder, Colo.: East
European Monographs, 1985).
196Milovan Djilas, Wartime (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977).
197

Agneza Bozic, “The Failure o f Institutions in Yugoslavia,” in Struggling
W ith the Comm unist Legacy: Studies o f Yugoslavia, Rom ania and P oland, eds.
Patricia Klein, Arthur Helweg, and Barbara M cCrea (East European Monographs,
distributed by Columbia University Press, 1988).
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between the units and to avoid the division o f territory with ethnically mixed
populations. The establishment o f Bosnia and Herzegovina as a separate republic, for
instance, was intended to obviate the contention between Croats and Serbs on the
origin o f the Muslims. Contrary to the Communist own principle “to each nation its
own territorial unit,” the largest republic, Serbia, was divided into three
elements— Serbia proper, the autonomous province o f Vojvodina and the
autonomous province ofKosovo-Metohija.

198

The justification o f this division of

Serbia, other than ethnic reasons, was that it would dispel fears o f revival o f Serbian
hegemonism which dominated in pre-war Yugoslavia. However, similar proposals for
other units, namely to form autonomous region of the heavily Serbian inhabited areas
in Croatia, were treated as “reactionary” and rejected on the ground that it would
lead to division o f other Yugoslav nations. 199 While none o f the republics was
ethnically homogeneous, they quickly became identified as the national and territorial
homelands o f their titular nations, with exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina which
was always described as consisting o f Serbs, Croats and Muslims.

200

The Constitution sanctioned equality o f nationality, race and religion. All
Yugoslav citizens had equal rights and duties; all six republics were also proclaimed

198Forty years later, this division o f Serbia will be the major cause for Serbian
intellectuals to demand a unified state in their Memorandum o f the Serbian Academy
of Sciences and Arts. This document will serve as a blueprint for the Serbian leaders
who created constitutional crisis since 1988.
199

Vojislav Kostunica, “The Constitution and the Federal States,” in
Yugoslavia, a Fractured Federalism , ed. Dennison Rusinow (Washington, D.C.: The
Wilson Center Press, 1988), pp. 78-92.
200

South Slav Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina were not recognized as a
nation, although they were often mentioned as a separate group.
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equal, which meant that no republic dominated any other, and that their equality
rested on their sovereignty. In reality, the republics w ere not sovereign.

201

The

Constitution o f 1946 provided each nation with a separate national unit and
representative assemblies, government, courts, anthems, flags and other signs and
symbols. But, as Stanovcic warns, one should not overestimate the importance o f
these signs and symbols because the system in general was centralized. The economy
was under the control o f the central government and the monolithic Communist Party
enjoyed a monopoly o f political and ideological power.

202

The standard monolithic totalitarianism featured complete nationalization o f
industry, centralized economic planning, a single communist front organization, and
elimination of all opponents. Thus, during the period 1945-1952, the FNRJ was
modeled after the USSR in both structure and operation.

203

Bilandzic refers to that

period as the period o f administrative centralism, while Cohen calls it hierarchical or
“bolshevik-type” federalism.204 The federal principle remained to a great extent

201
Not only were the republics ruled by the Communist Party, but the
Constitution limited their sovereignty. Articles 9 and 11, respectively, delineated that
certain rights belonged only to FNRJ, and that the republics constitutions conform to
the federal Constitution. See Djilas, Contested Country, pp. 160-61.
202

Vojislav Stanovcic, “History and Status o f Ethnic Conflict,” in Yugoslavia,
a F ractured Federalism , ed. Dennison Rusinow. Washington, D.C.: The Wilson
Center Press, 1988.
203

In 1948, however, the break with the Soviet Union and Eastern European
Communist parties occurred as a consequence o f the Yugoslav habits of autonomous
decision making and lack o f submission to Stalin, who wanted overall control over
the new Communist party states o f Eastern Europe.
204Bilandzic, H istorija, pp. 118-20; Lennard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: The
D isintegration o f Yugoslavia (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 26-28.
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theoretical, except that both houses o f the Skupstina, federal assembly, had equal
powers. Skupstina initially was the only bi-cameral legislature among the East
European “parliaments.” It consisted o f tw o houses, Federal Assembly, Savezno
Vijece, which was elected by universal suffrage and the Council o f Nationalities,
Vijece Naroda, which was made up o f equal number o f representatives from the six
republics and the two autonomous units.

205

Despite the facade of this “federal” structure, Bilandzic maintains that the
whole system was one absolute monolith on the top of which was the Politburo o f the
Central Committee o f the CPY with ten members, each o f them in charge o f certain
part o f the system.

205

The close interlocking o f party and state functions was also

symbolized by Tito’s position as head o f government, army and o f the party. This
system o f “administrative socialism” resulted in poor economic performance and
disillusionment with people who were waiting for proclaimed equality to occur.

207

Centralism, that is, state monopoly over the means o f production, was against
the principles o f national equality, especially in economic matters. In addition to a
highly controlled centralized structure, the fact that capital and major institutions
were located in Beograd led some individuals in other federal units to believe that the

205Bilandzic, H istorija, 118.
206Ibid.
207

The level o f economic development o f the regions to become constituent
units o f Yugoslavia was so disparate that the regions were divided into “developed”
north and “underdeveloped” south. For more detailed analysis o f these differences in
labor efficiency 1965—1977 and per capita social product o f the republics 1947-78.
See Ramet, N ationalism and Federalism , pp. 142—43, and Singleton, Short H istory,
p. 211.
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Serbian nation was favored and that little had changed compared to the pre-WW II
state.

208

The ruling CPY distanced people from power and weakened the

cooperation that had developed during the liberation war. The only support for the
centralist policies o f the state came from those who argued for the unitary aspect o f
nationalism.

209

The first signs o f intra-national conflicts, especially over the arbitrary

redistribution o f “centralized income” and investment funds, emerged to the big
surprise o f the CPY which strongly believed that “national question” was resolved
through federal structure and formation o f a big “socialist community” ignorant o f
particular differences among its constituent peoples. 210
In the 1950s, in order to win the confidence o f the population, the party
launched the “four Ds” policy with the aims o f democratization, decentralization,
deetatization and debureaucratization in hopes that it would dispel centralist and
etatist tendencies.

211

The well-known features o f the Yugoslav system, self

management and local government, reflected this orientation and grew out o f it. As
the CPY realized the need for change, as was common to communist states, a new

^ ra n k o Horvat, renowned political economist, and the director o f the
internationally recognized Yugoslav Institute for Economic Research from
1963-1968, lamented the destiny o f that institute which was located in Beograd, the
capitol o f both Serbia and Yugoslavia. Horvat was persecuted by Rankovic, the
director o f UDBA (secret police). As a result the federal Institute for Economic
Research, just like other four federal Institutes, closed and immediately became
Serbian institution, under the control of the Republic o f Serbia even though it claimed
federal character. Personal interview, October 14, 1997.
OflQ

Bilandzic, H istorija,.pp. 210-211.

210Ibid„ pp. 135-36, 143.
211Ibid., pp. 164-75.
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constitution was written to bridge the gap between the constitutional myth and
regime reality.
In 1953 the constitution was drastically modified, so that it became in effect a
new one. The Constitutional law o f 1953 reflected the cautious steps toward
decentralization. It took into account the development o f self-management under the
1950 manifesto “factories to the workers” and the reforms in local government which
occurred in 1952. At the Sixth Congress the CPY officially changed its name into the
League o f Communists o f Yugoslavia, supposedly to reflect its avant guard role
rather than ever-present administrative mechanism o f control. This change was done
with intention to win the confidence of the population. The local government reforms
gave a degree o f autonomy to the basic units o f local government, communes
(opstine), which were to oversee the economic, social, and cultural life o f the areas
under their administration. 212
The law also changed the structure of the Federal and republics’ assemblies
which now acquired the Producers’ Councils, Vijece proizvodjaca. The Federal
Assembly was made up o f Federal Council, Savezno Vijece, which “incorporated”
former Council o f Nationalities (elected by the representatives of the republics and
autonomous provinces) and Council of Producers. The question remains: why did the
communists eliminate/change Council o f Nationalities if the principle o f election
remained the same? To some analysts the answer lies in the fact that elimination o f

212

G. Lenardson and D. Mircev, “A Structure for Participatory Democracy in
Local Community: The Yugoslav Constitution o f 1974,” Comparative P olitics, 11,
2 (1977): 189-203.
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the Chamber o f Nationalities was consistent with ideological expectation that the
republics, before the state would disappear, would “wither away.”
The position o f the president o f the republic

213

was created and its first (and

only, since the post was eliminated in 1980, after his death) incumbent was Josip
Broz Tito. As a supreme executive body and effective government o f the country,
Federal Executive Council (Savezno Izvrsno Vijece), was created. The members o f
this body were elected by the Federal Assembly. The first FEC consisted o f thirtyeight members, thirty-six o f whom were members o f the Central Committee of the
C P Y 215
During the period between 1953—1962, the grip o f the communists was
somewhat loosened, although they still represented the only organized political force
in the society and, despite proclaimed and factual liberalization o f the society, the
party still had an option to exercise total control if necessary. Cohen describes this
period as “quasi-federalism” in one-party moderate centralization. Bilandzic best
describes the gap between theory and practice through the case o f one o f the closest
allies of Tito, Milovan Djilas. He was removed from his office because he strayed

George Klein and Patricia Klein, “Nationalism vs. Ideology,” in The
P olitics o f E thnicity in Eastern Europe, eds. George Klein and Milan Reban
(Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1981), pp. 247-79.
01 A

The president, who is also commander in chief o f the armed forces,
promulgates federal law by decree, proposes the election o f the judges o f the
Constitutional Court, appoints ambassadors, grants pardons for criminal offenses, and
if Federal Assembly is unable to meet, declares war. During a state o f hostilities or in
the event o f an immediate threat o f war, the president may pass decrees with the
force of law on matters within the Assembly’s jurisdiction. On this see Staar,
Communist Regim es, pp. 194—45.
215Bilandzic, H istorija, p. 177. See also Singleton, Short H istory, p. 229.
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from the party line by arguing for second socialist party that would compete with the
LCY. His removal testified that rhetorical changes would not lead to the LCY’s
abandonment o f political power over the society.
Liberalization occurred in economic sector toward establishment o f another
unique characteristic o f Yugoslavia “market socialism.” The powers o f taxation were
gradually transferred to the republics and to local units of government which could
now plan their own policies o f economic development. But this transfer o f power
contributed to greater inequality in the economic development among the constituent
units o f Yugoslavia, and would become a major issue in inter-republican affairs.
More than ideological, the need for a more efficient economy drove this
change which occurred in the midst o f a great debate between economists and
politicians, especially with those fearful o f market reforms which could undermine the
socialist basis of economy. Those that opposed economic reform came largely from
the southern underdeveloped regions—who were afraid that the market would
benefit the already prosperous areas of Yugoslavia disproportionately—but also from
influential institutions such as the Army and the Police, both dominated by the Serbs
and Montenegrins who feared that decentralization would erode the Serbian
dominance in government and the LCY.

2. 17

P atricia Klein and George Klein, “The United States and Yugoslavia:
Divergent Approaches Toward Diversity,” in E thnic Dynamics: P atterns o f
Intergroup R elations in Various Societies, eds. Chester Hunt and Lewis Walker
(Holmes Beach: Learning Publications, Inc., 1979), pp. 363-98.
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The 1960s: The Decade o f Reforms
The third Yugoslav constitution, adopted in April 1963, formalized the
changes made in the Yugoslav system since 1953; at the same time it provided a
framework in which the movement for democratic reform could expand. It departed
from its predecessor, the 1953 Fundamental Law, in several basic respects. The
former People’s Republic was now named the Socijalisticka Federativna R epublika
Jugoslavia, Socialist Federated Republic o f Yugoslavia (SFRJ). Decentralization
was advanced as best elaborated in the concept o f self-management, which was now
to expand to all forms o f the society. The Federal Assembly, Skupstina, now included
five chambers: Chamber o f Nationalities would meet when certain constitutional
matters affecting the relations among the republics were discussed. The remaining
chambers, the Chambers o f Sociopolitical, Economic, Education and Culture and
Social Welfare and Health, were indirectly elected to represent the functionally
specific interests o f the workers in different occupations.

218

The government, the Federal Executive Council (FEC), Savezno Izvrsno
Vijece, elected by the Federal Assembly, was responsible for coordinating and
supervising the federal administration. The FEC, the source o f legislative proposals,
was the most important governmental body so far as the character o f day-to-day
government operations was concerned. Its thirty-three members constituted what in
fact was a cabinet. The most important consideration, a stipulation pushed by Tito,
regarding the composition o f the council was that it should reflect the various
nationalities o f the country. A new institution, a Council o f the Federation, Savjet

218Skilling, G overnments, pp. 154-55.
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Federacije, was established. Its role was that o f chief advisory to the President. Its
members, usually distinguished former ministers, ambassadors, party officials,
soldiers and artists, were nominated by the president.
The 1963 constitution introduced two concepts. First, a system o f rotation in
office, whereby members o f public bodies may not be re-elected to a second
consecutive term. Second, it forbade simultaneous occupancy o f the leading political
offices in both state and LCY, except in the case of Tito, who was president o f the
republic for life. Another significant feature o f the 1963 constitution includes
acknowledgment o f the LCY and the communist-front Socialist Alliance as the only
political groups with legal status.

219

The inauguration o f the 1963 Constitution led to developments o f a disparate
nature. While the Constitution introduced a real measure o f decentralization, the
control o f the federal government was still firmly in the hands o f the party (through
the president o f the federal republic who now enjoyed enlarged powers). The
“federalization” o f politics, as part o f decentralization, took place through the
devolution o f power to the republics during the time which coincided with the period
o f economic reform o f the 1960s.

220

This decentralization, which occurred both at the state level and in the LCY,
fostered a closer association between nationality and territory since each republic and
the two provinces was constituted as the “home” of a titular nationality. The extent

219Bilandzic, H istorija, pp. 296-99.
220

The economic reform was officially inaugurated May 20, 1964 through
“Resolutions on the basic directions for the further development o f the economic
system.” The Federal Assembly’s Resolutions reflect the decisions o f the Fifth
Congress o f the Federal Trade Union Council [P eti K ongres Saveza Sindikata].
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o f democratization was manifested through Party’s renouncement o f Yugoslav
consciousness, or Yugoslavism, which had been so prominent in the fifties.

221

At the

Eight Congress o f LC Y in 1964, the up to that moment taboo, the national question,
was addressed as an “open question,” open for debate and a new approach. The
ideology o f Yugoslavism would be replaced by republican/national equality along the
lines o f self-management. Self-management would be the device used to constrain
particularistic nationalism, while assuring the continuation of party control.

222

Because the republics were territorially defined by ethnicity, the loosening of
central control and the separation o f the LCY from the state machine gave an
opportunity for more republican assertiveness. This assertiveness eventually would be
identified as nationalism. A growing chorus o f discontent from the republics came at
the end o f the 1960s. The representatives o f less developed republics, led by BosniaHerzegovina, which called for an unprecedented meeting o f the Chamber o f
Nationalities in 1967, complained about unfair distribution o f federal funds for
economic development. The increasingly liberal representatives o f more developed
republics, Slovenia and Croatia, on the other hand, complained about abuse o f the
same and other federal funds (social security, in particular) and wanted to abolish

See Djilas, C ontested C ountry for good description o f differences between
“old” Yugoslavism o f King Aleksandar and “new” Yugoslavism as promoted by the
Communist Party, pp. 179-180.
See Tito’s and Kardelj’s addresses at the Eight Congress: E ight Congress
o f LCY, Vol. 1 (Beograd: Kultura, 1965).
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them. At the same time nationalist discontent was visible in the cultural arena,
especially with issues o f language and the treatment o f minorities.

223

Throughout all this, each republican party developed internal divisions, of
liberal and conservative groups. In an attempt to diffuse these nascent revolts,
nineteen constitutional amendments that gave wider powers to the republics were
prepared and passed by the Federal Assembly in 1967-68. These amendments not
only reduced the prerogatives o f the federal government, but they also granted the
autonomous provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina near parity with the republics. They
also corrected the mistake committed in 1953 by reintroducing The Council of
22^1

Nationalities as the upper chamber o f the Skupstina.

But, the constitutional

changes did not achieve the desired effect o f dampening the determination of the
nationalist leaders for further autonomy and control. They claimed that their requests
reflected resolutions reached at Eighth Congress LCY. Yugoslavism was forced to
retreat further under the growing pressure from local, but this time Party, leadership.
The key turning point o f the 1960s was the major economic reform. The
reform was intended by Tito and the Party as an attack on economic inefficiency,
corruption, unprofitable enterprises, distorted prices and other detrimental effects o f
central planning. In reality, the reform was the result o f the decentralization:
“Centrally planned investment [had become] impossible in Yugoslavia because it was

223

For a more detailed description o f each republic’s requests, see Ramet
N ationalism and Federalism, pp. 115—18. For Serbia, see Nicholas Miller,
“Reconstituting Serbia: 1945-1991” in Bokovoy et al., State-Society, pp. 291-314.
224Bilandzic, H istorija, p. 330.
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no longer possible to agree politically about such planning.”

225

Remington describes

this period o f Yugoslav history as “Perestroika the Yugoslav way” because it was
marked by the Yugoslav economists’ struggle with the question o f how to reform the
country’s still largely command economy. The economic boom o f the early 1960s
convinced liberal economists from successful sectors of the economy that the time to
push ahead had come. F or them, the real problem with self-management was the ratio
o f principle to practice. Their choice was efficiency and real market socialism (capital
intensive selective development) instead o f token market socialism, and this was
achievable only through decentralized political power. The reform o f 1965 included
planning on the enterprise level, group ownership o f the means o f production,
removal o f the state control over banks, a greater role for prices and, in general, for
the market.226
The tug o f war between “economic realists,” usually identified with Croatia
and Slovenia, and conservative “political realists,” usually identified with Serbia, who
were more interested in preservation of their power basis was reflected in the removal
o f Aleksander Rankovic in 1966. Aleksandar Rankovic, a Serb, was Tito’s closest
ally, and since 1963, Vice-President of Yugoslavia and the head o f the State Security
Service, UDBA. When the economic reform began to take ground, and with it the
process o f decentralization o f the federal administration, Rankovic took the side of
unitarists and centralists because the implications o f reforms were in direct opposition
225

Deborah Milenkovitch, Plan and M arket in Yugoslav Econom ic Thought
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 177.
226Robin A. Remington, “Self-management and Development Strategies in
Socialist Yugoslavia,” in D iverse Paths to M odernity in Southeaster Europe, ed.
Gerasimos Augustinos (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), pp. 57-87.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

136
to the political and administrative interests o f Serbian unity. The policy of
discrimination toward Albanians in Serbia and Kosovo and Hungarians in Vojvodina
by Rankovic’s men was seen as unconstitutional and a conscientious effort at
undermining decisions o f the Eighth Congress.

227

Some analysts think that Rankovic

was just a scapegoat for struggles that were taking place in the leadership o f the
country as well as the way to get rid o f him.

228

It is important to note, however, how

Rankovic’s disgrace was perceived by Serbs at the time:
Serbs reacted to Rankovic’s fall as though the Serbian nation itself had been
defeated. B orba o f September 15, 1996, cited lamentations thatLC Y policy
had become anti-Serb and that the Serbs no longer had anyone to defend their
interests. UDBa itself was shaken up, and many key security personnel were
transferred to large trading corporations in Belgrade.229
However, in other parts o f the country, Rankovic w as seen as the leader o f a
coalition which was impeding the needed economic reform, so his removal
strengthened the pro-reform liberal coalition even though the alliances did not
necessarily represent best economic choices. Naturally, the chief opponents o f the
reform, the centralists, were those who would be left out in the shift to selective
development. The conservative leadership o f Serbia, as the main proponent o f
centralist tendencies, was hoping to establish itself as the leader o f the block o f
underdeveloped countries. Such a bloc would isolate Croatia and Slovenia, permit the
concentration o f industries in Serbia, and support centralization o f the political

227Bilandzic, H istorija, pp. 331-32.
228For different views o f Rankovic’s disgrace, see Pavlowitz, Im probable
Survivor, and Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism .
229Ramet, N ationalism and Federalism , 1992, p. 91.
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system and reassertion o f Serbian hegemony within the federal context. The expected
alignments on the economic grounds did not materialize because Slovenian and
Croatian liberals were able to capitalize on the fears o f Greater Serbian Chauvinism
and to solicit southern liberals to accept market mechanisms in the economy even
though it was not to their economic interest. It appears that the Croat and Slovene
leadership transformed economic issues (decentralization, decreasing o f aid to
unprofitable enterprises in the south), into political issues, i.e., liberalization as
opposition to the Serbian hegemony.

230

This example illustrates the claim that after decentralization took place, the
balance o f power between communal republican and federal institutions was never
definitely resolved. This balance usually displayed itself through the power struggle
between centralist or conservative forces—that argued for unity at any cost, and a
liberal stream—that leaned more toward democratization through
decentralization.

231

The reformers, who were joined by advocates o f party

democratization and liberalization in the cultural sector, got the support and blessing
o f Tito and federal party leaders. Tome claims that 1960s initiated the trend that
would color the rest o f Yugoslavia’s destiny: the diminishing role o f the party
state.

232

After Rankovic’s removal in 1966, the level o f political liberty was

significantly expanded but those liberties lasted only until 1971-72, when Tito

230Ibid., p. 98.
Klein and Klein, “Nationalism vs. Ideology,” pp. 249-51.
232

Gregor Tome, “Classes, Party Elites and Ethnic Identity,” in Yugoslavia, a
Fractured Federalism , ed. Dennison Rusinow (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson
Center Press, 1988), p. 69.
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decided they were harmful to the national security.

233

The balance o f power between

liberals and conservatives changed at that time because the far-reaching reforms the
leadership o f Croatia pushed went beyond desires o f its coalition partners.
In the late 1960s, faced with first the Croatian demands for revisions o f
Yugoslav economic system, 234 Serbian declarations about Kosovo, 23 5 Slovenes’
accusation that the federation discriminated against Slovenia,

236

and other acts o f

republican and provincial assertiveness, the institutions o f Yugoslav federation and
LCY proved to be incapable of dealing with changes inaugurated by economic and
political reforms which generated frequent crises in the functioning o f the federal
institutions. What happened was that even though republics were given a green light
to independently formulate their policies, the real executive power still rested with
federal institutions and Tito. All the executive power resided within federation which

233

Democratization brought a lot o f changes in previously highly controlled
political space, e.g., new political forces critical o f Communist policies, from
anarcho-liberal to conservatives were allowed to function; political freedoms were at
its highest since establishment o f SFRJ, the Yugoslavs were permitted to travel to
other countries and tourists from abroad were encouraged to come to SFRJ. Foreign
media were sold at the newsstands. See Bilandzic, H istorija, p. 339.
234

Some believe that the culmination o f republican assertiveness was the
“Deklaracija,” a statement signed by leading Croatian intellectuals in March 1967,
asking for the separate existence o f a Croatian linguistic and literary tradition and
denying the validity o f Serbo-Croatian as an historic language. Underlying this
assertion was the fear with some Croatians that Serbianization o f Croatian language
was taking place.
235

Interestingly, the first proclamations about the importance o f Kosovo for
Serbia and how the character o f Kosovo was to be determined by its history and not
by its democratic makeup, came from Dobrica Cosic, a member o f the Central
Committee o f the LC o f Serbia, at its Fourteenth Plenum on May 29, 1968. See
Miller, “Reconstituting Serbia,” p. 298.
This crisis is popularly known as Slovenian road affair (“cestna afera ").
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was not prepared to deal with republican demands. For instance, when different
republics would put their requests, that would be put for negotiations and decisions
made would reflect coordinated effort from all republican representatives who
frequently conflicted with each other. Because o f the lack o f institutional means of
coordination, republican assertiveness came to be seen in an increasingly negative
light. Yet, in order to change the federal institutions, all the republican leaders would
have to arrive at such decision by consensus. 237 As institutions lagged behind
proclaimed principles, it was increasingly obvious that the Yugoslav economy was
not strong enough for true economic reform. Severe economic conditions, the rise of
unemployment and the decrease in the standard o f living induced rising discontent in
the population. The student demonstrations o f 1968 pointed to the salience o f the
crisis. The students demanded jobs for Yugoslavs. They objected to the party
privileges and wanted knowledge and technical training to count for more than
political connections or military record. They requested a more meaningful
democratization o f party life, less corruption, and a return to socialist morality. The
demonstrations accused the LCY of being incapable o f dealing with the growing
problems in the Yugoslav society.

238

Nevertheless, at the Ninth LCY Congress in

1969 Tito decided to further the political reform. The LCY confirmed its own
devolution o f powers. The Congress endorsed the principle that the League was
made up of eight constituents bodies, one each for the republics and one each for the

237Bilandzic, H istorija, 368-69.
238Ibid., pp. 305-20.
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two autonomous provinces.

239

Instead o f two dominant blocks, the balance o f

Yugoslav politics will now have to be between nine o f them, the ninth representing
federal institutions.
Nationalism was the product o f several factors: o f the growing regional
inequalities and differences which did not correspond with the notion o f Socialism as
the society o f equals, o f the growing power of the republican/provincial party elites
and consequently o f the increasing emancipation o f the society from the party and
from the state.

240

Tome sees the national movements in Yugoslavia as the new social

actors that filled the social space vacated by the party in the 1960s.241
The 1970s: Nationalism
The period between 1963 and the last, 1974, constitution can best be
described as “cooperative” federalism among central, republican and local authorities.
The dynamics between state and party was somewhat paradoxical, but reflective o f
the tendencies that were plaguing the country: nationalist tendencies were
counteracted by unitarism and hegemonism, all equally dangerous for the unity of
Yugoslavia. The processes o f further decentralization and regionalization of the

239

McCrea claims that LCY, despite Lenin’s strictures, permitted meaningful
federalization, with the result that its party politics may be fairly described as
federalized. Barbara McCrea, The P olitical Dynamics o f F ederalism in a M arxistL eninist Setting: The League o f Comm unists o f Yugoslavia. Doctoral Dissertation.
University o f Notre Dame, 1992.
240

Oscar Gruenwald, The Yugoslav Search fo r M an: M arxism Humanism in
Contem porary Yugoslavia (South Hadley, Mass.: J. F. Bergin Publishers, Inc., 1982).
241 Tome, “Classes,” pp. 64-72.
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country and o f the LCY, were mixed with attempts toward recentralization o f the
party.

242

While the Party was committed to structural and territorial federalization in

order to satisfy national emotions, it did not give up its own monopoly and political
power remained highly concentrated in the highest organs o f the Party.

243

National

rivalries which developed because o f decentralization illustrated a trend that would
color the future o f Yugoslavia.

OA A

By the beginning o f the 1970s, the most vocal and articulate demands for
further decentralization, meaning greater congruence between republic and nation;
and democratization, i.e., greater space for independent expression of social
a

i c

movements, came from Croatia.

What the political elite in Croatia wanted above

all was reform o f the banking, foreign trade and foreign currency system so as to
implement their own policies within their republic, which meant going beyond the
power to veto decisions o f the federal government. The request on the part o f the
Croatian League o f Communists that money should be at the disposal of those who
earn it, rather than going to the center in Belgrade and then being distributed as the

242

Indicative o f this is Tito’s decision at the Ninth Congress of LCY in 1969,
to form a strong institution at the top of LCY. He created Izvrsni biro Predsjednistva
SK J, Executive Bureau o f LCY Presidency. See Bilandzic, H istorija, p. 369.
243Shoup, Communism, p. 113.
2 ^| i

Zdravko Tomac, University of Zagreb professor and Vice President o f the
Croatian Social Democratic Party (formerly Communist Party of Croatia), sees the
end o f the 1960s as the time when conflict in Yugoslavia actually started. At that time
o f decentralization and liberalization, “nationalism was beginning to be used as a
means o f mobilization” in various republics. Personal interview, Zagreb, Croatia,
October 14, 1997.
245Tomc, “Classes,” p. 69.
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federation decided, was interpreted by the Belgrade press as a growing wave o f
nationalism in Croatia.
The movement, popularly known as “Croatian Spring,” enjoyed popular
support in Croatia. In this short period, many ideological, national, and sociological
aspirations were verbalized, but within these two basic ideas, or visions o f the
Croatian state dominated: the national and liberal-democratic. The public supported
further democratization within the socialist system o f Yugoslavia. However, reading
between lines o f some written documents and in some incidents, it was possible to
discern a demand for complete independence, based on Croatian exclusionism, and
continuation o f the tradition o f the NDH. Goldstein claims that even though there
were some inappropriate anti-Serbian incidents, anti-Serbian feelings did not play a
major role in the “Croatian Spring.” Most Serbs, Croatia’s largest ethnic minority
were wary o f the movement. In some villages, remembering the tragic events o f the
World W ar D, they even obtained weapons.

246

The mass demonstration o f students on the streets o f Zagreb in December
1971 ended with the army and police moving into Zagreb and the arrest o f student
leaders and the prohibition o f Matica Hrvatska, the traditional Croatian cultural

AS

In 1971 Serbs constituted 14.2 percent of Croatia’s population, in 1981,
11.6 percent, and in 1991, 12.2 percent. The Serbs had an absolute majority in 11 o f
Croatia’s 114 municipalities. See Ivo Goldstein, Croatia: A H istory, trans. Nikolina
Jovanovic (New York: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), pp. 179-80. See
also Paul Shoup, “The Future o f Croatia’s Border Regions,” R adio Free Europe:
Report on E astern Europe, 2, 48 (1991): 26-33.
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organization that was revived during the period o f liberalization.

There followed

the purge o f republic and provincial leaders who were accused o f being
“nationalistically minded,” but who also were liberal and reformist. Following the
purge o f Croatian Party,
Serbian Party too.

to be even-handed, Tito purged the liberals o f the

JAQ

The 1971 Croatian crisis along with upheavals in Slovenia, Serbia,
Montenegro and Kosovo raised fears with the LCY leaders that any radical change in
the federal framework would threaten the unity o f Yugoslavia. Tome describes the
reaction o f the core party leadership to the crisis that ended the 1960s period o f
liberalization as twofold: It severely reduced the degree o f possible political
democracy while at the same time it delegated greater power to republican and
provincial party elites. Thus, the counter-reform had aspects that were anti-

For a fuller discussion o f history and implications of the “Croatian
Spring,’’see Milovan Baletic, ed., Ljudi iz 1971: P rekinuta Sutnja [People fro m
1971: Interrupted Silence] (Zagreb: Biblioteka Vrijeme, 1990); Ivan Peric,
Suvrem eni H rvatski Nacionalizam : Izvori i Izrazi [Contem porary Croatian
Nationalism : Sources and Countenances] (Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1976).
248

The 1971 Croatian Party leadership was frequently referred to as the
triumvirate: Mika Tripalo, Savka Dabcevic-Kucar and Pero Pirker.
249

Serbian liberals, such as Latinka Perovic, the secretary o f the LC o f Serbia,
and Marko Nikezic, the president o f the Central Committee o f the LC o f Serbia were
purged in 1972. The essence o f their position seems to have been that forces o f
democratization in Serbia should be used to dispel Great Serbian nationalism (and
prevalent identification o f Serbia with Yugoslavia) and to focus on its own
development. Latinka Perovic, C losing Cycle— The O utcome o f the 1971-2 S p lit
(Sarajevo, 1991), quoted in Branka Magas, The D estruction o f Yugoslavia (London:
Verso, 1993), pp. 351-55.
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democratic and aspects that were confederalist, although the growing confederate
character o f Yugoslavia was not admitted.

250

One inevitably wonders what was the reason behind this process o f de facto
confederation. The idea o f confederation, especially the accompanying popularity
which some o f the regional elites enjoyed among their people, was not acceptable to
key elements o f the Party. One can speculate that the reason for this was that the
party elite thought it had armed itself with the ideology o f self-management, and
therefore could allow greater powers to federal units. This ideology o f self
management was intended to hold the country together with the sheer strength o f
belief. Ideology became the main integrating factor, which was supposed to be
capable o f withstanding demands for both political decentralization and national
unity.
Developments in the 1970s proved that this hope was in vain. The
Constitutional Amendments in 1971 passed in March were intended to complete the
reform o f the federation. The Amendments were seen as an instrument which would
strengthen the self-managing system in opposition to the forces o f etatism. The
Communist were proud to announce that their federation defied any existing
definition o f federation because it was built on the “theory and practice o f selfmanagerial society,” which means that all the decision-making was to be done
through the process o f collective accommodation (usuglasavanja). Yet the effects of
these Amendments was only to strengthen the position o f the republics. Amendment
20 assigned to republics the status o f “states” that are carriers o f sovereignty. The

250Tomc, “Classes,” pp. 71—72.
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federation is to exercise its powers in foreign affairs, defense, foreign trade, the
common currency, and to ensure functioning o f one united Yugoslav market. But
regional party elites, paying lip service to “brotherhood and unity,” used the ideology
o f self-management to promote their own particular political interests and thus to
create political legitimacy and power bases in their home republics. The 1971
Croatian national crisis along with the upheavals in Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro and
Kosovo raised the fear with the LCY leaders that any radical change in the federal
framework would threaten the unity o f Yugoslavia.
Consequently, the Party focused on how to return Yugoslav politics to more
direct party control. As the only universal factor of unity, Tito decided to firmly hold
on to the army and police.

251

W as this a sign that the country could have been kept

together only by force? The resurrection of the wartime “triumvirate” o f party-armystate was only one safeguard Tito attempted to build into the system to keep the
country together. Self-management and the delegate system were another safeguard,
the later proclaimed as a mechanism o f direct election/participation, basically
reintertwined the party and the government from the Basic Units o f Labor and
community to the federation. In a weird, Yugoslav way, this is how reassertion o f the
party’s control was to occur. Perhaps the mechanism which most reflected Tito’s
awareness o f the nationality problem was the creation o f a collective Presidium at the

251Klein and Klein, “Nationalism vs. Ethnicity,” p. 251.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

146
LCY level and a collective State Presidency, each with one representative from the
eight units, at the federal level as T ito’s successors.

252

Developments in the 1970s proved that this hope was in vain. Klein and Klein
maintain that the Croat crisis o f 1971 was the logical result o f the Yugoslav system:
first, the Yugoslavs could freely travel to other countries and were able to compare
the conditions in their country to those o f other countries. In that situation it would
be difficult to prevent criticism. Second, the system was based on “contested
elections,” although opposing political parties remained illegal, elections were
contested by more than one candidate. Third, the republics have a freedom to dispose
of investment funds that they generated. To them, local politicians acted like any
power brokers within the political and economic market place. In order to mobilize
their constituencies they had to represent themselves as proponents o f their
constituents’ aspirations. If they wanted to enlarge their constituency across narrow
Party lines, they had to appeal to the entire population o f the republic on a
nationalistic basis.

253

In essence, regional party elites, paying lip service to

“brotherhood and unity,” used the ideology o f self-management to promote their own
particular political interests and thus to create political legitimacy in their home
republics, which became the only meaningful source o f legitimacy.
Since the Croatian movement o f 1971—72 was seen as a threat the leadership
o f Yugoslavia, under the firm hand o f Tito, decided to do whatever was necessary to

252

Inaugurated as part o f the 1971 Constitutional reform, Amendment 36; see
Bilandzic, H istorija, p. 373. At Tito’s death, the President o f the Presidency was to
rotate annually, according to he Constitutionally-determined rota, as indeed occurred
upon Tito’s death in 1980.
253Klein and Klein, “Nationalism vs. Ethnicity,” p. 250.
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preserve the unity o f the state. The reaction o f the core party leadership to the crisis
was twofold: They severely reduced democratization at the price o f decentralization,
which was acceptable to most ambitious republican party leadership. Political
democracy was decreased while at the same time greater power was delegated to the
republican and provincial party elites. Both tendencies were visible in the Resolutions
o f the IX and X Congresses o f the LCY, held in 1969 and 1974, respectively. The
Congresses served the function o f gathering party officials for long discussions about
the problems o f the country and future developments, which were meant to serve as
blueprints for changes in the whole country. The Tenth Congress of the LCY, held in
May 1974, attempted to establish the Party as a “state-building” force despite the
proclaimed commitment to the equality o f the nations and to the principles o f
workers self-management. The Congress demanded return to Party discipline (which
was denounced at the Ninth Congress) and condemned phenomena such as
“liberalism,” “pluralism,” “spontaneity,” and “federalization o f the Party,” all
keywords for the loosening o f Party control. Thus, the counter-reform had aspects
that were anti-democratic and aspects that were confederalist, although the
confederate character o f Yugoslavia was not admitted. 254
The next step in the counter-reform was the constitution that was introduced
in 1974 which replaced the 1963 constitution as amended in 1967 and 1971. The
1974 Constitution delineated a completely new set o f executive and legislative
institutions and a new way o f decision making. Cohen, and even Elazar, cogently

254Tomc, “Classes,” p. 71.
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describe the evolution o f the system toward confederation.

255

In Yugoslavia,

however, politicians and scholars respectively referred to this new development as
“polycentric federalism”o r “contractual federation.”
In introducing the 1974 Constitution,

257

Tito stated: “A determined break has

been made with all the remnants o f so-called representative democracy which suits
the bourgeois class.”

258

This was in response to the “sectarian” behavior of the

representatives to the Federal Assembly, who increasingly argued for the interests o f
their constituency rather them for federation as a whole. The most important
institutions promulgated by the 1974 Constitution were the indirect system of
elections, delegatski system , and the structure and decision-making o f the Federal
Assembly. The system o f elections was promoted as Tito’s way o f ensuring the unity
of the country. The elaborate and complicated system o f workers’ supposed
participation was difficult to achieve. The delegatski system never fulfilled its

255

Cohen, Broken Bonds; Daniel Elazar, E xploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa:
University o f Alabama Press, 1987).
256
Ciril Ribicic and Zdravko Tomac, Federalizam P o M jeri Buducnosti
[Federalism to the m easure o f the fu tu re] (Zagreb: Globus, 1989).
257

The 1974 Constitution is one of the longest and most complicated o f any
in the world. It covers every single aspect o f social and political relations and
describes in detail the rights and duties of Yugoslav citizens. (It covers matters such
as protection o f the environment, national defence, freedom o f movement and o f the
press, family planning, minority rights, etc.
Cited in Singleton, Short H istory, p. 261.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

149
promised function as a form o f direct democracy.

259

Gruenwald’s description o f the

fallacies o f the system demonstrates that it, as with every other political innovation,
suffered from party’s inability to give up its monopoly o f power. “In reality, the
Yugoslav system is a quest for totalitarian democracy,”

260

despite the window-

dressing of workers’ self-management.
261

The Federal Assembly

consisted o f two chambers, a Federal Chamber and

a Chamber o f Republics and Provinces, Vijece republika i pokrajina. The Federal
Chamber, which decided on the questions o f interest to the federation, consisted o f
220 delegates (30 delegates from each socialist republic and 20 from each socialist
autonomous province, all elected from the basic administrative units, communes).
The Chamber o f Republics and Provinces, in charge o f republican and provincial
issues which did not require consent o f the republics and provinces, consisted o f 12
delegates from the assemblies o f each o f the six republics and eight from the
assemblies o f each o f the two autonomous provinces. 262

259

Ivan Grdesic, “Interesi i Moc: Sadrzaj Rada Opcinskih Skupstina u SR
Hrvatskoj [Interests and Power: The Agenda o f the Municipal Assemblies in SR
Croatia]” P olitickaM isao 23, 1 (1986): 108-20.
260Gruenwald, Yugoslav Search, p. 173.
961

The Federal Assembly is the only body theoretically competent to amend
the constitution, pass national laws, adopt federal plans and budgets, call a
referendum,, ratify international agreements, decide upon questions o f war and peace,
alter the boundaries o f the Yugoslavia, lay down the foundation for internal and
foreign policy, and supervise the work o f the federal executive and administrative
bodies. See Staar, Com m unist Regimes, p. 197).
262Bilandzic, H istorija, p. 444; Kostunica, “Constitution,” p. 80.
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According to Kostunica, because o f equal representation o f the constituent
units in both chambers, the two chambers o f the federal unit differed from one
another only in the mode of voting—Federal chamber decided by majority vote, and
the second chamber by unanimous consent. He claims that Yugoslav federal system
was unique because o f the emphasis on required consensus o f all the federal units for
all kinds o f amendments: “Any constitutional amendment shall be deemed passed only
when the text adopted by the federal chamber has also been adopted by the legislative
assemblies o f all the federal units.” This provision granted an effective regional veto
over federal policy to each o f the republics and provinces.

The most sensitive

provision o f the Constitution was the raising of the autonomous regions o f Kosovo
and Vojvodina to a status equivalent to that o f republics, which included a position,
equal to that o f the republics in a newly created nine-person collective federal
presidency.
Since the adoption of the 1974 Constitution, the Yugoslav decisionmaking
process was marked by a constant tension between federal authority with
responsibility for all-Yugoslav policy and regional powers to obstruct its preparation,
adoption, or implementation. The 1971 Amendments and 1974 Constitution
established a complex system o f delegates and consultations at all levels of
government, while the 1976 Law on Associated Labor decentralized all economic
enterprises, even hospitals and charitable organizations, into Basic Organizations of
Associated Labor (BO ALs), Osnovne organizacije udruzenog rada (OOUR), which
were to be the fundamental units for negotiation in each self-managing enterprise.

263Ibid., p. 81. Also see Stephen Burg, “Elite Conflict in Post-Tito
Yugoslavia,” Soviet Studies 38, 1 (1988), p. 10.
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The architect o f the 1974 Constitution, Edvard Kardelj, characterized the complex
new system as “pluralism o f self-managing interests.” As Stokes argues, this all
sounded good, but in practice the new laws made it almost impossible for the federal
government to pursue a consistent economic program, since each republic now held a
suspensive veto o f federal legislation. It was difficult for enterprises to run themselves
efficiently since each BO AL held its own mini-veto o f enterprise process.

Another

consequence o f the 1974 Constitution that will influence prospects for politicization
o f ethnicity is the fact that from this time on, each republican Communist hierarchy
had sole control over the media in their respective republics.
The 1980s: An Eye Opener
The system appeared to function reasonably effectively as long as Tito was
alive. Through his ability to transcend conflicts and to enforce compromises in which
all the parties assented whether they liked them or not, Tito acted as the ultimate
mediator. After his death in May 1980, there was neither the instrumentality nor
agreement on the criteria for the resolution o f conflicts. Cross-national conflicts
became everyday phenomena. Tome regards them as an outlet used in the absence o f
other means to express national aspirations.

As economic conditions worsened,

federal decision making became extremely difficult and ineffective as the result o f the
growing reluctance o f the republics and provinces to compromise their short-term
economic interests in exchange for uncertain long-term gains. The perhaps

264Stokes, Three E ras, pp. 116-17.
265Tomc, “Classes,” pp. 72-73.
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unintended consequence o f self-management was to hinder any possibility for an allYugoslav market.266
In general, developments since Tito’s death had strengthened the
assertiveness o f regional structures, as the polity o f the central leadership had
continued to balance ethnic groups against each other. Political tensions realized
themselves in Croat bitterness against Belgrade; they stimulated emotional reactions
among the Serbs and brought into the open the issue o f Serbia as an unequal state;
they surfaced in an Islamic assertion in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 267
The eighties were characterized by an overwhelming decline of confidence o f
the Yugoslav society which was the result o f the growing popular disenchantment
with the party, socialism and self-management, all o f which in popular public opinion
did not live up to their promises. The major cause that contributed to the sense o f
general crisis was the economic deterioration, whose roots lie in the strategy o f over
borrowing, popularly known as “buy now, pay later.”
Besides economic factors, Ramet lists several other factors that encouraged
the growing popular discontent with the system, such as political paralysis,

^Liliana Dijekovic, “Privredna Kriza i Privredna Reforma u Jugoslaviji”
[Economic Crisis and Economic Reform in Yugoslavia],” in Quo Vadis Jugoslavijo?
[W here are you headed, Yugoslavia?], ed. Marijan Korosic (Zagreb: Naprijed,
1989), pp. 23-40.
267

Aleksandar Tijanic, Tajni Zivot Srba, H rvata i Slovenaca [Secret L ife o f
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes] (No place, No publisher, 1989).
268For a good overview o f the failures in economic policies since 1946, see
Eugen Pusic, “Buducnost je Vec Pocela, ali Proslost Jos Nije Zavrsila” [Future Has
Began, But the Past is N ot Over Yet] in Quo Vadis Jugoslavijo? [W here Are You
Headed, Yugoslavia?], ed. Marijan Korosic (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1989), pp. 11-137.
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demographic changes that affected the ethnic balance, and the breakdown o f
traditional society and the displacement o f the old norms by a widespread
relativism.

These factors also exacerbated nationalist passions. As Schopflin

attests, the party’s initial analysis that nationalism would fade away once the
economic inequality was eliminated, was flawed.

270

The roots o f nationalism were

deeper. Uneven economic development was, at most, one factor among many
accounting for the survival and revitalization o f nationalism. As Banac asserts, the
nationality question does not derive from religious differences, cultural diversity or
unequal economic development, but was shaped by the different structure and goals
o f various national ideologies.

271

It is thus important to consider how Communist

ideology reshaped, used or ignored those ideologies.
In the mid eighties, after numerous attempts to hide from the public the size
o f the foreign debt, the party finally admitted that Yugoslavia was in economic crisis.
The party, still in ultimate charge o f economics, launched several emergency
programs for the purpose o f stabilizing the economy, but the failure to tackle the
problems in time resulted in serious difficulties.

269

Pedro Ramet, “Apocalypse Culture and Social Change in Yugoslavia, in
Yugoslavia in the 1980s, ed. Pedro Ramet (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985),
pp. 3-28.
270

George Schopflin, “Political Decay in One-Party Systems in Eastern
Europe: Yugoslav Patterns,” in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, ed. Pedro Ramet (Boulder,
Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 307-24.
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Ivan Banac, “Foreword,” in Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan B abel, 3d ed. rev.
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), pp. v-ix.
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The three federal institutions, the Chamber of Republics and Provinces,
Collective Presidency and federal cabinet, FEC, were not able to restore to the
federation the formal powers it had lost as the result o f constitutional reforms which
shifted power to the republics and provinces. The Chamber o f Republics and
Provinces, with its provision that decisions must be made by consensus, reflected this
power given to the constitutional units. This severely affected any attempt to arrive
to common solution. Because the delegates to the Chambers represented a bloc, and
each delegate from the federal unit was required to adhere to the policy agreed on by
the home republic or province, there were often cases of alliance formation and
logrolling and lagging of negotiations in controversial areas (e.g., assistance to less
developed areas).

272

The collective Presidency, which served as the collective executive head,
brought together one delegate from each o f the federal units. After Tito’s death in
1980 they rotated annually according to the Constitutional rota in the office of
“president o f the presidency.” Even though Tito envisioned this body as the
mechanism o f party control over federation, the members of the presidency were
responsible to their respective units (which elected them) and thus lacked a common
vision and loyalty to the federal union. The decision-making mechanism o f the
presidency was severely endangered by exercises o f regional loyalties. Eventually,

272Burg, “Elite Conflict.”
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this endowed Milosevic with the ability to produce deadlocks in the presidency and
served as catalyst for Slovenia and Croatia to announce their separation.

273

In the late 1960s and 1970s, the Federal Executive Council served as broker
in negotiations among the representatives o f the federal units and the federal center.
By the late 1970s, the FEC became the most important decision-making body outside
o f the party and a significant actor in inter-regional negotiation. But, even these
characteristics could not bring back the powers that federation enjoyed before
decentralization began. Because of the great powers given to the republics and
provinces, most federal policies reflected, in effect, compromise between nine
conflicting positions, eight units and one “all-Yugoslav,” FEC. Similar to the
processes in the Chamber o f Republics and Provinces, the agreements on policy were
regularly inhibited by objections from the federal units until the last moment. Even
when the policies were passed they were often reduced to general policy statements
and subject to different interpretations in individual federal unit. Units were now
subject to little effective and institutionalized means to comply with uniform
interpretations once Tito died.
Even a short review o f Yugoslavia’s history, especially its post-World War II
developments, demonstrates that the most important institutions to consider in
answering why and how Yugoslavia descended into violent inter-ethnic conflict were
the role of CP Y, later LCY, and its attempts to resolve the nationality question

973
Gruenwald, Yugoslav Search, pp. 200-01.
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through federal arrangement.274 Federations that consist o f constituent units
identified with particular ethnic groups, or ethnic federations, have shown strong
tendencies toward comprehensive decentralization. Pressures from ethnic groups
identified with the constituent polities have been accommodated by federal
governments through the decrease o f federal control and the encouragement of
additional activity, regulation, and control by the constituent units themselves—all in
effort to limit secessionist tendencies and increase satisfaction within the federation
so as to preserve its political integrity.

275

At the core o f Yugoslav problems was the unresolved national question. The
ruling dogma in Communist Yugoslavia, which was often echoed in similar terms in
other Communist regimes o f Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, is that nationalism, if
allowed, will naturally and necessarily lead back to the horrors o f inter-ethnic strife
experienced in the Second W orld War. In order to justify such thinking, League o f
Communists represented itself as being the only force able to rise above national
particularisms, to secure both a harmonious state and the overthrow o f the bourgeois
class. They argued that nationalism is divisive, while communism unifies, that
nationalism is internally unstable, whereas communism offered internal institutional
stability. Part o f the myth became the argument that nationalism was unable to defend
Yugoslavia against external aggression, while communism has done so. However, as
Allcock observes, the main objections to this argument are that it does not fit the
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observed facts o f history, and that it was unable to bear the theoretical weight o f
explanation which is often placed upon it.

776

The theoretically simple opposition between nationalism and communism
was, as argued by Communist theoreticians, not justified. The League o f Communists
of Yugoslavia (LCY) had a conflicting relationship with nationalism. It used it for the
political purposes. But it suppressed it, as well. The LCY has promoted itself as the
defender o f national differences, and institutionalized its “good will” toward diversity
of the nations and nationalities in all post-war constitutions, and in the federal
framework. The political structure o f the country, the six republics and two
autonomous provinces, was created as a solution to the post-war problem o f creating
a legitimate alternative to the Serbian hegemonism and unitarism. The selfdetermination o f nations and nationalities was a fundamental component o f the
regime’s self-definition. Thus, despite the officially sanctioned Yugoslav view o f
nationalism and frequent attacks on “chauvinism,” “irredentism,” and “nationalism,”
the regime itself elevated the republics and provinces to the status o f the only
legitimate bearers o f competing interests within the system. In this way the LCY itself
created the contradiction. As Paul Shoup argues effectively, the LCY was never able
to develop a coherent theoretical position with regard to nationality.
Characteristically, it dealt with the question through a d hoc responses to tactical
needs; and despite the proclaimed respect for national identity in Yugoslavia, the

2 76

John Allcock, “Rhetorics o f Nationalism in Yugoslav Politics,” in
Yugoslavia in Transition: C hoices and C onstraints, eds. John Allcock, John Horton
and Marko Milivojevic (Oxford: Berg, 1992), pp. 276-96.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

158
LCY chose to remove the issue from intellectual debate rather than to undertake a
proper analysis o f the problem.

277
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CHAPTER VI
POLITICIZATION OF ETHNICITY IN SERBIA
The Context
In 1981, the year following Tito’s death, the Serbian communist party
leadership faced serious economic crisis coupled with escalation of tensions between
Albanians and Serbs in the province of Kosovo, following the mass demonstration o f
Albanians demanding the Province’s transformation into a Republic. The
demonstrations were violently suppressed, but periodic violence continued
throughout the 1980s. Subsequently, the establishment o f Socialist Republic o f Serbia
used methods o f repression including official prohibition o f all non-socialist forms o f
ethnic participation and punishment of any extreme or vocal expressions o f
nationalism, and the dispatchment of police and army reinforcements. With all those
measures in place, the Kosovo problem was containable within the province, but the
Serbs and Montenegrins o f Kosovo continued to leave the province they had
controlled until 1967. From 1967, they referred to Kosovo as undergoing period o f
Albanization.
The riots in Pristina affected the relationship between the mass media and
official Communist establishment. The Kosovo riots caused turmoil in the Yugoslav
leadership for several reasons. The event cast doubt that the national problem was
solved through socialism and self-management. It also threatened the stability o f the
leadership already overwhelmed by economic crisis and rising republican
159
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assertiveness. Rather than reveal the gravity o f the situation, the leadership imposed
censorship on reports about the province. Even though the first demonstration started
on March 11, 1981, the public was not informed about them until March 26, and then
only through a report on the session o f the Presidium o f the Pristina Communal
Socialist Alliance Conference at which the main topic was “Fulfilling the Socialist
Alliance’s tasks in economic stabilization and in solving certain currently important
socio-economic problems o f the commune.” A report on the Kosovo riots was
included in the agenda, but it was made to look like something o f secondary
importance.

278

P olitika, which was a paper not subsidized by the regime, dared to

publish the discussion about the problem o f limited and directed information
channeled to the journalists.

279

In their article, Zejneli and Nesic claimed that

“insufficient information may create the impression that the struggle against enemy
activities in Kosovo is not a serious issue.”

280

By the mid-eighties Kosovo was in

constant crisis, and a major factor o f instability in Yugoslavia. The Kosovo crisis
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involved questioning the relationship between Serbia and the federation, and the very
destiny o f Yugoslavia as a unified state. To the Serbs, the issue o f Kosovo meant the
pressures o f Albanian nationalism. According to Pavlowitz, 281 ethnic harassment o f
Serbs and consequent Serbian emigration had been a persistent phenomenon since
1966, but the authorities had not wanted to acknowledge them until 1981.
Even after the demonstrations o f 1981, the Serbian Communist leadership
could not agree on the best way to deal with the problem. Ivan Stambolic, former
president o f the Central Committee o f the LC of Serbia (CCLCS) and President o f
the collective Presidency o f Serbia, claims that such timid policies regarding Kosovo
were due to the fears that m ore assertive policies could be interpreted as a call to
Serb nationalists and supporters o f Rankovic to square old accounts.

282

The Serbs

and Montenegrins felt that their nation was in danger o f extinction by Albanians who
had pretentions to the sacred bithplace o f the Serbian nation, where its greatest
historical battles had been fought. Kosovo was the region central to Serbian history
and mythology, the source o f Serbian heroic pride.

283

Even though the region was

home to multiple political and economic crises, ethnic and national issues began to
dominate and subsume all others. The constitutional process o f decentralization and
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strengthening o f self-managerial units under Tito was a general tendency as all the
republics were gaining independence in relationship to the center, especially after the
1974 Constitution. In Serbia, however, the constitutionally affirmed independence o f
the two provinces o f Kosovo and Vojvodina, and the concomitant lost power o f the
Serbian leadership to appoint provincial officials, was an emotional issue—perceived
by many Serbian nationalists as a deliberate policy o f destroying the Serbian national
state284
In 1986, radical Kosovar Serbs started a campaign against Kosovo’s Albanian
communist leadership. Their delegations went to Belgrade where they made
emotional pleas for protection against the allegedly widespread politically motivated
rapes o f Serbian women by Albanians. Over the next four years, they would act as
Milosevic’s strongest tool.
The Kosovo Polje Committee organized so-called meetings o f solidarity in
which they told tales of suffering, o f rapes and harrassment and o f being forced to
move under pressure. They demanded protection from Albanian separatists, but their
ultmate goal was to bring both autnomous provinces under Serbia’s direct control.
The most prominent leaders o f the Kosovo Serbs were K osta Bulatovic, Miroslav
Solevic, and Bosko Budimirovic. While they held secret talks with Serbian party
leadership, Pristina’s League o f Communist accused them o f “consciously
manipulating justified dissatisfaction o f Serbs and Montenegrins by encouraging
national divisions and conflicts.” Solevic refiised to call their activities

*h}usan Bilandzic, H istorija Socijalisticke F ederativne Republike
Yugoslavije [H istory o f SFR Yugoslavia] (Zagreb: Skolska knjiga, 1985),
pp. 501-02.
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nationalistic.

<jgc __

_

They criticized the inefficiency of the present leadership and

demanded that Kosovo province be put under control o f Republic o f Serbia, to
“prevent creation o f Greater Albania.” To the Albanian population these requests
meant suspension o f their constitutional rights.
The crisis in Kosovo continued to test the already divided Serbian leadership.
The major divisions were about the position o f Serbia in relation to the federation and
how best to solve that problem. Ivan Stambolic, leader o f the moderate line, was
increasingly discredited because o f his moderate approach. The inability o f the
Serbian leadership to deal with persistent economic, political and ethnic problems
deepened dissatisfaction within both the general population and the ranks o f the
Serbian intelligentsia.
The most indicative document that revealed a broad strand o f how Serb
intellectuals perceived the Yugoslav crisis was The M emorandum o f SAN U (Serbian
Academy of Sciences and Arts). The day when the draft o f this document was
published, on September 24, 1996, in Vecem je Novosti, a Belgrade daily, the
potential effects were labeled a “political earthquake,” and a “political bombshell.”
Written in “trenchant [and] hysterical language,” the document came out o f a 1985
SANU annual meeting in which members decided to organize a commission for
writing o f a memorandum that would express SANU’s thinking about the current
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situation in Yugoslavia.

Shortly after, the members o f the commission and the

writers o f this document openly stated that this document provided the first definition
o f the Serbian national program. To Milosavljevic that meant that they were one o f
the groups which contributed to the faster disintegration o f Yugoslavia. After the
publication o f the Memo, the members o f SANU openly supported Milosevic’s
policies giving public opinion the impression o f complete congruence between the
new government and intellectual elite. 287 Many analysts argued that Milosevic did
not have a program o f his own, but that he has actually taken over the basic
assumptions o f the Memorandum, “the document o f greatest importance to an
understanding o f the Serbian national movement and political processes in Kosovo,
Serbia and Yugoslavia.”288
While the document dealt with problems o f Yugoslavia as a whole, its
primary focus was on how historically Serbs were in an “unequal” position in post
World War II Yugoslavia, so much so that their existence as a nation was threatened.
The Memo accused Tito and all non-Serb nations o f consistently discriminating
against the Serbs and Serbia. The document insisted that Serbia was a victim o f the
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Tito-Kardelj coalition which “imposed federalism on Serbia and divided it in three
parts.”

28 9

This anti-Serb coalition sponsored only Slovene and Croat economic

development and “prevented Serbia’s development. . . kept Serbia under constant
surveilance . . . [l]ed by the idea ‘weak Serbia, strong Yugoslavia.’” Instead of being
rewarded for the greatest military contribution and sacrifice in the last two wars,
Serbia was punished because o f its “unitarism” and “centralism.” “The worst
historical defeat in the peace cannot be imagined.”

290

Especially disturbing were parts of the Memo pertaining to the position o f the
Serbs in Kosovo and Croatia. The language was derogatory to the Albanians, calling
them “racist, those who kill, bum, rape, desecrate . . . who terrorize, who are
privileged.” The Memo claims that the Serbs o f Kosovo have been victims of
Albanian terror and violence and have been leaving Kosovo at an increasing rate.
The exodus of Serbs in Socialist Yugoslavia in its scope and character is
worse than in all earlier stages of the big exodus o f Serbian people . . .
[a]ccording to all evidence, faced with a physical, moral and psychological
reign o f terror, they seem to be preparing for their final exodus.”291
The Memorandum was equally alarming regarding the position of the Serbs in
Croatia who “are a victim o f refined and efficient policy o f assimilation. . . all in
order to disassociate Serbs o f Croatia culturally, economically from their
(homeland).”

292

Then the Memo claims:

289

Edvard Kardelj, a Slovene Partisan hero, was Tito’s chief ideologist.
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291Ibid., pp. 154-55.
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Except for the time under the (NDH) Independent State o f Croatia, the Serbs
in Croatia have never before been as endangered as they are today. A
resolution o f their national status is a question o f overriding political
importance. I f solutions are not found, the consequences might be disastrous
on many levels, not only for relations within Croatia, but for the whole o f
Yugoslavia.293'
This kind o f language from such a dignified body as the Serbian Academy had
never been heard before in communist Yugoslavia. For this group, legitimate
grievances became matters involving supposed genocide—Croatia was compared to
the wartime fascist quisling state, the NDH, and Serbia’s leaders were described as
Communist apparatchiks unable to fight for what Serbia deserves. In the conclusion,
the document called for more assertive definition o f Serbian national interests and
constitutional changes which would integrate tw o autonomous provinces into Serbia
and therefore allow Serbia to protect its citizens and stop the genocide in Kosovo.

294

Ivan Stambolic, President o f the collective Presidium o f Serbia during the
time o f publication o f the Memo, termed the document “an obituary for Yugoslavia.”
To him and other similarly minded Serbian politicians, the Memo was a formidable
manifestation o f Serbian nationalism. The Memo’s indictment o f Yugoslavia as the
reason for all the problems of the Serbs to Stambolic meant that the Serb nationalists
strove to create a Greater Serbia through disintegration o f Yugoslavia and conflict
with other Yugoslav nations. In his opinion, the nationalists failed to see that
Yugoslavia represented the only solution to the Serb question.
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In April, 1987, the Kosovo Serbs signed a petition denouncing their situation
as an oppressed minority, demanding action and warning the authorities that they
would no longer tolerate what they termed “genocide” being carried out against their
community.
Milosevic was invited by Kosovo Serbs as the representative of the top party
Serbian officials to address the communists and elected citizens. As President o f the
Serbian League o f Communists Central Committee Presidium (CC SLC), Milosevic
traveled to Kosovo Polje to explore Serbian grievances about mistreatment by
Communist Albanian authorities, and to prevent the masses from marching to the
capitol. The crowd o f 15,000 Serbs and Montenegrins protested against alleged
harassment by members of the ethnic Albanian majority, who they claimed had forced
them to resettle in other parts o f Yugoslavia, mainly in neighboring Serbia. 296 In
Kosovo Polje, Milosevic spoke the words that transformed his image “from faceless
bureaucrat to charismatic Serb leader.”
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There is another version o f this event and the relationship between Milosevic
and Kosovo Serbs, a version supported by Tim Judah, Laura Silber and Allan Little,
and Darko Hudelist. According to these authors, rather than being used by Milosevic,
the Kosovo Polje Committee used Milosevic, that is, “Milosevic was made for order
and if it had not been him, then probably someone else would have taken his place.”
At any rate, the Committee authored the rhetorical concepts later used by Milosevic
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such as “differentiation,” “amending the Constitution,” etc.

298

Milosevic willingly

accepted the call o f the Kosovo Serbs, and prepared well for the occasion— including
the presence o f Television Belgrade, even though such events were usually covered
by the local television. Dusan Mitevic, Deputy Director o f TV Belgrade described
how he introduced Milosevic as the leader o f the Serbs: “We showed Milosevic’s
promise over and over again on TV. And this is what launched him.”

299

Slobodan Milosevic
Prior to his speech o f April 24, 1987, in Kosovo Polje, when Milosevic found
his “populist voice,” Milosevic’s career was not different from any other careerist
who joined the Communist party in Yugoslavia. His political position could be
described as that o f a hard-line communist, a “true believer” in the cause o f
Communism. On the other side, people who worked close to him said that this “true
believer” behavior was a pose, and that he used Communism, as did everybody else in
Yugoslavia, primarily to gain power.300
At the Eighteenth Session o f the Central Committee of the League o f
Communists o f Serbia, held on November 1984, the most sensitive proposal the
Serbian party leadership offered at the session dealt with the relations between Serbia
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and its provinces. Serbians openly insisted on greater jurisdiction over the provinces,
and called for more decision-making powers for federal organs, but refused to call
their stand on the issue a plea for centralism or unitarism. It is at this session that
Slobodan Milosevic, who just recently entered the political arena, became associated
with the Serbian cause, and won the approval of the conservative faction in the LC
Serbia. Both Hopken and Bilandzic cited the excerpts from Milosevic’s speech at the
session to justify the unappreciative response of the delegates from the provinces o f
Kosovo and Vojvodina. Milosevic, a member of the Central Committee asserted:
We must free ourselves o f the complex of unitarism. Serbian Communists
have never been champions o f unitarism. On the contrary, we have throttled
every attempt at such a policy. The Serbian communists have long been
saddled with a complex about unitarism, and unjustly so, and made guilty for
a relationship with the Serbian bourgeoisie.301
Milosevic talked as a representative of all Serbs who were tired of being
labeled “unitarists” whenever they actually strove for “unity.” Another important
aspect o f this speech revealed Milosevic’s pledge for a market economy and
prosperity, that are possible only in an “undivided Yugoslav market,” that is, where
the federation is stronger than the republics. After stating that “[ejvery citizen can see
that the Yugoslav market is less and less united,” Milosevic attacked the existing
autarchic (republican and provincial) economies of Yugoslavia by saying that
“national economies” can realize “economic interests o f nations only ostensibly.”
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After this session, Milosevic’s name was associated with free-market economic
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principles. His characterization as an “ideologue o f reforms” reflected his desire
toward radical changes for the political and economic systems o f Yugoslavia.

303

This talk, in which he revealed his position on the issues at hand, served to
establish his credibility with the Serbian audience, and affected the receptivity o f his
speech delivered in Kosovo Polje in April 27, 1987.
As President o f the Serbian League o f Communists Presidium, Milosevic
traveled to Kosovo Polje to explore Serbian grievances about mistreatment by
Communist-Albanian authorities, and reportedly to prevent the masses from marching
to the capitol. The crowd o f 15,000 Serbs and Montenegrins protested against thenalleged harassment by members o f the ethnic Albanian majority, who they claimed
had forced them to resettle in other parts o f Yugoslavia, mainly in neighboring
Serbia.
Milosevic skillfully used Ivan Stambolic, his major political patron. Stambolic
generously helped Milosevic by offering him positions that he was leaving. In 1984,
Stambolic, chief o f the Communist Party o f Serbia appointed Milosevic head o f the
party’s Belgrade organization. In 1986, he succeeded Stambolic, who became
President o f the Presidency o f Serbia, as Communist Party chief (President o f the
Central Committee o f the Serbian LC [CC LCS] ) in 1986.

303Ratko Rodic, “Optimist Protiv Krize [Optimist Against the Crisis],”
Danas, 28 April 1987, pp. 20-21.
304In 1989, he became president o f the Presidency, and in December 1990, in
the first democratic elections he was elected president. He was reelected in the
presidential elections in 1992. See, e.g., Zeljan Suster, “Historical Dictionary o f the
Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia,” European H istorical D ictionaries, no. 29
(Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 1999), pp. 200-01, and Lenard Cohen, “Serpent in the
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Stambolic assumed that Milosevic was a good team player and that as a
representative o f the younger generation, unburdened by the legacy o f the past, he
would help him in finding a moderate resolution to Serbia’s internal problems. In the
period 1981-86, it seemed that way—just as was Stambolic, Milosevic was an
ambitious politician, and his rhetoric was that o f a follower o f Titoist communism and
bitter enemy o f nationalists.
When Milosevic became president o f CC LCS Presidium things started to
change. The event o f Milosevic appointment to the top Serbian party position was
very controversial as well. Per Milosevic’s request, Stambolic recommended only
Milosevic for the position, despite expectation for multiple candidates, which the
party started to embrace in an effort to present itself as a more democratic institution.
At that time, Stambolic considered this demand as another one o f Milosevic’s
ambitious tantrums and therefore asserted undemocratic methods in order to put his
protege in that position. Only a year later, Stambolic would realize what he had
done.305
The first card to be played by Milosevic was Kosovo. Knowing the
importance o f Kosovo in modem Serb mythology, Milosevic successfully used the
grievance o f Kosovo’s small Serbian minority against the ethnic Albanian majority.
He became the first postwar communist leader to overcome his fear o f the masses
and to use the masses for his own purposes. In order to use the masses, Milosevic
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embraced nationalism, and by doing that, paradoxically he reinvigorated the
Communist party. Since he presented himself as a leader who fought for national
goals, his opponents, both communists and nationalists, had very few political tools
to use against him.

306

The Tools: Rhetoric and Media
Milosevic’s Kosovo Polje speech o f April 24, 1987307 is important for several
reasons. At the meeting before his address, Milosevic ordered police to stop beating
people, “No one has the right to beat the people!” That gesture appeared as an
encouragement to a Serbian crowd to take on an official police structure, which was
mostly Albanian. The sentence alone was very significant because Yugoslav leaders
o f Milosevic’s rank did not encourage demonstrations o f one ethnic group against
another in such obvious terms. Milosevic not only took a stand against the police,
who were attempting to stop the demonstrations, but also exonerated the Serbs o f
any ideological deviations in their attempts to undo the autonomy o f Kosovo. “Very
briefly, he said, “such gatherings are not the gatherings of nationalists. Such
gatherings are not gatherings o f enemies.” He also threatened Albanian separatists:
Albanian separatists and nationalists have quieted down a little. They are
counting on time, and the circumstances work for them, as well. They should
know, however, there will be no tyranny on this soil any more. That will not
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be allowed by the progressive people o f Kosovo, it will not be allowed by
Serbia, and it will not be allowed by Yugoslavia.
Instead o f calming things down, Milosevic added fuel to the fire, and it was all
broadcast on the main Serbian news at 7:30 p.m. Milosevic became a popular Serbian
hero overnight.
The speech Milosevic delivered in Kosovo Polje would later be characterized
as legendary.

308

He was able to identify and express emotions his Serbian public was

feeling at the time. By saying, “Comrades, it is clear to all the people all over
Yugoslavia that Kosovo is a great problem in our land and that it is being slowly
solved,” Milosevic uttered aloud the words that were until then only whispered. He
criticized the leadership o f the Federation and the League o f Communists as being
indifferent to the Serbian issue. “In solving all these problems the League of
Communists unfortunately has not always been united and, therefore also could not
be sufficiently effective.” He identified himself with the Kosovo Serbs by claiming
that the “emigration o f Serbs and Montenegrins under economic, political, and simple
physical pressures constitutes probably the last tragic exodus o f an European
population.” H e compared the emigration to that which occurred during the Middle
Ages. His party vocabulary was interwoven with emotionally charged nationalistic
statements which were aimed at assuring people that he was aware and understood
the seriousness o f the problems affecting Serbs in Kosovo:
The spirit o f separatism and often o f counterrevolution is still present in the
process o f education and training, and in cadre policy. The emigration of
Serbs and Montenegrins under economic and political and simple physical
pressure constitutes probably the last tragic exodus o f a European population.

308Jajcinovic, “Suspicious.”
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The last time such processions o f desperate people moved was in the Middle
Ages.
Realizing that Kosovo’s political problems reflected the feeling of
abandonment fostered in Serbs and Montenegrins and that these problems had
become psychological problems, Milosevic touched something that was a taboo topic
for many years: Serbian national pride.

309

Milosevic said that “it has never been in

the spirit o f the Serbian and Montenegrin peoples to give up before obstacles, to
demobilize when they should fight, to become demoralized when the going is diffi
cult.” These words provoked in his countrymen remembrance o f their traditions o f
statehood and military prowess, particularly on the Allied side in both world wars.
This heroism entitled them, the majority of Serbs believe, to a position o f at least
“first among equals” in Yugoslavia.

310

Milosevic called on the Serbs to remain on their land where their fields, their
gardens, and their memories were. By saying, “Surely you will not leave your land
because it is difficult to live there and you are oppressed by injustice and humili
ation,” Milosevic reminded Serbs o f their historical duties because with their depar
ture they would “disgrace [their] ancestors and disappoint [their] descendants.” And
by leaving, they would implicitly validate Albanian claims to Kosovo as an Albanian
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Aleksandar Tijanic, Tajni Zivot Srba, H rvata i Slovenaca [Secret L ife o f
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes]. n.p.: By the Author, 1989.
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Patrick Moore, “Whither Serbia,” Radio F ree Europe, Situation Report,
Yugoslavia, 2 December 1988, pp. 7-9.
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land. Milosevic skillfully verbalized the emotions and grievances o f his fellow Serbs
at this time, and for that reason he was declared uthe leader o f all Serbs.”

311

One o f the most important consequences o f this rhetorical event was the
meteoric rise o f Milosevic as a proponent o f the “Serbian initiative.” The Serbs had
finally found their long-desired political leader who promised to deal with their
problems. He became the most popular and celebrated Serbian politician, recognized
as a truly charismatic leader.

312

The power his audiences granted to Milosevic was

one of the necessary prerequisites for the changes in the political and social system he
wanted to inaugurate. In this speech he encouraged stereotypes o f Albanians as
separatists and irredentists. Such tactical moves were in the service o f his immediate
political solution—the revision o f the 1974 Serbian constitution and a sharp reduction
in the autonomy o f Kosovo and Vojvodina.
Tijanic ascribes Milosevic’s political success and his becoming the Serbian
leader to the deep changes that were taking place in the minds o f many Serbs who,
for the first time in postwar history, put Serbia ahead of Yugoslavia, to discontent
with federal impotency over Kosovo, to frustration with the fact that every initiative
from Serbia was labeled as a “unitarist fraud o f Beograd,” and resentment of the
notion, carried by many in Yugoslavia, that it was sufficient to be Serb in order to be
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Milan Jajcinovic, “Populami, Licni, Bezlicni [Popular, Personal and
Faceless Leaders],” D anas, 27 December 1988, pp. 24-25.
Jelena Lovric, “Sudbonosni Dani [Fatal days],” D anas, 18 October 1988,
pp. 7-9.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

176
suspected o f unitarism.

Milosevic was able to identify such feelings and to remove

from Serbs’ consciousness the burden o f historical guilt. In his rhetoric he chose to
exchange it with the thesis o f “victimization,” and the sense o f grievance which were
more appealing to Serbs and their perception o f history. Milosevic astutely realized
that for the Serbs these were not times that would tolerate sluggishness and delicate
nuances, and that this was not a period in which every debate necessarily meant
espousing democracy.
This rhetorical event left a profound impact on Milosevic. Those who knew
him said that he came back as a different person. He began to carry out the promises
made in Kosovo Polje. Upon return, he requested the firing o f the Kosovo chief of
police, an Albanian. Soon after making this speech, Milosevic openly accepted
Memorandum SANU as his program o f action, imbuing the document with powers it
did not have prior to his utilization o f it. To all the critics o f nationalism in Serbia and
western Yugoslavia, the “Memorandum was a fire o f Serbian nationalism, fueled by
Milosevic.”

314

In Kosovo Polje Milosevic must have sensed an opportunity in seizing

on Serbian fears. After experiencing the potential force of Serbian ethnic grievances,
he saw them as offering a politically rich opportunity. Milosevic obviously decided to
use nationalism as a political weapon. Milosevic embraced nationalism and contrary
to Stambolic, did not think o f inter-ethnic problems of Kosovo as a sensitive problem
whose resolution takes patience, time and work within the legal and constitutional

313Tijanic, Tajni, p. 42.
3l4Djukic, Kako, pp. 120-21, 124-27.
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framework and in partnership with all the constituent units o f Yugoslavia.

315

These

fears o f others would be a constant topic that he would deploy in his communication
with his people.
Five months after Kosovo Polje, Milosevic used the institutions o f Serbian LC
to get rid o f his opposition. The Eighth Session o f Central Committee o f the Serbian
LC was a shocking surprise for Stambolic

but not to others who criticized

Milosevic’s use o f nationalism since Kosovo Polje. At the Eighth Session, Dragisa
Pavlovic, a moderate, was removed from his position in the Serbian Party Presidium,
because earlier that month he criticized those who were using the media to exploit
Serbian nationalism. He was openly wondering whether the media [.P olitika and
P olitikaE kpres] could do that without someone’s patronage.

317

Three months

following the Session Stambolic was replaced as president o f Serbia’s collective
presidency. This Eighth Session is regarded as the moment when the charismatic
Slobodan Milosevic took complete control o f Serbia, thus legitimizing greater
Serbian nationalism as a dominant ideology. 318

315

His views are expressed in his book: Ivan Stambolic, Rasprave o fS R
Srbiji 1979-87 [D iscussions A bout SR Srbia 1979-87] (Zagreb: Globus, 1988).
316Djukic, Kako, pp. 61-91; Stambolic, P ut, pp. 134—142.
317

Dragisa Pavlovic, Olako Obecana B rzina [Lightly Prom issed Q uickness]
(Zagreb: Globus, 1988). Pavlovic used the Session to chastise Milosevic for always
speaking about party “unity,” while taking measures which encouraged dissent in the
LC. Some think that this was the major reason why Milosevic removed him from the
position o f the President o f the Belgrade LC.
318

Aleksandar Nenadovic, “P olitika u Nacionalistickoj Oluji [Politika in the
Nationalistic Storm],” in Srpska Strana Rata: Traum a i Katarza u Istorijskom
Pamcenju [Serbian Version o f the War: Traum a a nd Catharsis in H istorical
(continued...)
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Although Milosevic promised to solve the problems o f his people, the period
between April 1987 and October 1988, the next big rhetorical event, his speech at the
Seventeenth Session o f the CC LCY, it was a period o f deepening crisis for the
Yugoslav federation. Conditions in Kosovo worsened—the tension between the
majority ethnic Albanians and the minority Serbs and Montenegrins could scarcely
improve under the strong one-sided propaganda o f the Serbian media. Kosovo
became a paradigm for the unsolved problems and decay o f the Yugoslav legal,
political, and economic system.
For the first time in modem Yugoslav history, the masses on the streets were
guiding the country. Numerous strikes o f workers were becoming commonplace in
Yugoslavia. Another type o f mass behavior, the so called “solidarity meetings,”
orchestrated by Milosevic’s supporters, presented the Yugoslav leadership with the
most serious threat because they proved the leadership’s inability to deal with the
inflammatory political situation. Milosevic would stage these meetings on public
squares. Hundreds of thousands o f people waving flags and shouting slogans, such as
“As long as Slobodan walks the earth the people will not be slaves to anyone,”
represented the “will o f the people” and no one could oppose it.
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(...continued)
M em ory], ed. Nebojsa Popov (Beograd and Zrenjanin: Republika, 1996), pp.
583-609.
319

This is one o f the slogans chanted during the demonstrations o f the Serbs
and Montenegrins in behalf o f Serbian party leader Slobodan Milosevic to protest
Vojvodina’s rejection o f Milosevic’s proposed constitutional amendments, which call
for more direct control by Serbia o f tw o autonomous provinces Kosovo and
Vojvodina. Milan Andrejevich, “N ew Protests in Yugoslavia,” R adio F ree Europe,
Situation Report, Yugoslavia, 9 September 1988, pp. 3-7.
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Amid the general crisis o f Yugoslav society, and o f the Communist party,
Yugoslavia’s only unifying force, and in the midst o f the war o f words that was
taking place among the republican leaderships, the 188 representatives o f the
republican and provincial Central Committees gathered together at the Yugoslav
level for the seventeenth session o f the Central Committee o f LCY.

320

The session,

which was held in Belgrade on October 17, 1988, was aiming at unifying the party
and searching for a solution to the crisis.
The seriousness of the political situation in Yugoslavia demanded that the
members o f the Central Committee (CC) display the highest level o f logic and
understanding in order to arrive at solution to the country’s problems. Statesman’s
oratory appeared to be most appropriate for a member o f LCY CC, because it
appeals to reasoned argumentation and clear presentation o f the issues at hand.
However, demagogic rhetoric prevailed in Milosevic’s address, thus implying that his
intentions were not so much the preservation of Yugoslavia as the advancement of
Serbian initiatives and his own goals.

320

The LCY Central Committee was the most authoritative body in
Yugoslavia’s communist-party system. The most significant resolutions and decisions
were issued in the name of The Central Committee, and they served as a guideline for
the future actions o f its members. The public interest in this plenum indicated that the
expectations among people were high. People hoped that the Central Committee at
its 17th Plenum would adopt decisions o f crucial importance for the fate o f the
country. See Lovric, “Sudbonosni.”
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In the speech

321

Milosevic expressed the expectations o f the Serbs, “From

this session Serbia expects changes that are necessary not to overcome the crisis but
to resolve it.” Through this speech Milosevic revealed a dogmatic attitude toward the
changes that would supposedly pull Yugoslavia out o f crisis. He displayed ethically
highly questionable arguments, especially in that part where he justified the “solidarity
meetings.” The purpose o f the whole speech appeared to justify the policies he
inaugurated as the president o f the Serbian League of Communists.
Much o f the speech is devoted to the topic with which Milosevic became
identified—criticism o f existing leadership: “[T]he leadership continue their marathon
and sclerotic sessions while the citizens continue to be poorer and poorer, the peoples
more divided, and the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo exterminated.” He asserted
that the Serbs have understood “this session as an end to a number o f sessions that
did not succeed” in solving a problem that has resulted in “the great, perhaps
irretrievable migration o f Serbs and Montenegrins from their land, and for the last
genocide in the twentieth century.” He scolded the leadership for wanting to address
other problems first:
Maltreatment, rape, and the humiliation o f people cannot wait until inflation is
bridled, unemployment is reduced, exports are increased, the standard o f
living is raised, democratic centralism is applied, and the relations between the
class and national elements are discussed . . . in the political and generally in
the spiritual sense, the people have outgrown their leadership.
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This speech is published in Milosevic’s Godine R aspleta, pp. 264-271.
Translation is avaliable in FBIS-EEU-87; Full citation: Milosevic Addresses Plenum.
(17 October 1988). Belgrade D om estic Service in Serbian Translated by FBIS-EEU88-201; 18 October 1988. All the quotations are from this speech, unless noted
otherwise.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

181
Milosevic’s oversimplification o f the complex Kosovo situation (explaining it
only in terms o f violence and crime committed by Albanians, and describing the Serbs
only as victims o f the crime) intentionally reinforced the stereotypes o f “bad Alba
nians.” Although he did not use that term, one could not accuse him o f being
ambiguous because the political context o f his speech made his message clear. The
speech was an appeal to hatred toward Albanians, or in Milosevic’s emotionally
charged language, to “[t]hose who exiled the whole nation from its territory”
As much as Milosevic presented himself as the promoter o f the changes
toward a “socialist democratic country,” the evidence he presented appeared rather
as pseudo-proof. The speech as a whole provides a good basis for an assessment of
Milosevic’s ethos as that o f a demagogue, and for the claim that he w as using
demagogic as opposed to statesmanlike rhetoric. In the dogmatic move toward
monolithic ideological unity, Milosevic did not tolerate any dissent; he even rejected
the “pluralism o f interests” which was the only legal way to express different opinions
in the Communist party, because
[tjhose who exiled the whole nation from its territory do not have an equal
position in this pluralism of interests with those who were exiled. ..their
interests are based on the exploitation and humiliation o f other people and
they do not represent a part o f pluralism o f self-managing interests, but
constitute injustice and shame.
The part o f the speech that is most indicative o f his opportunistic, and thus
demagogic political attitudes is that where he undertook the task o f informing “the
comrades outside Serbia who, because o f divisions in the media are not well or suffi
ciently informed . . . about the situation in Serbia.” First he defended the meetings of
solidarity with Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins:
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Comrades, these are held against the inability o f the existing institutions and
some individuals in them to stop the terror in K o so v o .. . . This kind o f public
reaction is not incompatible with our social system. On the contrary, it is fully
in the spirit o f our socialist and self-managing system, whose essence lies in
the fact that all working people should manage society.
The strategic use o f his rhetoric becomes apparent when one sees that each
“fact” Milosevic earnestly presented was followed by an attack on those opposing the
constitutional changes he offered. So the “fact” about the meetings is followed by the
following statement:
In this respect, the condemning or banning o f citizens’ gatherings in our
society is not acceptable. Nobody has the right to do this if these meetings are
rallies for socialism and Yugoslavia and are held with the aim of stimulating
institutions to take actions to protect and develop socialism, which is
something they are not doing at present.
Milosevic’s audience at this Session consisted o f representatives from all
parts of Yugoslavia. His appeal to their understanding o f “the real face of the
meetings . . . [as] something sacred” did not find a responsive audience. It was
difficult for the representatives to trust him because the media in other parts o f
Yugoslavia were disclosing that “the real face” o f the meetings was not what
Milosevic wanted them to believe, but the instrumental use o f the discontented
masses for particularistic political ends.

322

One o f the organizers o f the meeting o f

solidarity in Novi Sad, Scepanovic, reveals that the removal o f the Vojvodina gov
ernment was planned and “programmed . . . [i]t took only somebody to . . . direct the
events.”323

For example, see Danas, 1 March 1988; D anas, 11 October 1988.
323

Djordje Scepanovic, “Kako Seam Srusio Vojvodjansko Rukovodstvo [The
Way I Removed Vojvodina Government],” Danas, 11 October 1988, p. 8.
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Milosevic’s public discourse, o f which the above is an example, propelled his
reelection as Presidium President o f Serbia’s League o f Communists Central
Committee. To the Serbs, his rhetoric provided justification for the actions he
undertook in this period, actions whose dogmatic nature only added fuel to a country
already burning with problems. One o f these actions was the takeover o f media.
Aware o f the power of mass media in politics, right after Eighth Session,
23-25 September 1987, Milosevic took control over the most influential Serbian
media, the major TV network, Radio Televizija Beograd, RTB, and the largest
newspapers. One o f the publications was especially important, the daily P olitika.
Long-term correspondent for the paper Aleksandar Neneadovic argues that P olitika
coverage ensured popular support and political legitimacy. The public trusted
P olitika more than any other publication. The paper already had a great influence on
public opinion, if not o f entire Serbian nation, than on the most educated political and
cultural elites. That explains, Nenadovic argues, why there was so much conflict over
ownership o f the paper as well as abuse o f the paper’s media power. However, after
Milosevic took over it, this power also made P olitika especially responsible for
“spreading the epidemy o f demagogic populism and aggressive nationalism.”

324

From 1980 to 1987, Radio Television Belgrade (RTB) was an example of
objective reporting from Kosovo and strong anti-nationalist orientation. After the
Eighth Session in 1987, things started to change in this medium. The editorial policy,
led by Dusan Mitevic, was to show all the events pertaining to Milosevic’s ascent to
power as well as the meetings of solidarity, the symbol o f inefficiency o f the federal

324Nenadovic, “Politika,” p. 608.
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government in solving Serbia’s problems. The news reports recalled myths and
history which could provoke passions o f its viewers. The programs o f RTB became
the means by which most militant and nationalistic actors transmitted their messages
to the people o f Serbia and inflamed nationalistic passions. “We want arms!” “Death
to Vlasi! (Chief o f LC in Kosovo),” “We are all Serbs!” are some o f the messages
broadcast on RTB. The effect o f these messages was powerful since no official leader
or institution publicly opposed any o f these militant events. The RTB played an
important role in transmitting messages that reinvoked old myths, reminded people o f
Serbia’s victimhood throughout history, showed Tito in a negative light, heated the
dilemma about whether Yugolavia was the right choice for the Serbs and the
possibility o f reconciliation between partisans and Chetniks.

325

The event that played a crucial role in releasing nationalist passions o f the
Serbs was the celebration o f the six-hundredth anniversary o f the Battle o f Kosovo
Polje. TVB devoted much time to the event, broadcast it alive and repeated
Milosevic’s speech several times. The speech delivered in Gazimestan was the most
obvious evocation o f Kosovo myth in building the unity o f the Serbs.

The most

cited sections o f the long speech sent disturbing message to other parts o f Yugosavia.
Addressing over one million people at a central celebration commemorating
the 600th anniversary o f the Battle o f Kosovo, and o f Serbia’s new constitution
325

Rade Veljanovski, “Zaokret Elektronskih Medija [Reversal o f Electronic
Media],” in Srpska Strana Rata: Trauma i K atarza u Istorijskom Pamcenju [Serbian
Side o f the War: Trauma and Catharsis in H isto rica l M em ory], ed. Nebojsa Popov
(Beograd and Zrenjanin: Republika, 1996), pp. 610—36.
The speech o f Gazimestan is my translation from P olitika 's (29 June 1989,
pp. 1-3) transcript o f the speech. All the subsequent quotations are from this speech,
unless noted otherwise.
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proclaimed amid demonstrations and bloodshed in Pristina in March 1989, Milosevic
exclaimed:
Due to the forces of history and destiny, in the year in which . . . Serbia, after
many decades, regained its state and its dignity, it also celebrates the six
hundredth anniversary o f this historic event, which carries powerful historic
and symbolic significance for Serbia’s future.
The occasion o f the speech gave Milosevic the opportunity to yet again revive
the myth o f Kosovo, but this time, since his charisma was so complete, to criticize the
disunity o f the Serb leadership in 1939, and to use it as an allegory for contemporary
problems.
I f we lost the battle, it was due not only to the Turkish military superiority,
but also to the tragic discord o f the Serbian state. The discord, the evil fate,
followed the people throughout its history . . . and later, in socialist
Yugoslavia, when the Serbian leaders remained divided, prone to
compromises at the expense o f their people.
This message can be understood as a justification for removals o f many
officials from the Serbian leadership who did not agree with his hard-line policies in
the creation o f a unified Serbia: . . . “today we are in Kosovo to say . . . that such
disunity does not exist.” Additionally, it constituted open criticism o f Titoist
federalism, which divided Serbia and left 20 percent o f its population outside o f the
Serbian republican border. 327
The part o f the speech that would send the most serious threat to the leaders
of other Yugoslav republics was where he explicitly mentioned the possibility o f war:
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Agneza Bozic, “The Role o f Rhetoric in Politicization o f Ethnicity:
Milosevic and Ethnopolitical Conflict in Yugoslavia.” Paper presented at the Third
International Conference on Constitutional, Legal and Political Regulation and
Management o f Ethnic Relation. Ljubljana, Slovenia, 8-10 December 2000.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

186
“Six centuries later, we are in battles again. And facing new ones. They are not armed
battles, though such battles should not be excluded yet.”
Some authors interpret this as Milosevic’s threat to Kosovar Albanians. The
TV spectacular at Gazimestan was designed to promote and strengthen the myth o f
Kosovo as the cradle o f Serbian medieval culture and a foundation o f Serbian
national identity. The TV reporters reminded the Serbs how the territory which
belonged to Serbia until 1974, was unjustly taken from Serbia. They commented how
Albanians would sooner or later remove Kosovo from Serbia and unite it with
Albania. Serbia, therefore, had to reestablish its authority over Kosovo. Once again,
Milosevic appealed to self-evident, justified and painful grievances o f the Serbs, now
victims in the heart o f their own ancestral land, denied by Albanians their historic
right to live where they belonged. By suggesting that he would stand up for the
Serbs, Milosevic essentially appealed to justice. Thus, when shortly after the
Gazimestan celebration, the Serbian army and police were sent to Kosovo to abolish
its political and cultural autonomy, many o f Milosevic’s TV viewers believed that he
was doing what had to be done to restore justice. Looking straight into TV cameras,
Milosevic appeared as a real hero.
The decision o f RTB to write subtitles in cyrillic for the programs intended
for all-Yugoslav broadcast, was received negatively in the rest o f Yugoslavia. After
1989, RTB was not allowed to air any programs that examined political situations in
a critical manner, or to host any academics or politicians who were critical o f the

Milan Milosevic, “The Media Wars,” in B um This House: The M aking
and Unmaking o f Yugoslavia, ed. Jasminka Udovicki and James Ridgeway (Durham:
Duke University Press, 1997), p. 110.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

187
regime in power. It became an instrument o f propaganda o f one man, one party, and
Serbian nationalism, with the mission to provoke hatred by showing Serbian people
the danger coming from others, first Albanians, then Slovenes, then Croatians, and
later Europe. One o f the programmatic decisions was to promote unity with all the
Serbs who live outside Serbia in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and to include
their TV programs in TVB. When the w ar started in Croatia between Serbian
paramilitaries and the Croatian army, the news reports talked about “endangered
Serbs,” “massacres committed to the Serbs,” “Serb refugees.” The victims o f Serbian
violence were never mentioned. Since the TVB adopted the realization o f Greater
Serbia, it openly supported Serbian paramilitaries and celebrated w ar criminals as
heroes.329
Milosevic fired and replaced directors and editors o f the main publications:
P olitika and P olitika Ekspress, Vecem je N ovosti and D uga, and o f RTS—Radio
Television Serbia. They, according to Djukic, did the dirty jobs for Milosevic by
promoting hatred and fear of other peoples. Duga, for example, wrote about the
Slovenes’ exploitation o f the South, o f Albanians poisoning their own children and
blaming the Serbs. The magazine also wrote highly emotional articles about Slovene
chauvinism toward the Serbs and about Croatian genocide o f Serbs in the NDH in
1941, all of which forced the Serbs to “defend their pride.” The paper elevated
Milosevic for being the first one to understand to what extent Albanians degraded

329Veljanovski, “Zaokret,” pp. 624-25, 637.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

188
heroic Serbian people.

330

The editorial policy o f these publications became a tool for

Milosevic’s quest for arbitrary power, all under the guise o f populism and national
reawakening in Serbia. In their writing, they discredited leaders o f other nations and
nationalities and promoted Milosevic as the only legitimate leader, since “the people”
loved him. The president o f P olitika Publishing Board, Zivana Oblina, resigned in
September 1987, because “P olitika was losing its identity.”
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Milosevic’s team would inform the editors what to put on the front page,
sometimes even sent articles to be published in their papers. Since the editor o f
P olitika claimed in 1988, that “no [paper] can think differently than the people,” the
papers lost their professionalism and credibility. Milosevic found that the most
efficient method o f conquering the media was to appoint journalists into various party
commissions and give them authority and trust that only party functionaries enjoyed.
This joining of professional and political power resulted in greater power o f the
media than the old Titoist communist had.
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The fact that Dragisa Pavlovic, Belgrade LC president, was purged (at the
Eight session) for criticizing the burgeoning nationalsm o f P olitika and P olitika
eskpres, D uga and Intervju, proves the strategic importance of these to Milosevic. A
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Zoran Markovic, “Nacija—Zrtva i Osveta [Nation—Victim and
Revenge],” in Srpska Strana R ata: Trauma i K atarza u Istorijskom Pam cenju
[Serbian Side o f the War: Trauma and Catharsis in H istorical M em ory], ed.
Nebojsa Popov (Beograd and Zrenjanin: Republika, 1996), pp. 646-60.
331Milan Jajcinovic, “Politika u P olitici [Politics in P olitika],” D anas, 22
September 1987, pp. 24—25.
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Slavoljub Djukic, “Izm edju Slave i Anatem e [Between Fame and
Anathem a] (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 1994), pp. 70-73, 90; also see Nenadovic,
“Politika,” pp. 589-91.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

few weeks later, the director-general o f P olitika, editor o fM V an d editor-in-chief o f
news at TV Belgrade were removed for not supporting Milosevic.

333

In Kosovo,

almost all Albanian journalist lost their jobs at TV Pristina and the Albanian language
daily R ilindja. In Vojvodina, after the removal of the provincial government in fall o f
1988, Milosevic’s people first ousted the management o f Radio-Television Novi Sad
i

and the major daily D nevnik and replaced them with his loyalists.
After Milosevic discredited his opponents in Serbia, the media were in charge
o f demonizing Albanians. N ot only did they call them thieves, rapists, illiterate,
murderous, irredentists, secessionists, but they also created an atmosphere where the
Albanians would be viewed as second class citizens. The Serbian media took on itself
the task o f revealing the alleged violence Albanians committed, the purported
desecration o f graves and churches, and the resulting exodus o f Serbs. The picture
presented was one-sided, placing all the blame on the Albanians, while the economic
reasons for leaving the poorest region in Yugoslavia were seldom stressed. The
Serbian media regularly depicted Albanians as irredentists, separatists, and terrorists.
Such stereotyping only deepened the dissention between Albanians and Serbs.
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After the Albanians, the victims o f Serbian propaganda became Slovenes and Croats.
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M ark Thompson, F orging War: The M edia in Serbia, C roatia and Bosnia
and H erzegovina (London: Article 19, 1994), p. 57.
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Jasmina Kuzmanovic, “Media: The Extension o f Politics by Other Means,
in B eyond Yugoslavia, eds. Sabrina Ramet and Ljubisa Adamovic (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1995), p. 92.
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Djukic describes how P olitika’s editor, Zivorad Minovic, Milosevic’s good
friend, used a particularly tragic situation to inflame Serbian feelings and provoke
revengeful feelings toward Albanians.
The event was a killing in one of the Army barraks in Paracin, September
1987. Aziz Keljmendi, an Albanian soldier, killed four soldiers and wounded six.
Even though it was clear that Keljmendi was mentally ill, and that his motivations had
nothing to do with anti-Serb sentiments (in his illness he did not choose the “target:”
two Muslims, one Serb, one Croat; among the wounded were three Muslims, two
Croats and one Slovene), Minovic saw it as “perfect for our situation” and decided to
capitalize on this situation rather than to provide objective information. Belgrade
press gave enormous publicity to the event, the headlines and letters to the editors
were heated and fanned anti-Albanian feelings. P olitika alone devoted four pages to
this event for several days, including the first page. In other parts o f Yugoslavia,
Milosevic was criticized for reducing the once respected P olitika publications into
bellicose pieces o f propaganda. The editors o f the media who could not ethically
accept “Stalinist dictatorship,” or who opposed the imposed view from above were
forced either to resign or to accept lower positions.

336

When Croat and Slovene authorities refused to accept Milosevic’s policies o f
domination, Milosevic used the media to incite national hatreds and fears. As a
strategy to forge and consolidate public support for his aggressive policy, Milosevic’s
media campaign had no precedent in post-1945 Europe. The Kosovo campaign

Jajcinovic, “Politika”; Jelena Lovric, “Presijecanje Gordijeva Cvora
[Cutting the Gordian Knot],” Danas, 7 July 1987, pp. 11-13; Lovric, “Anatomija
Slucaja Pavlovic [The Anatomy o f the Pavlovic Case],” D anas, 29 September 1987,
pp. 7-11.
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created a media model which was extended to incorporate other targets o f the
Serbian leadership. This model identified and stigmatized a national enemy, rallied
and homogenized Serbs against this threat, and called for resistance. After the
Albanians in Kosovo, the enemies were Slovenes and Slovenia, then Croats and
Croatia, then Bosnia and its Muslim population. Simultaneously, there were
accusations against foreign targets such as CIA, the Germans, the Masons, the
Vatican, the Jews and the United States.

337

Media propaganda enabled the Serb authorities to encourage all Serbs to see
themselves as the tragic blameless victims in an international conspiracy to destroy
the Serb people and their homeland. In Belgrade, communist methods adopted the
nationalist ideology, have from the start o f the conflict deliberately incited Serbian
fears o£“ustasa hordes” in Croatia and o f “Muslim fanatics” in Bosnia. “P olitika
E kspress” o f October 23, 1991. published a testimony o f a Serb soldier about the
brutality o f the ustashas. This information was taken by the Military Museum in
Belgrade as part o f the exhibition on crimes committed by the Croats. Mr. Lozo
wrote to the Military Museum to say that his statement was taken out context and as
such made o f him “a propagator o f hate.” He demanded that his complete testimony
contained the description of the crimes committed by the Serbs, “many crimes for
which we the Serbs should feel ashamed and sorry for.”
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In the old days,

arguments were between liberals and conservatives, even Stalinists; now all debate
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Thompson, Forging War, pp. 55—56.
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Goran Lozo, “Upotreba Zlocina [Utilization o f Crime],” Vreme, 9 March
1992, p. 21.
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was reduced to ethnicity. Radio-Television Serbia (RTS) was one o f the Belgade
government’s most powerful instruments o f war.

339

Since the media became government mouthpieces, they played an active role
in bringing on the war.340 From late 1987 to spring 1990, Serbian state-controlled
media published and aired a number o f materials that evoked events from the Second
World War, in particular the crimes committed against Serbs by Croatian Ustasha.
D uga published five serials on Ustasha crimes during those months. Brana Cmcevic,
D u g a ’s columnist, wrote about an alleged “inherently genocidal nature” o f Croats.
Other typical stories in D uga or the daily P olitika ekspres dealt with the topics of
Croat and Slovene exploitation o f the Serbian economy for the last fifty years or
longer. The media encouraged anti-Croat and anti-Slovene feelings, with generous
help from prominent writers and academics. Serbian poet Matija Beckovic coined a
phrase about Serbs as “remnants of a Slaughtered people.” Before elections in
Slovenia and Croatia, in spring 1990, the media demonization o f the non-Serbs,
especially Croats, was at its highest. P olitika and D uga referred to most of Croatia’s
1
new parties as “ultra-nationalist” or “Ustasha-like.”
In Serbia, the Milosevic regime had done its best to limit if not destroy
independent media by imposing crippling taxes, restricting access to more powerful
broadcast transmitters and cutting supplies o f newsprint and fuel to the independent

339

William Shawcross, “Preface,” in Mark Thompson, F orging War: The
M edia in Serbia, Croaia a n d B osnia and H erzegovina (London: Article 19), p. ix.
340Kuzmanovic, “Media,” p. 93.
341Ibid.
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media. The official media constantly propagated the lie that the opposition and the
independent media, not the government and its allies, are responsible for all the
hardship o f the nation. In May 1992, Stojan Cerovic o f Vreme wrote accurately that
the director general o f RTS, MHorad Vucelic, “can now calmly invite the opposition
to say whatever it want s on television, because he knows t h a t .. . anybody who
explains the truth can do so only at his own cost. Reality sounds like the blackest
anti-Serbian propaganda, and anyone who describes it will frighten people and turn
them against him.”342
Milosevic also led an “anti-bureaucratic revolution” which was directed
towards removing leaders in provinces and republics other than Serbia. The object
was to remove those “incapable o f obeying the people’s will.” In other parts o f
Yugoslavia, this was seen as Milosevic’s attempt to extend his sway over all o f
Yugoslavia.343 Milosevic also sponsored “meetings o f solidarity”344 because they

342Shawcross, “Preface,” pp. x-xi.
3 4 3

Milan Andrejevich, “Slovenia Offers Reconciliation,” Radio Free Europe,
Situation Report, Yugoslavia, 27 June 1989, pp. 19—25; Thurow, “Divisive Populist,”
p. 1; Patrick Moore, “Yugoslavia: Ethnic Tension Erupts Into Civil War,” R adio
Free Europe, Research R eport, 3 January 1992, pp. 68-73.
344The “meetings” were massive demonstrations, usually o f 20,000 to 30,000
Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo, who protested the League o f Communists’
inability to formulate and carry out policies for calming the ethnic conflict in Kosovo.
They were also an expression o f support o f Serbia’s drive to change its constitution.
The height o f mass rallies was in the summer of 1988. They were organized
throughout Serbia proper, Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Serbian-populated Montenegro.
In the fall o f 1988, at one o f the meetings of solidarity, the government o f Vojvodina
was removed.
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imbued him with new energy and self-confidence.345 Slovene officials publicly
blamed Milosevic for open encouragement o f the nationalist-inspired rallies and
pressure tactics which “reminded many people o f central Europe in the 1930s” when
Hitler was rising to power.346
347

Both the meetings and the Serbian media elevated Milosevic to the skies.J
But since he did not deliver many o f his promises, and in awareness o f the

propaganda they were fed, the Serbs began to develop opposition against Milosevic.
The first large protest was staged in March 1991. The chief request o f the
demonstrators was to liberate Radio-Television Belgrade from Milosevic’s hands.

348

This time Milosevic did not cave to the grievances o f his people but sent tanks
against them. At this point he was becoming the source o f fear.

349

Judah describes Slobodan Milosevic as an opportunistic and cynical leader
who was interested only in power.

350

For Milosevic nationalism, that is politicization

o f ethnicity, was one of the chief ways to achieve and solidify his power. He astutely

345Djukic, Izm edju Slave, p. 112.
346Milan Andrejevich, “Ethnic Unrest Continues,” R adio Free Europe,
Situation R eport, Yugoslavia, 23 September 1988, pp. 8—10; Andrejevich,
“Slovenia.”
347Djukic, Izm edju Slave, p. 126.
348

Jagos Agicin, “Trese se, Trese Radio-Beograd [Radio Belgrade Is
Shaking],” Vreme, March 1992, pp. 11-12.
349

Milan Milosevic, “Jaka Straza na Svetosavskom Platou [Strong Guards at
Svetosavski Platou],” Vreme, March 1992, pp. 4-8.
350Judah, The Serbs, p . xii.
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understood the socio-cultural and political environment and administered his appeals
in a way that was appealing to both working class and intellectuals. His speeches are
a great example o f communist orthodoxy, Serbian patriotism and calls to war.
Something for everyone. And when he sensed that a new style would produce better
results, he was also was willing to sacrifice those who in the past were his friends and
allies.
Warren Zimmerman, the last America’s ambassador to Yugoslavia best
describes the effects o f Milosevic’s policies:
Whatever Milosevic may have contributed to the restoration o f Serbia’s selfconfidence, he has done major damage to the unity o f Yugoslavia, to
tolerance among its peoples, and to the Serbian democratic tradition itself. . .
Milosevic seems compelled to move by creating crises in which he defines his
own security and that o f his republic by the insecurity o f everybody else . . .
In the longer t e r m . . . Milosevic’s divisive tactics could encourage Slovene
separatism and Croatian nationalism and ultimately split the country.351
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Warren Zimmerman, O rigins o f a Catastrophe (New York: Times Books,
1996), p. 53.
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CHAPTER VH
POLITICIZATION OF ETHNICITY IN CROATIA
The Context
The purge o f the leaders o f Croatian mas-pofc (mass movement) leaders in
1971 left a bitter legacy in Croatian political and cultural life. Some analysts have
compared the effects o f the purge to the effects the “Prague Spring” o f 1968 had on
Czechoslovakia.

352

Put under the leadership o f orthodox Communists, led by

Vladimir Bakaric and Stipe Suvar, the republic became known for its continued
political repression toward any type o f “nationalism,” or perceived criticism of the
Communist authorities. The Republic of Croatia was ruled by Communists whose
actions earned them the title o f the bearers o f ideological dogmatism in Yugoslavia.
The repression caused widespread resignation and apathy among the population. 353
Croatia soon earned the nickname the “silent republic.” One o f the consequences was
that Communist Party slowly lost its legitimacy. In the period between 1971 and
1981, Croatians had the lowest rate of entry o f the new members in the LCY, while
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Christopher Cviic, “Croatia,” in Yugoslavia and A fter: A Study in
Fragm entation, D espair and R ebirth, eds. David Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda
(Edinburgh Gate: Addison Wesley Longman, 1996), p. 204.
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Ivo Goldstein, C roatia: A H istory, trans. Nikolina Jovanovic (New York:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), p. 196.
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Serbs continued to be overrepresented. In particular, young people and women were
increasingly absent in party ranks.
At the beginning o f the 1980s, Croatia, as the rest o f Yugoslavia, was
experiencing serious economic crises. In the first two years after Tito’s death, the
population was dealing with the scarcity o f items such as coffee, sugar, detergent, oil,
medicines and gasoline. Until 1983, the Party leadership did not do much to alleviate
the economic crisis, and, indeed, they did not even acknowledge the crisis. When the
Party finally acknowledged that the country was in crisis, the problem o f internal
divisions in the Party undermined the search for a solution. One observer discerned
five schools o f thought concerning the direction Yugoslavia should take if and when
reforms came.355
Closer to the mid 1980s, when many o f the deficiencies o f the system came
into the open, there begun open criticism o f the regime for its inability to deal with
the deteriorating economy. Together with demands for democratization o f the
Communist party, the rise o f exclusivist nationalism in various parts o f Yugoslavia
became pronounced as well.

356

The response o f the Croatian authorities was in line

with their ideological proclamations and the “struggle against nationalism.” By the
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Gojko Stanic, “Membership in the League o f Communists o f Yugoslavia,”
Yugoslav Survey 23 (November 1982): 25-36.
355

Dennison Rusinow, “Yugoslavia 1983: Between ‘Continuity’ and
‘Crisis,’” U niversity F ield S ta ff International R eports 3 (1983): 1-13.
356In Serbia there were reports o f Serbian students singing Chetnik songs,
wearing Chetnik emblems, and assuming the names o f leading Chetnik figures.
Croatian youth have been reported to have sung fascist Ustashe songs. Pedro Ramet,
“Apocalypse Culture and Social Change in Yugoslavia,” in Yugoslavia in the 1980s,
ed. Pedro Ramet (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 10-11.
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end o f 1980, several Croatian nationalists who had been imprisoned for their
activities in 1971 were taken to court and jailed again for spreading anti-Yugoslav
propaganda. Franjo Tudjman, specifically, was jailed for giving interviews to Western
media, in which he complained that the Croatian people continued to be politically,
economically, and culturally oppressed in socialist Yugoslavia, that the oppression o f
1971 had been causing a massive brain drain and strong anti-Yugoslav feelings
among younger population, that the number of victims in the Croatian Ustasha
concentration camps was much lower than official figures show, that exaggeration o f
the number o f victims burdened the Croats with endemic collective guilt.

357

This was

the biggest trial held after Tito’s death. The obvious message was to warn those who
were seen as most dangerous to the constitutional order o f the country.

358

In the 1980s the Croatian media begun to break free. The first alternative
radio station appeared, and the first newspapers that were not directly under direct
Party control. Especially known for their high professional standards were weekly
D anas, established in 1982, biweekly Start and weekly N edjeljna D alm acija. D anas
was known for its critical reporting about the conditions in Yugoslavia, and it quickly
became the most controversial publication in the country. The LCY frequently
accused it of anti-Communist views. The fact that D anas was published by the
Vjesnik publishing house, an official mouthpiece o f the Communist regime, testifies
357

The text o f the District Public Prosecutor Indictment (Okruzno javno
tuzilastvo-Zagreb) published in N a Sudjenju Dr. Tudjmanu Sudilo se H rvatskoj [The
Trial o f Dr. Tudjm anM eant T ria lfo r Croatia] (London: United Publishers, 1981).
358Ramet, Sabrina, N ationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962—1991,
2d ed., rev. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 203; Darko Hudelist,
“Dr. Franjo Tudjman: Zivot i Karijera [Dr. Franjo Tudjman: Life and Career,”
Globus, 11 December 1999, p. 52.
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to the fact that even major publishers did not have a coherent, established publishing
policy. The same events would be covered differently in different publications.
N edjeljna D alm acija was often criticized and served with court orders because o f the
writing in the F eral section, edited by Split students who in humorous ways criticized
< iC Q

individuals and the establishment.
The conservatives in the LCY found it difficult to deal with the growing
criticism o f the present policies and demystification of the myths and heroes of the
Yugoslav state, since the leadership succeeding Tito used them as their source of
legitimacy.

360

In M arch 1984 the Information and Propaganda Center o f the Central

Committee o f the League Communists o f Croatia (LCC) issued a document
“Concerning some Ideological and Political Tendencies in Art, Literature, Theatre
and Film Criticism, and the Public Declarations by a Number o f Cultural Figures that
Contain Politically Unacceptable Messages.” This document, known as “White
Book,” was authored by Stipe Suvar and his team, and criticized about 200 cultural
leaders all over Yugoslavia. It included quotations, interviews and aphorisms they
published, accusing them o f fermenting “cultural counterrevolution.” For this Suvar

359

The editors o f this page would start their own paper, F eral Tribune, which
would be equally anoying to the new Croatian regime as it was to its Communist
predecessors. Gall, Zlatko, “Sto je Vise Kleveta i Lazi F eral Nam je Drazi [The
More Slander and Lies, the More We Like and Adore Feral],n Start, 27 October
1990, pp. 46—48.
The m ost important were “founding myths”: first, the legend o f the
National Liberation Struggle o f 1941-1945 that created the new Yugoslavia, second,
defiance o f Stalin from 1948—1953, third, self-management as Yugoslavia’s unique
road to communism. Important as well was the ideology o f non-alignment. Needles
to say, Tito was a charismatic and undisputed leader, but also, an important element
of each one o f these myths.
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lost the trust o f the liberals and non-communists.361 In 1984, Ivo Skrabalo, professor
at the Croatian Film Academy, published P ovijest H rvatske Kinem atogrqfije [H istory
o f Croatian Cintem atography]. That was the last book that was sharply attacked by
the Croatian LC Central Committee as “non-Marxist and nationalistic.” The author
claims that such violent political criticism of his book was due to the title. Had it been
The H istory o f Cinematography in Croatia, he would have not been attacked. The
reason is that despite federalism and other concessions to the national question, it
was not acceptable to emphasize identity of nations.
Despite efforts such as the “White Book” to maintain party monopoly, there
were also significant forces within the Croatian LC who argued for the
democratization o f public life. The deterioration o f the economic situation since the
beginning of the 1980s opened the debate about possible solutions. Through the
debate the divisions between the forces of ideological dictatorship and those who
argued for change within the party began to surface in public. Compared to the
Slovene LC leaders who openly opposed Serbian proposals for recentralization and
more decision-making powers for federal organs, the Croatian leadership was more
reserved. Stipe Suvar argued for the status quo worried that any change in the

361Goldstein, Croatia, p. 196.
362

Ivo Skrabalo was member o f the editorial board o f H rvatski Tjednik in
1971, a paper that was closed as part o f the purge. He was not imprisoned for his
activities in 1971, but was prohibited from any public political activity. As a candidate
on a HSLS list, he was elected a mayor o f Zagreb, Croatia’s capital in 1997, but
Tudjman revoked his election. Personal interview, Zagreb, October 17, 1997.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

201

political system might undermine the entire evolution o f Yugoslav development since
1972 363
There were also individuals within the LC Croatia who argued that change
was needed. Jure Bilic, Croatian LC member, a conservative, admitted: “We have to
change things; otherwise chaos will prevail.”

Along with the existing ideological

polarization, important differences emerged between more economically developed
Slovenia and Croatia and the rest o f the country. The joke o f the time was that the
only thing the Party could agree on was that somenthing needed to be done. As to
what exactly needed to be done, there was no consensus among the parts o f the
disintegrating center.
On the eve o f the Thirteenth Party Congress, in 1986, the eight constituent
regional party organizations held their own Party congresses. In Croatia and
Slovenia, their Tenth Congresses marked the end o f an era, as younger, more liberal
Communists replaced the conservatives.

Even though there was a lot of talk about

democratization, Croatian Communists were not ready to give up their monopoly.
One of the ways in which they proved their hold on power was through the trial o f

Wolfgang Hopken, ‘Tarty Monopoly and Political Change: The League o f
Communists Since Tito’s Death,” in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, ed. Pedro Ramet
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 29-55.
i

Slobodan Stankovic, “Strife and Disputes Continue,” Radio Free E urope
(April 1985): 21.
365In Slovenia, Milan Kucan, who would become independent Slovenia’s first
elected President, was elected as Slovene party secretary. In Serbia, at their party
congress held in 1986, Milosevic became president o f Serbian party. See Sabrina
Ramet, Balkan B abel: The D isintegration o f Yugoslavia from the D eath o f Tito to
the Warfo r K osovo, 3d ed., rev. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999), p. 17.
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Andrija Artukovic, the Minister o f Interior, Justice, and Religious Affairs in the
fascist Independent State o f Croatia (NDH) during World W ar II. The 84-year-old
Artukovic was extradited from United States in February 1986. The trial was held in
Zagreb where he was charged with deliberate murder o f about 230,000 Serbs,
Croats, Gypsies, Jews and other Yugoslav citizens. He was sentenced to death, but
his execution was postponed because o f his falling health. This trial provoked mixed
reactions among the Croatian Serbs. For those Serbs who remembered World W ar n ,
the trial opened old wounds, revived old memories, and stirred old hatreds. For some
Serbs, this trial served to “prove the genocidal nature o f the Croatian people.”366
In 1987, after the Eight Session o f the Serbian LC CC, during which
Milosevic established himself firmly in control o f Serbian political scene, Slovene and
Croatian media began to write with worried criticism about developments in Serbia.
The Croatian politician and theoretician, Dusan Bilandzic, expressed his fears o f
“destructive tendencies which use pressure and street methods in politics . . . as if the
old Balkan mentalities are awakening.”

367

The name o f Slobodan Milosevic was not

mentioned. In 1988, Start published an analysis o f authoritarian charisma and how
damaging it could be “especially if it takes an exclusive, specific ethnic orientation.”
Muhic asserted: “[I]n our circumstances this .. . may be regarded as an attempt at

Olujic, Zeljko, K ako Nisam Obranio Andriju A rtukovica [How I D id N ot
D efend A ndrija A rtukovic] (Zagreb: Revija Vjesnik, 1991).
'l/Z0]

__

Mirko Galic, “Dramatika Naseg Zaostajanja [The Dramatics o f Our
Lagging Behind],” Danas, 22 September 1987, pp. 12-15.
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forcible imposition o f monolithic ideological and political unity.”

Again, no names

were mentioned, but from the text it was clear that the only person who could fit this
description was Slobodan Milosevic.
In 1988, Milosevic’s methods o f street politics and the mass “happening of
the people” did not find a receptive audience either in Croatia or Slovenia. While the
Slovene media were publishing freely without much supervision on behalf o f the
Communist elite, Croatian communists were still holding on to old cliche and
methods. When, for example, D anas published an article about Milosevic and
described him and his “anticonstitutional radicalism” as “the greatest danger to
postwar Yugoslavia,”

369

the Croatian Central Committee Presidium was quick to

criticize the weekly as confrontational, “digressing from the platform o f the Sixteenth
LCY CC plenum and as “editorial mistake for which political responsibility must be
established.”

370

The Belgrade media was already describing journalists and writers

who wrote critically about developments in Serbia as “Serbophobic scribes . . . who
fish in muddy waters.” The article by Brkovic was characterized by P olitika
comentator as “an unbelievably blunt, uncivilized, and above all anti-Serbian text.”

371

368Muhic, Fuad. “Are We Threatened by Charisma?” Start (3 September
1988), pp. 18-22. Translated in JPRS-EER-88-108; 16 December 1988, pp. 42-48.
369

Brkovic, Jevrem. “Skica za Portret Lidera [Sketches for the Portrait o f a
Leader].” D anas, 30 August 1988, pp. 28-29.
370

Vjesnik, 2 September 1988, cited in Milan Andrejevich, “Croatian Central
Committee Presidium Criticizes Zagreb Weekly,” Radio Free Europe Research:
Situation Report, Yugoslavia, 9 September 1988, pp. 19-20. The Slovene media
freely criticized the regime since the 1986.
371Andrejevic, “Croatian CK.”
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As inflammatory speech from Serbia intensified in the late 1980s, the
Communists o f Croatia and Slovenia began to defend themselves against Serbian
attacks. A t the same time, Croatian intellectuals begin to organize secret meetings to
discuss ways to break “the shameful, demeaning Croatian silence,” and to follow the
changes taking place in other East European countries.

372

Skrabalo claims that these

meetings were also the reaction to the fact that there was no one political leader in
Croatia who would stand up to Milosevic’s policies.

373

In February o f 1989 about 10,000 Croatian Serbs took part in demonstration
against the alleged support o f the Zagreb leadership for Croatian and Albanian
nationalism, and in support o f Serbia’s constitutional amendments, which were aimed
to abolishing autonomy o f autonomous provinces. This time, worried that these
ethnic-related protests could lead to terrible consequences, the Croatian LC reacted.
During the plenary session o f the Croatian CC on May 22, Celestin Sarderlic, a
moderate, accused Serbia o f provoking Serbian nationalism in Croatia, by giving the
Serbian population orders to resist the policies of Croatia’s Communists. He also
accused Serbia o f portraying Croats as genocidal people:
Hundreds of articles have been published that systematically promote the
argument that Croats are by nature genocidal, anti-Serbian, and anti-Yugoslav
. .. This not only spurs nationalistic tendencies but provokes feelings o f
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Hudolist, Darko. B anket u H rvatskoj [Banquet in C roatia], 2d ed.
(Zagreb: Globus International, 1999), p. II.
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Skrabalo, Interview.
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anxiety and fear among the citizens o f Croatia and objectively increases the
opportunity for Croatian nationalism and anti-Serbian feelings.374
On July 9, 1989, in Knin,

Croatian Communists organized a celebration of

the six-hundredth anniversary o f the battle o f Kosovo. While the meeting was
supposed to be usual official show o f Communist rhetoric about brotherhood and
unity within Yugoslavia, Jovan Opacic and his group o f Serbs disrupted the program
and told the crowd that they should relinquish the myth about Yugoslavia and focus
their energies into strengthening the Serb political and spiritual identity. Some people
in the crowd wore Chetnik attire and chanted “This is Serbia,” and “Slobo the Serb.”
Srpska Borba, the Serb emigre paper, published “Proposal for Creation o f a Serbian
District in the areas o f Northen Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, Banija, Slavonia and
Baranja” to be deliberated and possibly adopted during the commemoration o f the
six-hundredth anniversary o f the Battle o f Kosovo. The document states the
following reasons for establishment o f the Serbian District, which would be a new
federal unit in Yugoslavia:
The fact that in this century, in particular during World War n, genocide was
practiced against the Serbs of these districts by Croatian Ustashi and
Domobrans” .. . that the language spoken by Serbs and Croats is actually the

Andrejevich, Milan, 1989, “The Croatian Offensive "itadiro Free Europe
Research: Situation R eport, Yugoslavia, 27 June 1989, p. 21. Banac provides an
analysis o f the historical revisionism which assisted Milosevic political program.
Among these are works that treat the Croats as genocidal people. See Banac, Ivo,
1992, “Historiography o f the Countries o f Eastern Europe: Yugoslavia,” Am erican
H istorical Review 97(4): 1084—1104.
375

Knin is one o f the 11 municipalities in Croatia with an absolute Serb
majority and one o f the old Chetnik strongholds. Even though majority o f the
Croatian Serbs identified with Communist regime, the areas around Knin, Obrovac,
and Benkovac were more receptive to Milosevic’s policies. See Tanner, Marcus.
Croatia: a N ation F orged in War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pp.
218-29.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

206
Serbian language [which was stolen [from them] in the process of
Catholicization o f the Serbs . . . No attention should be paid to the tales o f
Croatian megalomaniacs about Dalmatia as the old homeland o f Croatism,
since if w e follow that logic w e can lay claim to the territories o f certain
Balkan and even central European states.376
The Croatian authorities arrested and jailed fourteen instigators for disturbing
the public meeting and incitement o f inter-nationality hatred. Opacic’s arrest, largely
the result o f the coverage by Belgrade media, helped to make him a Serbian hero, a
victim o f “endangered Serbdom.” The Belgrade media portrayed his case as that o f
“the man whose head has been put on the block in Croatia just because he is o f
Serbian nationality.”377
Opacic’s persecution resonated with Serb nationalists throughout Yugoslavia.
In Croatia, however, the question o f “unequal justice” arose. H ow is it possible that
Serbs who rallied in Kosovo were not detained by Serb authorities?

378

The

Intellectuals o f Serbian Academy o f Sciences and Arts (SANU), especially, the
patron o f Serb nationalism in Belgrade, Dobrisa Cosic, adopted Opacic as their
mascot and demanded from the federal authorities his release. The SANU group
became involved in the issue o f Serbs in Croatia, describing their position to
Milosevic’s regime as deteriorating, and calling for an autonomous province for

J “Proposal for Creation o f a Serbian District in the Areas o f Northern
Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, Banija, Slavonia and Baranja,” Srpska B orba (July 1989).
Translated in JPRS-EER-89-143, 20 Decemeber 1989, pp. 30—32.
377

Licina, Djordje, “Indictment in Petty Politician’s Encirclement,” Vjesnik (3
September 1989), p. 4. Translated in JPRS-EER-89-116, 24 October 1989, pp.
17-18.
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Culic, Marinko and Babic, Jasna. “Politika u Sudnici [Politics in the
Courthouse],” D anas, 15 August 1989, pp. 9-10.
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them.

379

The Serbs from Kninska Krajina, many o f whom had joined the nationalist

Chetniks in World W ar n , took the Croatian government’s harsh reaction to their
protests as a signal that it intended to suppress Serbian culture and deny all rights to
the Serbian community in Croatia.
In an interview in N IN , Belgrade weekly, the Metropolitan o f the Orthodox
church o f Zagreb and Ljubljana, Jovan Pavlovic, claimed that “no one should have
been arrested [after the celebration o f the six-hundredth anniversary o f the battle of
Kosovo in Croatia]. . . since [no one] committed any misdemeanor or crime.” He
stated that Serbs in Croatia did not have an equal status because many o f the
conditions necessary for nationalities to nurture their cultural, ethnic and religious
identity, were lacking in Croatia. The Metropolitan specified:
The Serbian nationality in Croatia must have schools with instruction in its
own spoken and written language; where they would study their own
tradition, literature, and culture; that they have their own press, and finally, if
I may be allowed to say it, their own free church . . . It is also illogical for
their justified demands to be interpreted maliciously, most often as an
outburst o f Serbian nationalism. Serbs in Croatia have been literally deprived
o f many things.380
To the question if present troubles in Croatia and Serbia are driving the Serbs
to think about moving out, the Mitropolitan answered:

379

Tanner, Croatia, p. 219; Also see Laura Silber and Allan Little,
Yugoslavia: Death o f a N ation, rev. ed. New York: Penguin, 1997, pp. 94-95. This
reputation helped Opacic in becoming one of the founders o f Serbian Democratic
Party. The party was founded in Knin, February 17, 1990. The leader o f the party, on
recommendation o f Dobrisa Cosic, was Jovan Raskovic. The mission of the party
was to provide means of expression o f the national interests of the Serbs.
380

Spasojevic, Svetislav, “Interview with Jovan Pavlovic, Metropolitan o f
Zagreb and Ljubljana, N IN (B October 1989), pp. 40-42. Translated in JPRS-EER89-137, 7 December 1989, p. 19.
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The last thing I would want to do as a human being is to pour oil on the fire
that is already raging. Fleeing from the truth, when people talk about the
relations between Serbs and Croats in their joint state o f Croatia, is one o f the
most frequently practiced ways o f inflaming ethnic passions. As a boy in my
village, I saw the peasants being converted, the Orthodox Church turned into
Catholic Church, I saw it demolished, people fleeing to Serbia. . . Even
today, people speak in whispers about moving out. We are second-class
citizens in our own homeland.381
From above paragraphs, it is obvious that Serbian Church indeed poured oil
on a fire that was already burning. The Serbian population in Croatia was reading
exclusively Belgrade publications, thus the effects o f the Metropolitan’s memories o f
the past injustices could not be perceived but as an affirmation for the fear among the
Serbs, already inflamed by the content o f Memorandum and other writings. Nenad
Ivankovic, who covered the Serbian Ortodox Church for Danas, claims that the
Church played one o f the most destructive roles in inflaming passions o f the Serbs in
Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, in effect, influenced the content
o f the Memorandum. 382
As nationalisms mutually incite and feed off each other, the aggressiveness o f
Serbian nationalism aroused Croatian nationalists. Horvat asserts that Croatian
nationalism, provoked by Serbian, lagged behind Serbian for two to three years.

383

The Croats saw events in Knin as a provocation, and even though entire Yugoslavia
was critical o f the Serbian nationalists, the main damage has been done in Croatia.

381Ibid., p. 22.
382

Nenad Ivankovic, Zagreb, Croatia. Personal interview, 31 October 1997.
See also Ramet, N ationalism , p. 251. She claims that Serbian Orthodox Church
helped Milosevic in mobilization o f the Serbs.
383

Branko Horvat Zagreb, Croatia. Personal interview, 14 October 1997.
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D anas commentator, Jelena Lovric, reflected on nationalistic incidents among
Croatians and Serbs o f that summer, and lamented that they transformed the
nationality and the republic “which up to now have been able to look the entire
country frankly in the eye, to be ashamed.” The most difficult issue, however, as
Lovric argued, was that in the situation o f the time, the rise and penetration o f
Croatian nationalism could not have been prevented, because of inadequate political
measures.

384

In 1989, many different political groups formed in Croatia. They functioned
illegally, as they were not allowed to register under the existing system. Frequently,
however, their representatives held public discussions, or Tribina, where they openly
debated their programs and the future o f Croatia and Yugoslavia. By December
1989, there were fifteen alternative groups and associations, twelve o f which were
politically active, such as the Croatian Social Liberal Alliance [H rvatski Socijalno
Liberalni Savez] (HSLS), Croatian Party o f Rights [H rvatska Stranka P rava] (HSP),
Croatian Peasant Party [H rvatska Seljacka Stranka] (HSS), Croatian Democratic
Alliance H rvatksi D em okratski Savez] HDS, Croatian Democratic Union [H rvatska
D em okratskaZajednica] (HDZ), etc. One o f the few that did not embrace
nationalistic program was UJDI, the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative.

■ajM

Jelena Lovric, “Is Croatia Also Burning?” D anas (1 Augustl989), pp.
7-9. Translated in JPRS-EER-89-102, 2 September 1989, pp. 20-23.
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Their program did not stand a chance in the context of the highly assertive national
programs.

385

Under the coordination o f the Croatian Society for Protection and Promotion
o f Human Rights, Thirteen groups formed zdruzenu hrvatsku opoziciju—Untied
Croatian Opposition.

386

Their first public act involved request for internationally

recognized political rights and freedoms, legalization o f political parties, free
elections for Sabor (Croatian assembly), handed in to the government o f Republic o f
Croatia on December 8, 1989. On the day o f their demonstrations, December 10,
1989, the headline o f the main news program on TV Zagreb at 7:30 p.m. was that the
Central Committee on its thirty-second session “recommended holding o f general
elections in January o f next year. This initiative is with intention to speed the
processes o f political pluralism as inevitable in the processes o f democratization o f
political developments in the Republic.”

387

The opposition saw this news as a great victory, confirmed at the eleventh
party congress o f the LCC, held from December 11 to 13.

388

At the congress, the

385

The founders o f UJDI were well known intellectuals such as Branko
Horvat, Zarko Puhovski, Ivan Prpic and Nebojsa Popov. They wanted to be an allYugoslav independent organization working on the urgent and necessary democratic
reconstruction o f the Yugoslav community. Their request to register as a citizens’
association was rejected on several occasions. Branko Horvat, Interview.
386The list o f the groups is in Hudolist, Banket, p. 155.
3R7

Dnevnik TV Zagreb, 10 December 1989, 7:30 p.m., as quoted in Hudelist,
Banket, p. 167.
388However, the historical decision o f the LCC to give up its monopoly o f
power was equally, perhaps even more, influenced by internal divisions and struggles
within the members o f the LCC on how best to react to Milosevic’s attempts to
(continued...)
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LCC called for promotion o f democratic socialism, the establishment o f market
economy, and the encouragement o f multiparty pluralism. Croatia was the first
republic in Yugoslavia to embrace Westem-style parliamentary democracy in which
Communists would compete openly with other political parties. The first major step
tow ard developing a new multiparty system was to be the election in April 1990 o f
delegates to Croatia’s Republican Assembly. Andrejevich claims that three factors
explain the reformist move in Croatia. First, nationalism, namely problems with
Serbian minority in Knin, representatives of which described Croatian policies toward
Serbs as discriminatory. Underlying this problem is the relationship between Croatia
and Serbia. Croatia’s critics had labeled Milosevic’s type o f socialism as populist,
neo-Stalinist, anti-Yugoslav, or fascist. The response from Serbia was equally blunt,
accusing the Croats o f separatism and nationalism.

389

Second, the debate about the

future and the shape o f political pluralism, and third, the call of Serbian State
President Milosevic to cut all economic ties with Slovenia.

390

To this one needs to

add the serious economic crisis reflected in hyperinflation.
The LCC, under new leadership of Ivica Racan, a reformer, proved their
commitment to democracy by resisting Milosevic’s anti-pluralist and dogmatic
policies at the fourteenth extraordinary Congress o f LCY that took place in January
(...continued)
undermine Tito’s Yugoslavia and destabilize Croatia. See Hudolist, B anket,
especially chapters 7 and 8.
389

This war of words is best illustrated in Milorad Vucelic, “Advancement of
Forgeries,” N IN (27 August 1989), pp. 23-26. Translated in JPRS-EER-89-112, 12
October 1989, pp. 13-15.
390

Milan Andrejevich, “Croatia: Reform and Tension,” Radio Free Europe:
R eport on Eastern Europe, 19 January 1990, pp. 33-36.
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1990. After being outvoted on crucial reform measures, the Croatian delegation
walked out with the Slovene delegation. That move, supported by Bosnian,
Macedonian and Yugoslav Federal Army delegations, in effect, marked the end o f
Communist Party and showed the growing strength fo the republican leaderships.
The death o f the only all-Yugoslav force for many meant the end of
Yugoslavia.

391

The Serb members o f the LCC were not satisfied with the behavior o f

the Croatian communists at the congress because as they expressed it, “We do not
see any fixture for the Croatian LC outside o f the LCY.” And while the Croats
approved o f the delegation since they did not want to be “in a unitarist party together
with Milosevic,” the Serbs were beginning to leave the LCC because they did not
want to be in an “ethnic Croatian party.” The Serbs in Croatia were devoted to the
party, because in World War n it saved them from Ustasha, and in the post war
Croatia provided an integrating institution for them.

392

The elections were set for April, first round, and May 1990, second round.
The LCC changed its name into League o f Communists-Party o f Democratic Change
to accommodate its new program.

393

In February 1990, the Serbian Democratic

391

Mihajlo Mihajlov, “Can Yugoslavia Survive?” Journal o f Democracy, 2
(Spring 1991): 79-91.
392

Jajcinovic, Milan, “Tragic Possibility o f Choice,” D anas (6 February
1990), pp. 17-19. Translated in JPRS-EER-90-061, 7 May 1990, pp. 20-22. The
Serbs were disproportionately represented throughout the post World War n period
in Croatian police, o f which they comprised about 76 percent, in state bodies, about
24 percent in the republic’s administration, in the ruling LCC, and even in controlling
positions in the economy. Goldstein, Croatia, p. 180.
393

Tudjen, Branko, “A N ew Program and Name,” V jesnik (12 February
1990), p. 1. Translated in FBIS-EEU-90-037, 23 February 1990, pp. 88-89.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

213

Party was formed in Knin, the Krajina region. Its founders, Jovan Opacic and Jovan
Raskovic, said that goals o f the party were to prepare for the upcoming elections,
fight for the equal status o f Croatian Serbs in a united federal Yugoslav community
and support the formation o f Serbs’ autonomous province if the people decide so at a
referendum. Judah makes the connection between Milosevic’s “There’ll be war, by
God!” pronounced four days before the formation o f the SDS alluding to Milosevic’s
response to Croatia’s Communists purported “separatism.”

394

The communists in power devised a two round majoritarian electoral system
with single member-districts, as in France and Great Britain. As Communists
expected to win a plurality, the system was intended to maximize their representation
in the new parliament and to ensure the prolongation of their power after the first free
elections. 395 They did not consider the outside money that had begun flowing from
Croatian emigrants, mostly in the U.S. and Canada, to Tudjman’s Croatian
Democratic Union or the outside political expertise that would create his effective
nationalist electoral campaign. The populist national party HDZ— H rvatska
Demokratska Zajednica [Croatian Democratic Union] o f Franjo Tudjman won the
elections. Because o f the electoral system, with 42 percent o f the votes, they won 58
percent o f the seats in parliament, 205 out o f 356. The Communists o f SKH-SDP

394Judah, Serbs, p. 168.
395

Ivan Grdesic claims that LCC-SDP’s electoral law unintentionally gave the
first free elections to HDZ as a gift. Personal interview, Zagreb, Croatia, 15 October
1997.
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received 73 seats; the Coalition o f National Accord, 11; and Serbian Democratic
Party, 5 seats.396
Franjo Tudjman
Comparing Milosevic and Tudjman, former United States Ambassador to
Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman, describes the former as driven by power and later
as a person obsessed with Croatian nationalism.

397

As a young adult, Tudjman

fought with Tito’s Partisans in Croatia and became a member o f Communist Party o f
Croatia in 1942. His diligent work in the National Liberation War, the NOB, and
adoption o f Communist ideals, Tudjman justified by his beliefs that “freedom to
Croatian people can bring only Croat people themselves.” Tudjman considered
Pavelic’s NDH a fascist quisling entity contrary to the teachings o f Stjepan and Pavle
Radic. 398 Tudjman quickly progressed within Partisan officer corps, because o f his
ability to mobilize Croats from northwest regions (known for their anti-Yugoslav
feelings and beliefs in Radic’s program) into the NOB, believing that Communist
Party would indeed solve the national question in Yugoslavia. He often advised

396

Socijalisticka Republika Hrvatska, Republicka Izboma Komisija. Izyjestaj
ofProvedenim Izborim a za Zastupnike u Sabor Socijalisticke R epublike H rvatske
[Report on E lectio n sfo r Representatives to the Assem bly o f Socialist R epublic
Croatia], Zagreb, 16 May 1990.
397

Warren Zimmerman, O rigins o f a Catastrophe (New York: Times Books,
1996), p. 75.
398

Zeljko Kruselj, “Franjo Tudjman: Biografija [Franjo Tudjman:
Biography],” in F ranjo Tudjman, ed. Tomislav Pusek (Zagreb: Globus, 1991), p. 29.
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officers o f the NOB to approach this population by emphasizing Croatian interests
before Yugoslav.

399

After the war, Tudjman wanted to continue his education, but since the JNA
Joint Chiefs o f Staff in Belgrade needed a cadre from Northwest Croatia to fulfill its
policy o f equality o f nations in the military, Tudjman was required to remain on duty.
He would spend ten years working in the Ministry o f National Defence. His first
conflict with Serbian and Montenegrin generals, already defined as centralists by
many, came in 1953, when he argued against independence o f the Army from the
government which was proposed as part o f the Constitutional amendments. He
started his academic work in the 1950s on the topic o f military history and role o f
territorial defence in NOB, and published several books and papers. During his tenure
at the Ministry o f Defence, he also served as assistant editor o f the “Military
Encyclopedia,” for which he wrote a contributing article about the history o f the
NOB in Croatia. The generals so disliked his article that the Chief o f Staff, General
Ivan Gosnjak, decided to involve Tito. Tito did not have any comments. Those at the
Military History Institute argued that Tudjman’s numbers did not correspond to the
reality. Tudjman referred to their view o f history as politicized.400

399Ibid., pp. 32-34.
400Ibid., pp. 41—47. See also Franjo Tudjman, Bespuca P ovijesne Zbiljnosti:
Rasprava o P ovijesti i F ilozofiji Zlosilja [W ilderness o f H istorical R eality: A n E ssay
on H istory and Philosophy o f Violence] (Zagreb: Nakladni Zavod Matice Hrvatske,
1990). Here, Tudjman notices that those who wrote on Slovenia, Macedonia and
Serbia did not have any reviewers, his article beside his name as an author, included
names o f fourteen reviewers, article on Bosnia’s NOB included manes o f six
reviewers, and article on Montenegro five names, pp. 31-32.
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In 1960 Tudjman was promoted to the rank o f JN A General. In 1961 he
retired from military and established the Institutute for the History o f the Labor
Movement o f Croatia, under the auspices o f the Central Committee o f the LCC.
While at the Institute, Tudjman devoted himself to research. The major subject o f his
research was the contribution o f Croatian revolutionary movement to the NOB,
which centralist circles in the LCY tended to marginalize. During his directorship at
the Institute, Tudjman stood up to such treatment of Croatia’s contributions and
challenged authenticity o f their research. In 1964, his commentaries to the H istory o f
SKY, challenged the Party’s version o f the Cvetkovic-Macek agreement by describing
it as “a step forward compared to the earlier situation” and that the agreement
“solved the national question o f one o f the most oppressed nations-Croatia.” For this,
Bakaric and Berus openly criticized Tudjman as a Croatian nationalist. He promised
to Bakaric that his Institute would not open “forbidden” questions. He broke the
promise several months later. In his lectures Tudjman relativised the crimes o f
Ustashas over Serbs.401 Serious historians considered Tudjman a “quasi-historian
and charlatan with clear political ambitions.” Dr. Jaroslav Sidak refused to serve on
Tudjman’s dissertation committee, and Ljubo Boban accused him o f plagiarizing his
dissertation. Tudjman responded by branding those who challenged him exponents o f
Rankovic’s conspiracies 402
The biggest issue was his research about the victims o f World War n and
especially the victims of the Jasenovac concentration camp established by Ustasha,

401Hudelist, Darko, “Dr. Franjo Tudjman: Zivot i Karijera [Dr. Franjo
Tudjman: Life and Career],” G lobus, 11 December 1990, pp. 38-42.
402Ibid., pp. 44-45.
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and known as “the biggest cemetary o f Serbs in Yugoslavia.” The list o f the victims
was compiled in 1964 by the Republican Statistics Institute, as part o f the research
for the purpose o f gaining war reparations from Germany. The statistics turned out to
be several times less than the official figures proclaimed in 1945, and were never
made public. Tudjman accepted the figures o f the Republican Statistical Insitutie as
official, and wanted to use them in his attempt to revise existing accounts o f the
NDH. Bakaric and Croatian Central Committee strongly opposed Tudjman in this
effort and decided to eliminate Tudjman from the public life o f Croatia. For the
immediate cause Bakaric used the affair around D eklaracija o nazivu i polozaju
hrvatskogkrtjizevnogjezika, Declaration Concerning the Name and Position of
Croatian Standard Language. Tudjman resigned from the Institute just before he was
removed from LCC.

403

This was the beginning o f Tudjman’s life as a dissident,

which he used to write for the rights o f small nations for their national freedom and
against supra-nacional ideologies, among which he counted pan-Slavism and
Yugoslav unitarism.404
During the “Croatian spring,” Tudjman did not have significant leadership
position. He used his position as member o f editorial board o f M atica H rvatska to try
to remove the Croatian leadership. He was more radical than the leaders o f Croatian
spring, and argued for inclusion o f parts o f Bosnia to create Greater Croatia, but he
could not find much acceptance for his ideas. Miko Tripalo, one o f the mas-pok 1971
leaders later revealed that Tudjman’s vision o f Greater Croatia included division of

403Kruselj, “Franjo Tudjman,” pp. 80-82.
404Hudolist, “Dr. Franjo Tudjman,” p. 46.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

218
Bosnia and “human transfer.” Tudjman was imprisoned in 1972 for his activities in
M atica H rvatska, while real leadership was only replaced.405 Later released, he was
imprisoned in the 1980s for giving interviews to the foreign press. These prison
sencences earned him the position o f martyr who sacrificed for Croatia. In the 1970s
Tudjman started to make contacts with Croatian immigrants. Their role would be
crucial in his election campaign and will help him in winning first democratic elections
in Croatia.
The Tools: Rhetoric and Media
The speech Tudjman delivered to the First General Assembly o f HDZ, held in
Zagreb February 24—25, 1990,

406

is important to this analysis not only because he

spoke as the president o f the party, declaring its election campaign program, but also
because o f the conflictual nature o f the speech. The rhetorical situation appeared
especially delicate because, for the first time in the socialist republic o f Croatia, at
Tudjman’s invitation, the Croatian emigration returned to the republic. The
reputation o f Croatian emigration in Yugoslavia was that o f “Ustashe members,”
“butchers o f Serbs” and o f world terrorists. Although this was a useful stand for the
Communist Party, there was some truth to this, since many Ustashe members did flee
abroad. However, this obviously did not apply to the entire Croatian diaspora, which
also included supporters o f the old Peasant Party, and other political groups as well
as many who simply emigrated for monetary reason. Tudjman saw Croatian diaspora

405Ibid., pp. 50-52.
406The speech is published in G lasnikH D Z, (March 1990): 17-20. All the
citations below are from this speech, unless noted otherwise.
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as one part o f the Croatian nation that needed to be reunited with the homeland. He
had foreseen their potential importance, and counted on them in his campaign. He
admitted that the decision to invite the emigration back; and arrange for them to get
visas, was a “turning point in my life in terms o f decision making.”

40V

He opened his speech by declaring:
This meeting as historical, because it is the first meeting o f one Croatian
democratic party after full half o f a century o f one party totalitarianism, even
more because it is the first display o f spiritual unity o f homeland and Croatia’s
emigration.
Tudjman argued that formation o f HDZ was a result o f the need to respond to
the historical process o f democratic change and to defend Croatia against “greater
Serbian expansionism” and accusations about “genocidal nature o f Croatianism.” To
these attacks, HDZ responded that it “argued for the right o f every nation, including
Croatian, to permanent, inalienable, and complete right to independence to secession”
In this speech, Tudjman began the tactic o f attacking those who disagree with
him or those who “do not have any ideas about historical and geopolitical factors
which influence the destiny of certain people.” To those who purportedly “adhere to
hegemonic-unitaristic or Yugoslav greater state beliefs and see the program o f HDZ
as nothing but renewal o f Ustasha N D H ” Tudjman replied:
They forget that NDH was not just “quisling” creation and “fascist crime” but
also the expression of historical aspirations of Croatian nation for its
independent state and the realization on behalf o f the international actors, in
this case o f government o f Hitler’s Germany, which created the New
European order on the ruins o f Versailles. Consequently, NDH did not
represent just a whim o f the Axis powers, but was a consequence of
predetermined historical factors.

407Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 85.
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This strategic move o f “positive affirmation o f NDH,” Hudolist claims, was
the result o f the agreement Tudjman made with the so called “Norval circle.” In
1987, when Milosevic to o k over Serbia, a group o f Herzegovinan priests invited
Tudjman to Norval, Canada. Among the members o f the emigre group were Anto
Beljo, Vinko Grubisic and Gojko Susak. The “Norval circle “fostered the idea o f
conciliation between Ustasha and Partisans as the way to fight for an independent
Croatian state. In Tudjman they saw a man who could carry the message back home.
During the next two visits to Canada, in 1988 and 1989, they finalized the
program.408 The Norval group became the chief financial provider o f the HDZ. In a
sense, as Hudolist puts it, the Norval priests, “bought” Tudjman 409 Gojko Susak,
the leader o f the group, later became Tudjman’s Minister o f Defense.
In the speech, Tudjman revealed the expansionist nature of HDZ program and
its territorial aims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, again arguing historical determinants:
We ask for territorial integrity o f Croatian people in its historical and
geopolitical borders . . . because we realize that Bosnia and Herzegovina is
according to its Constitution, the national state o f Croatians. Our request is
expression and continuation o f the views o f Croatian politicians o f the last
century, o f “the father o f the nation” Dr. Ante Starcevic, Mihovil Pavlinovic,
Dr. Ante Trumbic and Stjepan Radic. They talked about Bosnia and
Herzegovina with respect to its geopolitical unity with Croatia and the West.
To be true to the Norval program, Tudjman included in his speech the part
about AVNOJ and ZAVNOH, and how they positively contributed to development

The chief components of the Norval program were: (1) independent and
self-reliant Croatia; (2) unity o f partizans and Ustashe in the war against Serbs; (3)
Serbs reduced to the ethnic minority, i.e., ethnicly clean Croatia; and (4) division o f
Bosnia and Herzegovina whose Croatian parts would be later attached to Croatia.
Hudolist, “Dr. Franjo Tudjman,” p. 53.
409Hudolist, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, p. 53.
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o f Croatian nation since, if the Croats had not been on the side o f the winner “they
would not avoid Chetnik, (i.e., Serbian) genocide.”
Since its formal establishment in June 1989, HDZ already had offices in
almost all o f the Croatian cities. Such wide support, Tudjman claimed, was due to the
fact that the HDZ demanded realization o f the right o f Croatian people for
“independence within its historic borders.” Tudjman stated that part o f the HDZ
program is to request “that internal relations in SFRJ be based on confederal
principles.”
For the many in the audience, especially emigres, this assembly served as an
opportunity to voice their grievances about cruel treatment o f Croats by the
diplomatic corps and Yugoslav secret service. They expressed their gratitude for
acceptance as part o f Croatian nation. Others used the opportunity to complain about
Croatia’s exploitation within Yugoslavia and the negative presentation of HDZ by the
media in Croatia, especially by Television Zagreb.410 In an interview in Vjesnik,
Tudjman claimed that HDZ had the most democratic, and the “most Croatian”
program which derived from all the positive experiences o f Croatian political past.
With 200,000 members, the paper described HDZ as the largest political organization
in Croatia.411
The response o f the Serbs to this event and Tudjman’s controversial speech
was the mass rally in Petrova Gora, Krajina, in March. The HDZ assembly was

41 °G IasnikH D Z (March 1990): 21-13; Vjesnik, 25 February 1990, p. 3.
411Jadranko Sinkovic, “Dr. Franjo Tudjman: Imamo Najhrvatskiji Program
[Dr. Franjo Tudjman: We Have the Most-Croatian Program],” Vjesnik, 25 February
1990, pp. 9-10.
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decorated with Croatian traditional symbols. However, the traditional Croatian flag
and Croatian coat o f arms were last used during the 1941—45 Ustashe dictatorship.
Such symbols contributed to the resurrection o f this frightful period in the minds of
Serbs. Even though the checkerboard pattern on the Croatian flag goes back to
medieval times, and should be politically neutral, this could not dispel the anxieties
and fears, fed by Milosevic’s propaganda, among Croatia’s Serbs.
Speakers at the rally labeled the HDZ a radical nationalist group intent on
disrupting the country. Some protesters carried portraits o f Slobodan Milosevic and
called for a ban on all parties that advocated Croatian secession. The military made
their opinion known in their weekly publication in which they condemned HDZ for
accepting into its membership “pro-fascists and chauvinists” and “for closely
coopearting with Ustasha emigre groups.” The paper called for a ban o f HDZ and
other Yugolsav parties with similar orientation.

412

The Defense Minister, General

Veljko Kadijevic, openly threatened to retaliate against any political party which
called into question Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity. There were attempts by the
military to persuade Croatian Communists to ban HDZ, but Croatian Party head Ivica
Racan responded that democratization Croatia was inaugurating was not the force
that was breaking Yugoslavia apart. It was, in his words, “Milosevic and [JNA’s]
A t <5

refusal to resist him.”

Such JNA threats only bolstered Tudjman’s popularity.

The Croatian election campaign was characterized by nationalist passions and
heated discussions. The question of Croatia’s relationship to the Yugoslav state
i 1 A

Zimmerman, O rigins, p. 75; Milan Andrejevich, “Croatia Goes to the
Polls,” R adio Free Europe: Research on E astern E urope, 4 May 1990, pp. 33—37.
413Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 89-90.
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dominated the 1990 election. All other issues—including that o f the introduction of
the market economy—took second place. Without explicitly calling for independence
and the immediate dismantling o f Yugoslavia, as some others in the campaign did,
Tudjman made it clear that, if he were elected, Croatia would function on an
independent basis within a Yugoslavia that would be reorganized into a confederation
or “alliance o f states.” The most controversial features o f the campaign were
Tudjman’s statements about the Serbian minority in Croatia “All people are equal in
Croatia, but it must be clear who is the host and who is the guest,” he criticized the
preponderance o f Serbs in administrative positions in Croatia and hints at the possible
partition o f Bosnia between Croatia and Serbia. Most helpful to Tudjman’s campaign
was the fact that he gave priority to Croatian national interests in the face o f “Serbian
neo-expansionism” and “Bolshevik totalitarianism.” The victory o f the HDZ in
Croatia in the First elections was a combination of assertive Croatian nationalism and
a kind o f “anti-communist plebiscite,” since the Communists were blamed for both
suppressing basic civil rights and leading the country to economic ruin.414
A few weeks before the elections in Croatia, convinced that HDZ, or Ustasha,
as General Kadijevic labeled them, would win, the JNA in a joint effort with
Milosevic, took away weapons from the arms depots o f the territorial defence units
from Croatian cities and distributed them to the Serbs in the Knin region 415 The

414Goldstein, Croatia, pp. 210—211. See also Lenard Cohen, Broken Bonds:
The D isintegration o f Yugoslavia (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), pp.
94-101.
41 te rrito ria l defence (TO) was part o f the concept o f Total National
Defence, which meant that apart from the military, each republic had reserve forces
(continued...)
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Krajina Serbs received additional military supplies in another action, when a train
carrying arms was looted o f its cargo in the Knin region and the JNA did not find it
necessary to conduct an investigation into the matter. The action of arming the Serbs
in Croatia was a thought out strategy between Milosevic and General Kadijevic. Both
o f them believed that the old federation was finished and that the future lay in a
smaller Yugoslavia that would unite all Serbs in one state.416
Milosevic’s plan was to allow Croatia and Slovenia to secede, but that
municipalities o f Lika, Banija and Kordun, which have created an association,
stay on our side, and let people of these regions decide through referendum
whether they want to stay or leave [Yugoslavia]. He demanded that Croatia
and Slovenia be excluded from the vote on that issue since they do not
represent the part o f Yugoslavia which makes this decision.41'
In July Dmovsek and Suvar, the respective representatives o f Slovenia and Croatia in
the Federal Presidency, asked for a plan of action (or exercise) o f the military in
1990/1991, because there were rumors that the Army planned an operation against
Croatia and Slovenia. Jovic decided that they could only look at plans in the presence

(...continued)
distributed in various cities, to call upon the event o f the war. In some cities and
villages, the TO arms were under direct control o f municipality and in others, parts o f
police headquarters. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 117—118; Judah, The Serbs,
pp. 168-173.
416Judah, The Serbs, pp. 169—172.
417Borisav Jovic, P oslednji D ani SFRL[The L a st D ays o f SFRYJ
(Kragujevac: Author, 1996), p. 161. Jovic was a chief ideologue for Milosevic.
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o f a general and not take any notes. Both Dmovsek and Suvar were insulted and
41g

dropped the request. Kadijevic, on the other hand, was happy to “destroy” them.
Croatia’s Serbs (12 percent o f the total republic population) voted either for
the reformed communists or for the small Serbian Democratic Party lead by Dr.
Jovan Raskovic, a Zadar psychiatrist. Opinion polls held during the campaign showed
that the majority o f Croatian Serbs strongly opposed plans for converting Yugoslavia
into a loose confederation, and that they rejected the very idea o f Croatia’s
independence. Among Croat voters, an important factor militating in favor o f the idea
o f a loose confederation was resentment at the Serbian political and propaganda
offensive, then in full swing, initiated by Serbia’s President, Slobodan Milosevic. That
resentment grew rapidly into an overwhelming massively pro-independence
referendum in Croatia in May 1991, which closely matched a similar Slovene
referendum held in December 1989.
On May 30, 1990, deputies in the first multiparty Croatian assembly elected
Tudjman as the republic’s President. All five members o f Serbian Democratic Party
(SDS) boycotted the session. Raskovic, the leader of the SDS, refused Tudjman’s
concilitatory offer that Raskovic or another member o f the SDS accept the title of the
419

Vice-President o f the Croatian assembly. The speech

Tudjman delivered for the

occasion represents his reflections on the historical importance o f the first free
Croatian elections in which

418Ibid. , pp. 171—174. Jovic’s diary reveals that the newly elected
governments o f Croatian and Slovenia are identified as enemies, conspiring with the
“foreign forces” against Yugoslavia.
4l9The speech is published in G lasnikH D Z, 11 June 1990, pp. 16-20. All the
quotations are from this speech, unless noted otherwise.
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Croatian people chose the party whose program most clearly emphasized
their century-long aspirations to be free and master o f its faith. . . [The nation
chose] to have unrestrained right to national independence and uncurtailed
right to self-determination, which implies the right to sovereign, independent
state, and secession from other nations and states; or to join other—according
to its vital interests.
He repeated the promise that there would be no discrimination or any
revanchism. The speech was critical o f the legacies o f old regime and introduced
some o f the changes that the new government was to work on. Among those was a
need for a new constitution and reconstitution o f Yugoslavia, and integration with
Europe. He argued: “The only way to preserve state sovereignty of Croatia—while in
union with other nations, can only be within a confederation, only as an negotiated
alliance of sovereign states, a confederation o f independent states.”
As one o f the amendments to the Constitution, the new regime accepted the
Croatian coat o f arms to be put in place o f the former communist symbols. The coat
o f arms was the historic red and white checkboard in which the top left comer is
white. For the Croats, this coat o f arms was an affirmation o f their 900-year link to
their hero-king, Tomislav and thus to their own nationhood. The new government
spent a lot o f time on post-electoral triumphalism— celebrations including the
presence of the Catholic church, parades and new symbols o f status and power all to
affirm Croatian “statehood.” During those celebrations throughout Croatia, a large
number of Partisan war memorials were demolished, and there was an emphasis on
Croatian national symbols. It did not do anything to alleviate the fears which the
combination o f regime change and the upsurge o f Croatian nationalism evoked in
those who felt excluded from the new system, particularly o f the Serbs in Croatia.
Plestina argues that HDZ’s failure to do so in the crucial first six months o f power
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left the window o f opportunity open for Raskovic, Babic and Opacic who skillfully
manipulated symbols to increase fear and widen the cleavage between Croats and
Serbs in Croatia.420
In the speech421 delivered to the HDZ assembly in June 1990, on the first
anniversary o f HDZ founding, Tudjman used the opportunity to reflect on the
problems facing the new government and offer ways in which he proposes to solve
them. The chief enemy o f the new government was a “resistance o f old structures
which, on pretence o f their professionalism, are trying to hide behind the rule o f law.”
Tudjman especially noted how Radio TV Zagreb “continued their business as if
nothing had happened.” He threatened the director o f RTZ, who refused to vacate his
position, even though he was one the leaders of the previous party in power.
Tudjman promised to him, and others who behave in similar way, to take different
steps within the rule of law. He repeated that the professionals from the old system
can continue with their work, but the leaders from the old system cannot stay. “That
is a principle, and there is nothing more to discuss about it.” H e informed the
representatives that he was working on establishment o f a Croatian news agency.
Tudjman also identitifed a new enemy, those who thought that Tudjman was a
temporary solution for Croatia, because things should be done in a different way. To
those who argued for more radical approach to solving Croatia’s problems, Tudjman
said “not to play with the destiny o f Croatian people,” because “their politics would

420Dijana Plestina, “Democracy and Nationalism in Croatia: The First Three
Years,” in Beyond Yugoslavia, eds. Sabrina Petra Ramet and Ljubisa S. Adamovic
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), p. 132.
421 The excerpts o f the speech are published in G lasnikH D Z, 28 June 1990,
pp. 9-10. All the quotations below are from this speech, unless otherwise noted.
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create enemies from allies.” This speech is also important because it offers an
illustration o f how HDZ was dealing with the problem o f the Serbian minority.
Tudjman reacted to the document printed in Cyrillic and disseminated to the
municipality with majority Croatian population, after Serb Democratic Party broke
relations with the Croatian Assembly. Tudjman stated that “in sovereign and
democratic Croatia, the official language is Croatian and Latin alphabet. Where there
is majority Serb population, cyrillic is used as well, but not solely.” He was greeted
with a long applause.
Soon after, Tudjman proved that despite his talk about democratic
government, he did not have much respect for democratic values. He took over the
media and punished those accused o f an anti-Croatian slant, i.e., those that did not
obey his vision o f Croatia’s developments. Serious violations of the rights o f Serbs
began. They were fired from work, required to take loyalty oaths, and subjected to
attacks on their homes and property. Zimmerman remembers how he sat several
times at Tudjman’s lunch table and listened to his ministers berate Serbs in the most
racist terms. Tudjman did not join in, but he didn’t stop them either.

422

The media situation in Croatia was favorable before the elections. Censorship
was almost nonexistent, many new independent radio and television stations were
beginning to flourish. What censorship existed was post-publication, and a rather
lengthy process. Frequently, when a publication was banned, it had already sold out
before the decision to ban. D anas enjoyed the reputation as the most independent
weekly in the country. Despite the promise o f democracy and freedom o f press in

4AA

Zimmerman, O rigins, p. 75.
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democratic Croatia, the HDZ showed that it was not going to honor its promise. The
means o f controlling and disciplining the media included: Replacing media personnel,
especially those in charge o f radio, television, the Hina news agency and Vjesnik, the
main national daily, by HDZ faithful. Through the privatization laws, the HDZ
steered publicly-owned media companies either into state ownership or into the hands
o f chosen businessmen. The HDZ established monopoly o f the airwaves and tolerated
paramilitary means to intimidate journalists.
Things became especially difficult when the war started in 1991. Open
propaganda in Croatia began in summer of 1991 with an action by army commander
Branimir Glavas, to “destroy Serb terrorists” in Osijek.

Tudjman wanted its

version o f the war’s origins, course, and purpose to be uncontested. In wartime,
Tudjman and his party seized the chance offered by the Serbian aggression to
discredit his critics as unpatriotic and self-serving. By assuming a monopoly o f the
Croatian national interest, the HDZ cynically used the w ar as the ultimate pretext to
bridle independent media.424
In spring 1990, during and after the first elections, several privately owned
periodicals were started in Croatia. Two of them, Slobodni Tjednik and Globus,
survived the first months and built circulations o f 100,000 and more. After three
years o f national hysteria in most o f the Serbian media, national passions were now
running high in Croatia. D anas magazine, which tried to hold to an objective and
calm perspective, experienced a decline in circulation from 180,000 at the time o f the

423Viktor Ivancic, as cited in Mark Thompson, F orging War: The M edia in
Serbia, C roatia and Bosnia and H erzegovina (London: Article 19, 1994), p. 134.
424Thompson, Forging War, pp. 132—33.
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1990 elections to 60,000 just before the war, a year later. The state controlled media,
Vjesnik, Radio and TV Zagreb adapted to the new regime almost overnight. Within
two months o f the elections, through the Croatian Ratio-Television Act, the assembly
changed Radio-Televizija Zagreb into Croatian Radio-Television, HRT, declaring it
as a public broadcasting organization, but instead o f transforming itself into public
television, it soon became the mouthpiece of the party in power.
iA^

The purge in television was finished by 1991.

HDZ’s director o f the new

Croatian agency Hina, referring to the anti-HDZ press: “Many o f these journalist are
of mixed origins, one Croat parent, one Serb. How can such people provide an
objective picture o f Croatia? . . . They hate C roatia. . . The only place you can read
about President Tudjman is Hina news.” Antun Vrdoljak, the director-general o f
HRT, described Croatian Television as a “cathedral o f Croatian spirit.”

Through

1990 and 1991, journalists came under intense pressure not to criticize or even
question the government. This pressure came from the ruling party, both openly and
behind the scenes, and also from other journalists. Malicious attacks on “disoriented,”
“unpatriotic,” and “Yugonostalgic” journalists became standard in the government
controlled media. As in Serbia, new journalists, without much experience, were
quickly promoted. In Thompson’s opinion, they became arbiters o f the conflict for
most o f the population. These reporters did not try to verify allegations or to report
the other sides view. When the w ar started a journalist “who [did] not lie for the
homeland [was] a traitor and enemy.”

425Zalepurgin, Sasa, “Moj Slucaj [My Case]” G las Istre-T V Tjedan, 18
October 1997, pp. 4—5.
426Thompson, F orging War, pp. 147-55.
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Slobodni Tjednik, notorious for being the tabloid version o f national politics
often run unverified and completely concocted stories depicting all Serbs in Croatia
as self-evident suspects for treason. In Slobodni Tjednik, and to some extent the
weekly Globus, the Milosevic-controlled Serbian press found a sparring partner on its
own level.

427

Tudjman was unable to achieve cooperation from Raskovic, leader of the
Serbian Democractic Party. Raskovic demanded that the Serbs be defined as a
constituent nation in the new Croatia along with the Croats and not be reduced to the
status o f national minority, of the Serbs from Knin. Raskovic recommended that
Tudjman not rush with the new Constitution, whereas Tudjman considered the new
Constitution as the affirmation and declaration o f the sovereign Croatian State, and
insisted that debate on Constituion begin. Amendments to the Constituon were
adopted in July. A week later, the Serbs, led by Opacic, adopted their Declaration on
Sovereignty and Autonomy of Serb nation. Since Raskovic apparently was not
militant enough, Milan Babic emerged as a self-proclaimed leader o f Croatian Serbs,
surpassing Raskovic and working tightly with Belgrade. Babic asked Belgrade to
make sure that the Croatian flag would not fly above Knin, that Croatian police
would never enter Krajina, and that Serb policemen would not wear new uniforms.
On August 17, several days after the meeting between Babic and Jovic, Babic
declared a state o f emergency in Knin and placed obstructions on all roads leading to
Knin. In the Croatian media this event was described as balvcm revolucija, the tree-

Jasmina Kuzmanovic, “Media: The Extension of Politics by Other Means.
hi B eyond Yugoslavia, eds. Sabrina Ramet and Ljubisa Adamovic (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1995), p. 93.
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trunk revolution. The blockade in Knin was accompanied by a referendum on the
question o f autonomy.
With this act, the leaders o f the Serbs o f eleven municipalities declared
themselves an autonomous region of Krajina. The radical Serbs in Serbia staged a
meeting in Stara Pazova, in support of Croatian Serbs, and offered to send volunteers
to fight with them.

428

The irregulars repeatedly cut rail and road links between

continental Croatia and the coast. Tudjman’s government declared the referendum as
illegal and contrary to the Constitutional order.

429

This event represented the first open challenge to Tudjman’s authority. He
called the extraordinary session o f the Croatian parliament in August 1990.430
Croatia, and new democratic government is facing the conspiracy to
overthrow, to destabilize, to Kosovize Croatia, to overthrow democracy in
Croatia, and in Slovenia, against democratic transition in whole o f Yugoslavia
. . . we are facing emergency situation. W hat we in Croatia experienced in the
last 8 days is not only civil disobedience, it is the announced rebellion. First
rebellion without arms, which, as you see, culminated in open armed rebellion
in something that international law calls not only violence but terrorism . . . In
these eight days Croatia was put in a great test.
In the speech, Tudjman voiced frustration over the fact that he could not find
anybody from Krajina to communicate with. He spoke with Raskovic on several
occasions, even though his party had only five members in the parliament, “because
those radical extreme Serbs, and especially in Serbia, did not consider Communist

428Jovic, P oslednji, p. 179.
429Cviic, “Croatia,” pp. 207-08; Reuf Mirko Kapetanovic, K ronologija
Zbivanja u R epublici H rvatskoj 1989-1995 [C hronology o f Events in R epublic o f
Croatia 1989-1995] (Zagreb: Informator, 1997), pp. 9-10.
430The speech is published in G lasnikH D Z, 31 August 1990, pp. 10-12. All
the subsequent quotations are from this speech unless otherwise noted.
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representatives as their representatives.” Wanting to act as true democrats, Tudjman
continued
wanting to ensure sovereignty o f Croatian people, we gave all the rights to
the Serbs and told them “Please, we offer you, who consider yourself a true
representatives o f Serbian people . . . the position o f the Vice-president o f
Sabor.” However, those talks with Raskovic did not yield results.
Tudjman argued that his government did not endorse any discrimination, but that
they wished to guarantee all citizens and national rights,

yet his proposals fell on

deaf ears. When he called Belgrade to get an explanation about what was happening
in Krajina, Jovic refused to admit any implication, even though he received the
delegation from Knin. In his diary he noted that “Serb rebellion is a consequence o f
[Tudjman’s] ascent to power.”
In his speech Tudjman identified the enemy as the leadership o f SDS (Serbian
Democratic Party) “with assistance o f greater Serbian, hegemonistic and Unitarian
mass media, messengers, agitators, etc.” He only added oil to the fire by once again
explaining why it was necessary to fire Serbs from important positions.
Wanting to establish equality o f the Croatian person, such equality so that he
can be equal in very delicate services, from police, to finances, television, this
and that, etc. We wish to ensure such equality o f the Croatian person in
Croatia, while the Serbs w ere 3, 4, 5, 6 times more represented in these most
responsible services, compared to their percentage in population. The Serbs in
Croatia must understand that that was momentary, maybe useful for an
individual, but as a whole, damaging even to that Serb and to the Serbian
population, because this did not create conditions for longer mutual
coexistence on the Croatian territory.

43 j

Tudjman’s attempt to conciliation are visible form several sources:
“Raskovic, Vice Premier,” Vjesnik (8 May 1990), p. 1. Translated in FBIS-EEU-90091, 10 May 1990, p. 66; “Tudjman Interviewed on Future o f Croatia,” Tanjug
D om estic Service. Translated in FBIS-EEU-90-096, 17 May 1990, pp. 66-67.
432Jovic, Poslednji, p. 179.
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These words, illustrate Tudjman’s insensitivity towards the Serbs at such a
critical time. It certainly helped Milosevic and the JNA gain initial credibility in the
eyes of the outside world for their claim that they were acting to protect the Serbs of
Croatia from another round of genocide like the one in World W ar II.
Many Croat politicians and analysts believe that Tudjman came to power
thanks to Milosevic. Racan, for example, observes:
Milosevic’s aggressive policy was the strongest propaganda for Tudjman.
Milosevic was sending his gangs to Croatia, where they were dancing and
singing “This is Serbia” which provoked and liberated the national pride and
the nationalist reaction o f Croats, which was effectively used by Tudjman.433
By the time o f the first Croatian elections in the spring o f 1990, the Croatian
press was saturated with reports o f the speeches and news reports o f Milosevic and
his allies. While Milosevic and Tudjman mutualy reinforced each other, the
population on both sides were subject to manipulation, and infiammatoiy media.
In the Serbian community in Croatia, the perception of an acute, palpabie, and
imminent danger hovered like a dark cloud over the home of each individual Serb in
Croatia. The lack o f police investigation or court actions in actual cases o f violence
against individual Serbs or their property was another factor making the Serbian
community feel that it was under attack and unprotected.434
These people were an easy prey for someone like Milan Babic, who used the
vulnerability o f Serbian population to impose himself as their leader. A few
chronological details about proclamation o f autonomy o f the autonomous region
433

Ivica Racan, as quoted in Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 84.

434Ejub Stitkovac, “Croatia: The First War,” in B um This H ouse: The
M aking and Unmaking o f Yugoslavia, ed. Jasminka Udovicki and James Ridgeway
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), pp. 153-54.
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Krajina testifies to that effect. The referendum on autonomy requested by Milosevic
and carried out by Babic and Opacic took place several months before the Croats
declared themselves in favor o f confederation in October 1990. Similarly, the Serbian
vote for secession in March 1991 predated by several months the Croatian
declaration o f independence, which was voted on in June 1991. This could be
interpreted as an argument that the Serb separatist movement in Croatia was not
primarily a reaction to Croatian separation from Yugoslavia, but result o f the
manipulation by skillful ethnic entrepreneurs in Jovan Raskovic, Milan Babic and
Jovan Opacic greatly assisted by Milosevic in his attempts to preserve his power.

435

However, the rhetoric o f Tudjman and the HDZ provided fertile ground for the
separatists.
Knin remained the sore point for Tudjman. He hoped until the last minute to
avoid civil war, but he could not stop the influx o f Serbian volunteers who came to
help their Serbian kin. JNA showed that they indeed found a country to defend— mini
Yugoslavia including all the Serbs, so even before the official outbreak o f the war in
Croatia, following its declaration o f independence, the JNA was fighting alongside
Serbian irregulars, under the pretense o f keeping the two sides apart. Only in 1992
did Army generals admit to cooperation with Serbian volunteer forces in Knin,
because the Serbian Minister o f Defence was confronted with a question o f what to
do with so many returnees from the war. He claimed that Serbian volunteers who
joined the JNA to fight in Knin have the same rights and duties as any soldier. This
included particularly vicious groups such as Dragcmovci, Seselj’s White Eagles,

435Plestina, “Democracy,” p. 135.
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Arkan’s group, etc. Nincic concluded that the JNA was never this permissive toward
Croatian volunteers.
Radicalism was on the rise among the Croats. There were many volunteers
who were willing to fight the enemies o f independent democratic Croatia. Some o f
the most radical Croats criticized Tudjman for his “Gandhi-type o f politics” and
“retreat in the face o f more and more aggressive Yugoslav monster.” These groups
argued that “to terror and killing, the state needs to respond adequately.” Just as
radical Serbs from Serbia wanted to “liberate” Serbs in Croatia, so the majority o f the
i
<
5
«
T

radical Croatian groups wanted to help their Croatian kin in Bosnia.
Kuzmanovic, a media analyst argues that the w ar between Serbia and Croatia
has from the start also been a w ar for interpretation: the interpretation o f what is
going on, who is defending and who is attacking, and what is the “truth.” Some
journalists have clearly violated the international code o f ethics for w ar reporters.
D uga’s Nebojsa Jevric repeatedly wrote how he took part in fighting and looting on
the Serbian side near Knin in Croatia, while researching his story. D uga ’s editorial
board praised Jevric and another reporter for having taking part in that action.
Croatian reporters would report from the battlefield without any regard for the
Serbian victims.

438

As part o f the war o f interpretation, one o f the m ost crucial media

issues was naming the enemy. The Serbian electronic media used “Ustasha forces”

436Nincic, Roksanda. “Sumrak Generala [Twilight o f Generals],” Vreme,
March 1992, pp. 18-21.
437Kruselj, Zeljko, “U Boj, U Boj [To the Battle, To the Battle], D anas, 4
December 1990, pp. 19—20.
438Kuzmanovic, “Media,” p. 94.
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and “Tudjman’s black legions.” As for the Serbian irregulars, the terms “reserve
forces” and “defenders” were the terms o f choice in the state controlled media in
Serbia. In particular situations where the JNA and Serbian irregulars were besieging a
city or area with a clear Croatian majority, paradoxes took place. “The defenders o f
Mirkovci [a Serbian village] have encircled Osijek,” Belgrade TV reported in
October 1991. Later, when Serbian irregulars attacked the Croatian city o f Zadar and
fought a battle near Maslenica Bridge, the TV reported that “defenders o f the bridge
are progressing toward the city.”

439

The Croatian media first dropped the word “Yugoslav” in talking about the
JNA. Croatian TV eventually decided on the expression “Serbian-Chetnik Army,”
sometimes adding the modifier “occupational.” Other Croatian media used
“Chetniks,” “terrorists,” “rebels”, “fighters for Greater Serbia,” and “Serbian Army.”
The war over interpretation was also a war for radio frequencies. It had started in
spring 1991, when the first illegal Serbian radio station began broadcasting in Petrova
Gora (Radio Petrova Gora). Illegal Serbian stations later appeared in Mirkovci,
Celarac, and Sveta Nedjelja, Croatia. The Croatian TV transmittion tower on Sljeme
above Zagreb was twice hit by army rockets in fall 1991.440
The following example testifies the extent to which Serb and Croat media saw
and interpreted horrible events o f the w ar in Croatia: Borovo Selo was a municipality
with a majority Serbian population, that, just like many other Krajina and Slavonia
regions used roadblocks to prevent Croatian authorities from entering. On May 1,

439Ibid.
440

Ibid., p. 95.
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1991, two Croatian policemen in a marked police car entered Borovo Selo without
permission. They were immediately arrested. The next day, the Croatian authorities
sent some twenty policemen to liberate them. Their vehicle was met by a shower o f
gunfire from Serbian irregulars, some local, some from Serbia. The Croatian
authorities then sent 150 policemen in buses as reinforcement. Seventeen people were
dead after a fierce armed confrontation.
The report o f the Hina, the Croatian news agency, was: Croatian policemen
numbering 150 had come to Borovo Selo for a meeting agreed to by both sides. They
encountered a barrage o f gunfire from the local population and terrorists from Serbia.
Twelve “guardians o f law and order” and fifteen residents were killed on the spot.
Belgrade TV broadcasted tape by the Chetnik commander Vojislav Seselj and
showed it several times. According to this version, fourteen o f Seselj’s men had led
the battle against “the Ustashe.” Seselj reported that one civilian and one hundred
Croatian policemen died.441
By 1991 and the outbreak o f the actual fighting, the rhetoric o f both Tudjman
and Milosevic, aided by mass media, had created two separate “realities,” each
convinced the “others” were coming to kill them.

^ S titk o v a c , “Croatia,” pp. 156-57.
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CHAPTER V m
CONCLUSION
Kingdon argues that in times o f political change, certain problems arise that
open windows o f opportunity for the pursuit and implementation of political agenda.
If the polity entrepreneurs do not recognize that opportunity and are not ready to
push for their proposals as solutions to the problems, the opportunity passes them
by.442 In the second half o f the 1980s, Yugoslavia was experiencing deep social,
political, and economic problems that institutions o f the weakened federal center
seemed unable to solve. Demonstration of popular discontent became a
commonplace, all demanding solutions to existing problems. Nationalism was only
one o f these manifestations o f discontent, but one that appeared easy to capitalize on
for an emerging ethnic entrepreneur.
However, in multinational and multiethnic states, what might present a
solution to the problem o f one community, might present a new set of problems for
another community, and the need for entrepreneurs in that community to offer their
solutions to the problems. The analysis of politicized ethnicity in Serbia and Croatia
shows that that was the case in Yugoslavia. The study o f the Yugoslav historical and
political context illustrates that the act of politicization o f ethnicity is only one o f the
many complex reasons which contributed to the Ethnopolitical conflict, but perhaps
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John Kingdon, Agendas, A lternatives and P ublic P olicies, 2d ed. (New
York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995), pp. 165—170.
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the most important one that explains the brutal violence toward “other” ethnic group.
Political communication through mass media and rhetoric were o f crucial importance
in spreading nationalistic panic. Both Milosevic and Tudjman endorsed and used such
political communication.
In 1987, a window o f opportunity opened in Kosovo Polje where the
bitterness and aggravation o f nationalist passion o f Serbs caused by the Albanian
challenge to Serbian suzerainty, presented itself as a problem in need o f immediate
solution. Milosevic offered to the Serbian community what they wanted to hear: that
he will protect and unite all the Serbs. Milosevic thus seized on the plight of the Serbs
in Kosovo and established himself as an undisputable leader o f the Serbs.443
His rhetoric offered understanding o f their situation, and he promised
solutions the Serbs wanted to see realized. In his rhetoric Milosevic invoiced national
myths o f the large empire and Serbia’s greatness, heroism and courage. In the context
o f meetings o f solidarity these myths were given more potency through national
symbols, some o f them Chetnik. For guidelines, Milosevic used blueprint prepared by
the Serbian intellectuals in the Serbian Academy o f Sciences and Arts, the
Memorandum. For tools, besides his inflammatory rhetoric, Milosevic used mass
media. Each major phase o f development o f the Milosevic’s regime has been
accompanied by the takeover o r destruction of some important media outlet. His rise
to power an the path to war against Croatia were eased by the takeover of the
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Dennison Rusinow, “The Avoidable Catastrophe,” in B eyond Yugoslavia:
Politics, Econom ics and Culture in a Shattered Community, eds. Sabrina Petra
Ramet and Ljubisa S. Adamovich (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press), p. 20.
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newspaper P olitika, the weekly magazine MAT and the state radio and television
network RTS.
Milosevic’s solutions included abolishment o f autonomy in Kosovo and
Vojvodina, two autonomous provinces whose autonomy, by limiting Serbia’s
sovereignty, made Serbia unequal in comparison to other federal units in Yugoslavia.
Thus, the supposed problem o f inequality o f the Serbs in Serbia was solved.
However, the Serbs were dispersed in other federal units o f Yugoslavia, so that
presented the next problem Milosevic needed to solve: “United Serbs.” To that end
Milosevic employed media content of which was to incite hatred and fear o f other
nations and ethnic groups. Milosevic demanded for Serbian minority in Croatia rights
he brutally took away from Albanians and other minorities in Serbia.
In multiethnic communities, such as Yugoslavia, what might present solution
to one nation, might appear as a problem to another. Once Milosevic’s skillful use of
crowds and tactics to intimidate his enemies began to spill over in other parts o f the
country, anti-Serbian sentiment began to form. Resentment against Croatians was
skillfully conveyed to the Serbs in Croatia.444 In Croatia, Milosevic’s attempts to
impose his power resulted in manipulation of the Serbian minority, which in turn gave
prominence to ethnic entrepreneurs such as Babic, Raskovic and Opacic, who in the
new crisis sensed the window o f opportunity for their own view of solutions to the
problems. They followed Milosevic’s example o f use o f crowds and spreading o f
hatred and fear o f Croatians.

All the steps in this action are well elaborated in Tim Judah, The Serbs:
H istory, M yth and the D estruction o f Yugoslavia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1997).
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But Milosevic also contributed to Tudjman’s rise to power in Croatia. This
nationalistic leader o f a center-right HDZ, however, made that window o f
opportunity particularly suited for him through help o f those interested in solving
Croatian national question. His blueprint for creation o f an independent Croatia was
drafted by emigres from Herzegovina, a strongly nationalist region in the south o f
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Once Tudjman came to power, his proposed solutions to
the Croatian question involved firing, demotion and other violations o f the civil rights
o f the Serbs. His intolerance o f Serbs allowed other more radical groups to take
things into their own hands and abuse an already frightened population.
Before Tudjman came to power in Croatia, in his rhetoric he appealed to
Croats in 1990 to look on him as the true champion o f Croatia in her struggle to
reject the various anti-Croat “black legends” o f recent history, especially the one
about the Croats as a “genocidal people” publicized by certain Serb churchmen and
intellectuals. Tudjman brought out and legitimized many o f Croatia’s symbols which
were until them forbidden, some of which were used by Ustasha. He also appealed to
Croatian national pride, and presented the Croatians as a unique nation, one o f the
oldest in history, which was able to preserve its distinctive cultural values to
accomplish a fully independent national state. At that moment in time, Tudjman
appeared as the only one able to resist Milosevic’s aggressive moves.
Just as Milosevic was helped by hard-line Communists who wanted him to
lead Serbia, Tudjman was helped by an electoral system Croatian Communists
designed. From a relative majority it created an absolute which resulted in arrogance
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o f the new president and his ruling party.445 In the new Constitution the powers of
the president were elevated to the point, that Tudjman’s system was referred to as
Latin American type o f authoritarianism. Tudjman also took over the media and held
them in a tight grip. Those media and journalists who did not give in to his vision o f
Croatia’s independence, he charged with treason to the Croatian cause. F or Tudjman
patriotism served as a means o f repression.
Milosevic’s and Tudjman’s legacy o f media manipulation continued in the
Bosnian war. The participants o f the conference “Making War and Peace in the
Balkans: The Role o f the Media” held at the Center for Russian and East European
Studies, University o f Michigan in October, 1995, contend that the multi-ethnic
Bosnian society was destroyed by a war inflamed and fueled by a sophisticated use of
radio and television by political entrepreneurs for political goals expressed in ethnic
terms. Tom Gjelten, National Public Radio correspondent in Bosnia, claims that the
capture o f a Bosnian television tow er in 1991 was crucial to Serbian nationalists’
strategy in the Bosnian war. Control o f Bosnian television allowed the Serbs to air
anti-Muslim propaganda in order to instill fear and suspicion among the nonMuslims.
It is obvious that neither Milosevic or Tudjman operated in a vacuum. A lot
o f their success originated from their ability to take advantage o f the Communist
system. Part o f the reason they could control the media is because they inherited from

445The new election law o f 1992 underwent some, mostly cosmetic, changes
affirming the same principle: to concentrate all the power in the hands o f one
governing party. And again the party o f Franjo Tudjman won the elections with
around 40 percent o f the votes and gaining over 60 percent o f the seats. Dunja
Melcic, “Communication and National Identity: Croatian and Serbian Patterns,”
P raxis International 13, 4 (1994), p. 359.
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its Communist predecessor a large state-controlled publishing and broadcasting
enterprises, which were based in and controlled by the respective republics. They,
however, outdid their predecessors in using the media openly for political purposes.
Another legacy o f the Communist regime, which Tudjman and Milosevic used
with great success was to focus on enemies. The old Yugoslav regime fought
“bourgeois” nationalism as the “class enemy” or as examples o f the “backward
thinking.” The nationalism found enemies in the nationalisms o f other Yugoslavs.
Other nations were projected as revanchist, separatist, aggressive, and genocidal, but
Croatian nationalism and Serbian nationalism, projected themselves as a defensive
response respectively to “unitarist-hegemonist” and “Serbophobia” on the part o f
other nations. As nation replaced class as the fundamental ideological principle,
opponents o f the regime became enemies o f the nation.
In an attempt to find a connection between Communist regime, which tried so
hard to solve national question, and the nationalism o f Tudjman’s and Milosevic type,
both Melcic and Zimmerman agree that the problem was in the fact that Yugoslav
national project as realized in the federation did not have any connection with
democracy. The nationalism o f Milosevic or Tudjman’s type did not have many other
alternatives from which people could freely choose. In Zimmerman’s words, “The
two leaders combined the worst features o f communism and nationalism.”446
To the grave problems that challenged the very survival o f the federal state,
they offered solutions that benefited only them and their narrow circle o f helpers.

446Melcic, “Communication,” and Warren Zimmerman, O rigins o f a
Catastrophe (New York: Times Books, 1996).
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Their “solutions” created even larger crisis that only fortified their positions o f
power.
This purpose o f this study was to present an analysis in which both ethnic and
political dimensions o f the potential violent inter-ethnic conflict would be analyzed
with equal attention. Part o f the reason for such effort was to demythologize the
burdened concept o f ethnicity. This was done by differentiating between ethnic and
violent inter-ethnic conflict. The other reason was hope that with knowledge about
things political, which capitalize on vulnerability o f ethnic identity, we can prevent
another similar tragedy. Yugoslavia provides us with a case o f continued ethnic
conflict, conflict that is so often present in almost every multi-ethnic and multi
national community.
Ethnic conflict can become violent. Turning ethnicity from a peaceful
phenomenon involves a deliberate political act, as was illustrated by both Milosevic in
Serbia and Tudjman in Croatia. Actions of these two ethnic entrepreneurs, their
abuse o f media, and through deliberate propaganda, o f their own ethnic groups,
offers good case studies o f how politicization of ethnicity occurs. What makes
communication variables especially useful in efforts o f conflict prevention, is their
visibility, which is the result o f new technology of broadcasting and the internet.
Surely, there will be as much knowledge about similar occurrences in other parts of
the world. Let us hope that that knowledge will be put to better use than what was
known about Yugoslavia’s slow and painful destruction through hatred and fear.
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